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Wanaporn Techagaisiyavanit
Good Governance in the Treaty-Making Process and Its Democratic Dilemma

The emergence of Thailand’s treaty reform has not only brought change to its legal
landscape, but also significant social, political and economic implications within the
governing process. While it is political and social in the sense that the mechanisms
introduced under Section 190 of the 2007 Constitution (treaty clause) are intended to secure
greater accountability and transparency in the public administration through the increased
involvements of the public and the institutional branches, the economic dimension derives
from the fact that this provision directly deals with the scope of the executive’s authority in
the conduct of international relations, trade and investment upon which domestic economy
depends. This new approach makes perfect sense, especially from the liberal democracy
perspective which believes in the restriction of government power. Nevertheless, these
implications in which the effectiveness and responsiveness of government function have
been substantially undermined come with a new dilemma and challenges which also pose
threats toward the principle of democracy and its implementation.
This dissertation hopes to provide a middle ground for Thailand’s treaty model
through the exploration of the relationship between legal and political disciplines in the
maintenance of the good governance principle and practice. In the derivation of the treaty
model, the study draws out two important arguments to secure the government
administration’s effectiveness, (i) the cultural component in which various democratic
theories concerning the mechanism of public participation are examined to maximize the
political role of the public, and (ii) the structural component in which the separation of
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powers principle is addressed in relation to creating the proper roles and functions of the
legislature and judiciary in the foreign affairs context. The comparative study of the surveyed
countries’ treaty practices, which reveals the executive’s central foreign affairs authority, the
legislative manner of control and the application of judicial limits, is also used in order to
help determine the scope of the public, legislature and judiciary involvements in the treaty
process along with these two important components.
The study opens up a new meaning of democracy in which practicality is the focus of
its adoption. The proposed treaty model will not only carry out this important principle, but
will also continue to operate as both the people’s safeguard against the encroachments of
their interests and as the machinery that promotes a quality administration. Therefore, the
research concludes that, while the current legal and institutional arrangements of the treaty
clause are found inadequate to effectively respond to socio-political and economic
challenges, the proposed treaty reform can become an important platform for a more
ambitious model of the future.
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Introduction
Public participation and the principle of separation of powers have been known as
ones of the most important democratic mechanisms that help legitimize a political process by
enabling checks from the public and among the political organs whose functions and powers
are prescribed by a constitution to ensure that their exercises of powers are in accordance
with the objectives of democracy. Constituted as part of the civil and political rights, public
participation is widely guaranteed by national constitutions and international law due to its
ability to generate a quality political environment, namely accountability, responsiveness and
transparency in the governing system. Along the line, the system of checks and balances
under the principle of separation of powers is recognized for its significant role in
maintaining the division of power and responsibilities among the institutional organs to
prevent the domination of a particular branch over governmental activity. Because of their
abilities to limit governmental authority through close public involvement and the
supervision among these organs, it can also be said that the emphasis of these governing
mechanisms’ function is particularly on the improvement of transparency and accountability
in the public administration. Thus, in this traditional sense, public participation and the
system of checks and balances are perceived as governing mechanisms that facilitate a better
exercise of the people’s sovereign power by guaranteeing a type of political condition
necessary for the maintenance of the system of self-governance.
To this end, Thailand democratic reforms through the implementation of the 2007
Constitution have strengthened these mechanisms by widely guaranteeing people’s right to
direct political participation in several areas of public affairs while improving the ability of
the legislature and judiciary in the scrutiny of the executive activity. This progressive move
1

made tremendous changes to the area of foreign affairs, particularly in the treaty-making
process. Section 190 (the treaty provision) which came to replace Section 224 of the 1997
Constitution requires direct public involvement in the making of a treaty, and has expanded
the power of the legislature in the approval of a treaty negotiation and the function of the
judiciary in deciding the constitutionality of the treaty. Section 190 is thus seen as a
revolutionary treaty model which proves the Thai democracy to be simply more than a
representative democracy. By adding a public participatory process and greater checks from
the legislature and judiciary, Section 190 is intended to empower the people with additional
tools for counter-balancing the government, and to improve the transparency and
accountability of the process in accordance with the democratic principle. The executive’s
extensive obligations, which involve a public hearing, legislative approvals (prior and after a
treaty negotiation) and the policing power of the judiciary, therefore, have a drastic impact on
the treaty-making process.
Despite its democratic ideal that aims at increasing direct involvement of the people
in governmental decision, the challenge that remains in the new phase of the Thai democracy
is to ensure that these democratic mechanisms serve their purposes comprehensively and
effectively in the sense that the improvement of transparency and accountability should not
interfere with the responsiveness and effectiveness of governmental administration which are
also vital to the management of domestic affairs and international relations. This question
will therefore be addressed through the limits of the democratic mechanisms in the treatymaking context. The reconstruction of Section 190 will require that the interest of the
government in having an effective and responsive administration be taken into account
through adjusting the scope of public participation, balancing the roles of the legislature in
2

the treaty approval and the judiciary in the enforcement of Section 190 for these mechanisms
to best fulfill their functions. With this respect, my thesis statement asserts that while direct
political participation and the system of checks and balances are essential to the
establishment of democracy, maintaining proper balance between these limits (citizens’
participatory rights and checks from other institutional organs) and the government’s interest
in having an effective administration are even more crucial to the success of the Section 190
implementation and the procurement of the people’s interests in the realm of foreign affairs,
which depend significantly upon the efficiency of government operation.
In this dissertation, Chapter I will introduce the problems of Thailand’s current treatymaking practice - the struggles we have had in order to affirm democracy and the principle of
good governance by presenting internal and external weaknesses that have become the
challenges in the maintenance of the two notions (accountability, transparency,
responsiveness and efficiency) . Chapter II will briefly explain Thailand’s political evolution,
and its current political structure to serve as background information and a clarification of the
public role and the functions of each institutional branch under the 2007 Constitution. In
Chapter III, the examination of the value of liberalism which focuses on individuals’
fundamental rights to be incorporated into the process of public participation will provide an
argument for narrowing down the treaty categories to be subject to Section 190 process
(discussed in Chapter V). The proposal of a liberalism method presented in Chapter III is a
cultural approach which argues for fostering people’s democratic political culture through the
adoption of liberalism in a participatory process. Chapter III by exploring the notion of direct
public participation through assessing its value (reflected in different democratic theories),
weaknesses and contribution to democracy will thus address the first area of concern, which
3

is the treaty scope. Then, in Chapter IV, I proceed to address the second and third areas of
concern regarding the necessity of the executive competence and judicial limits in the realm
of foreign affairs, which is a structural approach. The argument will go to support the
readjustment of the treaty process in Chapter V by allowing the executive to prior determine
its competence together with the other two branches (through the determination of whether
the treaty in question must follow through with Section 190 process), and applying the
concept of judicial deference under the circumstances where important government policy
decisions may be involved. This is another important component which touches upon the
question of political structure by suggesting how the principle of separation of powers can
play its role in the maintenance of good governance, not only through the imposition of
“checks” on the public administration, but also through preserving each institutional branch’s
independence and autonomy (power and responsibility). The arguments for a properly
designed public participation under the liberal approach (Chapter III) and the executive
competence in the area of foreign affairs (Chapter IV) will then come into play in the
reshaping of the Thai treaty-making model (a proposal to amend the treaty clause) in Chapter
V which addresses i) the treaty scope (the readjustment of important treaty categories to be
subject to public participation and legislative approval) and ii) the treaty process (the
suggestion of proper roles and manners of the legislature and judiciary’s involvements).
Although we cannot deny the crucial roles of the legislature and judiciary in the
establishment of democracy as they are the institutional instruments of ensuring
accountability and transparency of a governing process, the operation of their functions must
not exceed the necessary level required to sustain all other democratic elements (namely,
government accountability, transparency, responsiveness and effectiveness) within the
4

machinery of the public administration. The study therefore neither aims at questioning
whether we should advocate the use of public participation nor answering whether we must
fully embrace the executive’s monopoly of foreign powers, but rather examining what type
of issues should be subject to the participatory method, and what can be a proper treatymaking process that will maintain balance between the people’s interests and the
government’s responsibilities in order to secure the entire objectives of our democracy. The
last Chapter (Chapter VI) will therefore provide the justifications why the proposed treaty
model can fully serve these interests.

5

Chapter I: Good Governance in the Treaty Process and Problems in Democracy
I. Introduction
This chapter will introduce the current democratic challenges faced under the
implementation of the 2007 Constitution in the area of foreign affairs, which specifically
requires special process in the making of treaties that are important to national interest.
The chapter is intended to explain the dilemma of improving transparency and
accountability in governmental administration without paying adequate attention to other
democratic elements by showing how the reduction of the administration effectiveness as
a result of these efforts has interfered with the goals of democracy and the principle of
good governance. Section I presents two crucial political events which mark the periods
of political changes for the better and for the worse – the birth of the so-called “People
Constitution” (2007) and its aftermath. Riots and the unwelcoming gesture of the rural
poor under the operation of the 2007 Constitution is the conundrum brought by these
changes. These are problems that require us to dig deeper into its root causes rather than
simply labeling them as the conflict of colors to answer why the mechanisms of the
current Constitution could not address them. Section II will then explain one of the newly
developed mechanisms under the Current Constitution in the area of foreign affairs which
has embarked on the idea of “strong democracy” through the strenuous checks of
institutional branches and direct public participation in the treaty-making process. This
Section shows how the new treaty practice is adopted for the enhancement of democracy
and the principle of good governance. In spite of the good faith effort toward advancing
the democratic goals, Section III will present internal and external struggles concerning
the preservation of administration effectiveness and responsiveness to the domestic and
international demands that the country is facing in the maintenance of these ideologies,
which in turn have weakened some of their underlying objectives. The challenges in
6

practice are also the obstructions to the democratic and good governance principles. Thus,
Section IV will serve as a summary of the current issues of the treaty process and an
introduction to a solution that build toward a proposed treaty model that would help
maintain the balance of the democratic elements, the interests of the people, and the
smooth function of government.
II. Toward Political Changes
The summer of 2010 brought one of the longest and deadliest protests in the Thai
history. When the Red Shirts were formed in March of 2010, it was peacefully joined by
nearly 140,000 people.1 However, the political movement which lasted nearly two months
turned violent when the protesters’ demands had not been met. Numerous deaths and
casualties were the results of the government’s attempt to disperse the demonstration.
Grenades and gunfire were the primary means of communications between the two sides.
A state of emergency was declared covering at least seventeen provinces nationwide.
Back in September of 2006, another military action had previously been taken, but
for the different objective - to overthrow the government of the former Prime Minister,
Thaksin Shinawatra, who was at that time in New York City for a meeting of the United
Nations General Assembly.2 The Royal Thai Army and the national police force roamed
the streets of Bangkok. National television where the coup makers made their
announcement ceased all scheduled programs. The Army declared martial law
nationwide, ordered all soldiers to report to their barracks and banned unauthorized
troops. Within a few hours, tanks and troops had successfully taken over the Parliament
House and all other strategic points whereas 3,000 police forces were prepared to be
deployed to ensure public order.3 Despite troops and tanks, the incidence turned out to be

1

Robert Horn, Thailand PM Gains Upper Hand in Protest Crisis, TIME, May 5, 2010,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1987118,00.html
2
Coup D’Etat, BANGKOK POST, Sept. 20, 2006, at 1.
3
Id.
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the most peaceful, non-resisting military coup in the Thai history.4 There were no clashes
and gunshots. The reason behind the non-resisting gesture of the public was believed to
be “the alleged corruption and internal rifts that had reportedly plagued the Thaksin’s
administration”.5 The previous national crises were blamed for its lack of transparency
and public participation in the policy decisions, particularly in the pursuit of international
trade negotiations.
Despite the legitimacy claimed in the military intervention in 2006, it inevitably
led to the bloody protest in 2010 whose proponents (primarily from the rural north and
northeast) had benefited from the populist policies that Mr. Thaksin created during his
five years in power - such as on health care, jobs and education. Unfortunately, the
attempt of the opposite group to improve the country’s democratic condition (to fight
against the corruption) was neither welcome nor supported by the rural poor. More sadly,
the so called “People’s Constitution” of 2007, albeit equipped with several democratic
mechanisms to ensure the system of good governance, has not seemed to solve the
conundrum either. For one reason, establishing a democratic condition which requires
people to be deeply involved, especially in the area that people may have little reason to
care about, such as that of foreign policy, when they still struggle for their means is a leap
of faith. And for another reason, subjecting the executive branch to the extensive check
mechanisms in the areas which demand a speedy, responsive and effective administration
when the branch barely has room to breath requires luck. Thus, this Constitution,
although highly democratic, is still aspirational in its terms, and has posed critical
problems in practice. But before we take a further look at what went wrong with our
Constitution, we shall first appreciate the benefits it has to offer in the following section.

4

Anjira Assawanonda & Piyaporn Wongruang, Most Peaceful Military Coup in Thai History, BANGKOK
POST, Sept. 21, 2006, at 6.
5
Id.

8

III. Establishing “Strong Democracy” in Foreign Affairs
The 2006 coup d’état led to the abrogation of the 1997 constitution with a promise
to bring back a better democratic one. The plan was to “materialize” the 1997
Constitution which “went a long way toward identifying basic rights of the people”, yet
failed to achieve the objectives for the most part.6 Although the 1997 Constitution was
praised for its several areas of improvements such as adding the provisions of the rights
of locals over their natural resources, establishing additional checks and balances through
independent governmental organizations, and providing the right of the people to petition
for a bill, these initiatives have been deemed insufficient in terms of the areas they
covered.7 The writers of the new Constitution were then charged with a challenging task
in order to identify and incorporate the missing piece, “political will” of the people. The
new phase of the Thai Constitution is thus intended to equip people with stronger civil
and political rights, especially in the area of remote politics such as foreign affairs. The
initiative, for the first time, requires people’s consultation and a more extensive
legislative involvement in the making of important international commitments.
Despite the claim of a failure to carry out people’s political will in the
previous Constitution, the 2007 version yet faces another real challenge which is how to
accommodate both citizens and government’s interests, and to put the mechanisms that
guarantee people’s certain control over governmental activity into practice. The 2007
Constitution was built upon a strong democratic principle that prioritizes people’s
participatory rights in a wide range of national policy and legislations. The accountability
thus takes place vertically (from people to government) and horizontally (among the
branches). However, the downside of this heavily checked system is that it could place
major obstructions in the executive administration if not properly balanced. The
6
7

Tunya Sukpanich, What Comes Next: A New Charter, BANGKOK POST, Sept. 24, 2006, at 1.
Id.
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administration ineffectiveness can pose challenges at two different levels. Domestically, it
adversely affects a responsive characteristic of the government toward its people. And
internationally, it causes disruption in the pursuit of the country’s diplomacy and foreign
relations. These challenges faced by the government in fulfilling its constitutional
obligations under the 2007 Constitution will be further elaborated in Section III.
A. Good Governance and Democracy in the Thai Constitution
i. Defining “Good Governance”
The concept of good governance may be close to the notion of democracy in the
sense that it is a type of governing method which describes how public institutions should
conduct public affairs and manage public resources in order to guarantee certain
outcomes that benefit constituents. According to United Nations Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), good governance refers to the process
of decision-making which possesses eight major characteristics, namely “participatory,
consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable
and inclusive and following the rule of law”.8 These are the manners in which a public
institution should exercise its power in order to secure this term.
The participatory-based model of the Thai Constitution which guarantees more
extensive rights and opportunities for citizens to equally take part in the conduct of public
affairs can easily fit into this term by possessing these characteristics such as public
participation, inclusiveness and accountability. Party to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Thailand affirmed its commitment to the Covenant in
its Constitutional provisions, in particular Article 25 which guarantees citizens the right
and the opportunity to take part in the conduct of public affairs.9 This commitment of

8

See http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp
Accession on 29 Oct. 1996 with reservations to Article 1, 6, 9 and 20. International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
9
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public participation is strongly reflected in several constitutional provisions, for instance,
Chapter 3, Part 11 concerning liberties in connection with assembly and association and
Chapter 7 concerning direct political participation by the people. In addition to the right
of the people to vote, Chapter 7 also guarantees the right to petition the proposal of a bill
to the National Assembly, the right to lodge a complaint to remove the persons from
office, and the right to a referendum where the matter may affect “national” or “public
interest” or is required by law.10 And more importantly, the Constitutional duty of the
government to seek public consultation, for the first time, is extended to the conduct of
foreign affairs under Chapter 9, Section 190. Thus, these numerous mechanisms reflected
throughout the Constitution are strong evidences of the writers’ efforts to meet the
definition of “good governance” in which people are truly engaged in the governing
process, and, as a result, transparency, accountability and responsiveness in governmental
administration can be improved. In particular, the problems of transparency and
accountability are expected to be better addressed through Section 190 which involves
substantial legislative close supervision and a public hearing in the making of important
international agreements.
ii. Defining Democracy
The concept of democracy, which is to be further explored in detail in Chapter III,
is also closely connected to the principle of good governance. This section will therefore
briefly introduce this self-governing concept in order to provide a better understanding
with regard to the important characteristics of the Thai Constitution. Democracy means a
type of governing process in which the supreme power is vested in the people. The term
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV4&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec (last visited Sept. 5, 2011).
10
In contrast to the 1997 version, the provision that grants the people the right to a referendum where the
matter may affect “national” or “public interest” or is required by law has a strong democratic character to
the extent that a referendum could serve as a final word for a policy decision, and not just an advisory
opinion MANIT JUMPA, “kwamroo beungton kiewkab rathatumnoon hang ratcha anachak thai,” translated in
BASIC KNOWLEDGE OF THE 2007 CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND 261 (2008).
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thus suggests the power which is to be (whether directly or indirectly) exercised by the
people in the political process to protect personal autonomy against arbitrary decisions
made by a few.11 This notion of public participation provides a strong basis for selfgovernment by carrying out its very fundamental function, enhancing the abilities of the
people to control the direction of their communities and to defend their interests
accordingly.
For Thailand, the efforts to strengthen the people’s participatory rights in the areas
of national concerns are identifiable with Benjamin Barber’s term, “strong democracy”,
which is defined by “politics in the participatory mode”.12 The framework of the
Constitution opens up opportunities for the people to exercise their sovereign powers both
through their representatives and through their own voices. The framework also allows
broader checks from the legislature, judiciary and other constitutional independent
organizations13 in the supervision of governmental activities. For instance, Section 190
expands the legislature’s role in the approval of treaty negotiation for a wide variety of
important treaties while specifically granting the constitutional court the power to decide
the constitutionality of those treaties undertaken by the executive.14 Such provisions have
a strong democratic implication in the sense that the exercise of governmental power will
be limited and carefully watched by different organs and through political participation of
the people to ensure that the government pursues its policy in accordance with its
citizens’ interests. Thus, the public participation and strong check mechanisms have

11

Democracy is valuable because it expresses the will of the people, and supports individual autonomy
under conditions of interdependence. Amy Gutmann, The Disharmony of Deocracy, in NEMOS:
DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY 128 (John W. Chapman and Ian Shapiro, eds) (Vol. XXXV 1993).
12
BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY 151 (2nd ed. 2003). This type of democracy demands for a
high degree of the state accountability which involves substantial direct participation on the part of people.
GEORGE SORENSEN, DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION 10 (George A. Lopez et al., eds. 1993).
13
These independent organs include the Election Commission, Ombusmen, National Counter Corruption
Commission, State Audit Commission. See CONST. (2007), Ch. 11, §229-254 (Thail.).
14
For details, see Section II, B (iii).
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added more democratic elements to this representational system along the line with what
is required under the notion of good governance.
iii. Good Governance in Relations to Democracy
Good governance and democracy therefore share a common political
characteristic which can be described as a process by which power is exercised. Both
concepts are about a quality of a governing procedure, one which is “good” and another
which is “by the people”.15 Nevertheless, one may argue that governance by the people
(democracy) is not necessarily “good governance” when it results in the alienation of the
minority’s interest. This issue is something that the principle of good governance
warrants within the element of equity and inclusion.16 However, rather than seeing both
terms as conflicting, I would call good governance a subset of democracy as a concept
that operates under the umbrella of self-governance. Whereas the term “good
governance” is narrowly defined to signify a few prime elements, democracy confers a
wider meaning of what it is to be “self-government”.17 The debates among different
schools of thoughts are the evidence of a wide variety of qualities that each one regards to
when defining the meaning of “democracy”. However, this section is only meant to show
an overlapping concept between good governance and democracy which are believed to
be enhanced under the new model of the Thai Constitution.

The term “good governance” is not only limited to the meaning of the process of decision making, but
also refers to the quality which is to be distinguished from “bad governance”. These qualities are
participation, the rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus-oriented, equity and inclusiveness,
effectiveness and efficiency, and accountability. Asiwaju Bola Tinubu, Good Governance, Democracy and
Sustainable Development Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Dec. 15, 2008, P. 10
16
Another distinctive aspect that departs the concept of good governance from democracy is basing a
decision on consensus. Many models of democracy such as liberalism and agonism may reject this rationale
by seeing it as suppression of differences and subordination of rights which could eventually lead to violent
conflict. Carol C. Gould, Diversity and Democracy: Representing Differences, in DEMOCRACY AND
DIFFERENCES 172-174 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996). Bonnie Honig, Difference, Dilemma, and the Politics of
Home, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCES 261(Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996) (“[when] both oughts are
compelling, and the situation that stages their conflict is inescapable. In such cases, I think if constructively
at all, in terms of acting for the best and this is a frame of mind that acknowledges the presence of both the
two oughts”).
17
These interpretations reflect in the different models of democracy such as classicalism, developmental
republicanism, liberalism, elitism, pluralism, agonism.
15
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Several elements of good governance can be identified within the concept of
democracy. Among other things, good governance emphasizes participation in the
governing process (whether private or public) by stakeholders. By the same token, the
system of self-government (democracy) which refers to a mode of decision-making over
which the people exercise their control also suggests the significance of the people’s
involvement in such a process to assure their ownership in a sovereign power. Political
participation within the meaning of democracy may range from electoral process to direct
public participation in important policy decision. In a slightly different aspect from good
governance, democracy is also an end objective. Democratic means established under
various models of democracy are themselves the goal of a governing system that the
principle of good governance defined, namely accountability, transparency,
responsiveness and effectiveness. Therefore, the questions of what is the purpose of good
governance and how we come about it are where democracy comes into the equation. 18
The means that the principle of good governance warrants also serves as an objective of
democracy. And, these qualities must be secure for a system to be democratic and good
governing. For the purpose of this dissertation, these characteristics will be our focus in
the development of a treaty-making model in Chapter V. How far the Thai Constitution
has carried these concepts into practice, especially in the area of foreign affairs will be
examined in the following section.
B. A Move Forward: Democracy and Good governance in Foreign Affairs
i. Thailand’s Treaty-Making in the Historical Context
Thailand’s treaty-making experiences dated back to the Sukhothai period (AD.
1257-1350) in which Siam (the previous name of Thailand) maintained foreign relations
with China, followed by Ayudhya (AD. 1350-1767) and Ratanakosin periods (AD. 1767-

18

Tinubu, supra note 15, at 11.
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present).19 However, it was the Ratanakosin period that expanded and modernized the
treaty practice of Thailand with western powers such as Great Britain and the United
States.20 The vast majority of treaties concluded were commercial in nature. The Treaty
of Amity and Commerce with the United Kingdom in 1826 became Thailand’s first
recognition of Western power in the region. In 1833, the United States began diplomatic
exchanges with Siam, as Thailand was called until 1938. However, it was during the later
reigns of Rama IV (or King Mongkut, 1851-68), and his son Rama V (King
Chulalongkorn (1868-1910), that Thailand established firm rapprochement with Western
powers. The Thais believe that the diplomatic skills of these monarchs, combined with
the modernizing reforms of the Thai Government, made Siam the only country in South
and Southeast Asia to avoid European colonization.21
The turning of the twentieth century marked a major change of the Thai’s treatymaking history. By joining the peace treaty of 1919 and undertaking internal legal
reforms, Thailand gained better recognition as becoming a modernized nation, which led
to the abolition of unequal treaties with several western nations.22
ii. The Tradition: Executive as the Authoritative Treaty-Maker
The first Constitution of Thailand (June 24, 1932) formalized the practice of a
treaty-making.23 Whereas the treaty-making process has been changed back and forth in
later Constitutions, the tradition that remains unaltered is the plenary foreign affairs
power of the executive with accountability toward the legislature whenever certain
categories of treaties were to initiate. The common categories that are subject to
19

Sompong Sucharitkul, National Treaty Law and Practice: Thailand, in 27 NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND
PRACTICE : FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED KINGDOM 173, 174 (Leigh
Monroe et al., eds.1995).
20
These are Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the United States in 1833, Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation with Great Britain in 1855, France, Denmark and the German Republic in 1858,
and Portugal and the Netherlands in 1859 and 1860 respectively. Id. at 174-175.
21
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2814.htm.
22
This recognition is especially significant to the abolition of extraterritorial regimes that had previously
been imposed upon Siam through the refusal of the application of Siam’s law upon foreigners. Id. at 177.
23
Id.
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parliamentary approval are peace treaties, treaties which provide for a change in the
territories of Thailand or affecting its sovereign rights, and treaties which require
legislative enactments for implementation.24 These types of treaties require the Executive
to seek guidance and consultations from the National Assembly (the Parliament) which is
composed of the Senate and the House of Representatives. This political structure will be
elaborated in Chapter II.
The requirement of active participation of the public in the treaty-making process
was never present in the Thai constitutional history. Public involvement rather took place
in a form of treaties publication, also known as Government Gazette, which is tantamount
to promulgating the treaty as the law of the land. Nevertheless, a collection of treaties
compiled and published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was generally “for official
use” with “limited circulation”.25 The role of the public in the matter of foreign affairs
was thus restricted. Treaty negotiations were undertaken without public
acknowledgements and inputs. And thus, the executive’s conduct in the foreign affairs
was primarily subject to legislative supervision, and not directly accountable to the
people.
iii. Against the Conventional Practice
It was the conclusion of several Free Trade Agreements (FTA) and other treaties
undertaken by Thaksin’s Administration that triggered the claims of the opposition party
and others as non-transparent for aiming at favoring his affiliated business enterprises.
Such claims brought major changes to the treaty-making process.

24

See, e.g., CONST. (1932), Ch. 4, § 54 (Thail.) (repealed 1946), CONST. (1946) , Ch. 4, § 75, § 76 (Thail.)
(repealed 1947), CONST. (1949), Ch. 7, § 153, § 154 (Thail.) (repealed 1951), CONST. (1991), Ch 7, § 156, §
177, § 178, (Thail.) (repealed 1997).
25
Sucharitkul, National Treaty Law and Practice: Thailand, in 27 NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE:
FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED KINGDOM, supra note 19, at 191.
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Section 190 may be seen as a revolution of a treaty-making process that makes
foreign affairs no longer simply the matter of a state.26 Traditionally, the power to
negotiate and conclude international treaties is vested in the executive branch under the
prerogative of the King.27 The Cabinet is deemed the vital decision-making body since its
decisions can become the source of authority for government actions. A proposal of any
treaty negotiation must be subject to the ratification of the Cabinet before it can proceed.
The Cabinet is thus traditionally an independent authority that undertakes the initiation of
the vast majority of treaty negotiations, whereas the role of the Parliament had always
been “supplementary or complementary” as ones being called upon to approving treaties
in limited cases as reflected in Section 224 of the 1997 Constitution.28

A treaty which provides for a change in the Thai territories
or the jurisdiction of the State or requires the enactment of
an Act for its implementation must be approved by the
National Assembly.29

However, this authoritative tradition is being replaced by the increasing
parliamentary, judicial and public roles in the treaty-making process under the
Constitution of 2007. Not only does Section 190 require specific procedures which
subject treaty-makings to public scrutiny and legislative approval, the provision also
broadens the categories of treaties that must undergo such a process which is subject to
the supervision of the Constitutional Court, the sole interpretative authority. These
categories are as follows:
A treaty which:

26

In the old days, a treaty-making is a matter reserved for the privileges. Very few selected officers were
afforded opportunity to attend international treaty negotiations. Id. at 193.
27
Although the King is absent from any formal political role, he is often used as the legal representation of
the executive government. This is due to its unique tradition dated back hundreds of years that regards the
King as a divine figure and a guardian of his people.
28
Jaturon Therawat, Roles of the Parliament in Treaty Making Process under the Thai Constitution 2 (Nov.
21, 2008) (Working Paper, on file with the King Prajadhipok’s Institute), available at
http://www.kpi.ac.th/kpith/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=264&Itemid=9.
29
CONST. (1997), Ch. 7, § 224, (Thail.) (repealed 2006).
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(1) Provides for change in the Thai territories or
extraterritorial areas over which Thailand has sovereign
rights or jurisdiction in accordance therewith or in
accordance with international law
(2) Requires the enactment of an Act for the implementation thereof
(3) Has extensive impacts on national economic or social security, or
(4) Generates material commitments in trade, investment or
budget of the country must be approved by National
Assembly.30

The specific procedure is described in the following paragraph:
Prior to undertaking a treaty negotiation of any treaty
specified under paragraph two,
(1) The Council of Ministers shall provide information and
cause to be conducted public hearings, and shall give the
National Assembly explanations on such treaty.
(2) For this purpose, the Council of Ministers shall submit to
the National Assembly a framework for negotiations for
approval.
(3) When the treaty under paragraph two has been signed, the
Council of Minister shall, prior to the declaration of
intention to be bound thereby, make details thereof
publicly accessible…
In the case where there arises a problematic issue under
paragraph two, the power to make the determination
thereon shall be vested in the Constitutional Court…31

Aside from broadening the first treaty category to include “extraterritorial areas
over which Thailand has sovereign rights or jurisdiction”, the 2007 Constitution, which
came to replace the 1997 version, has encompassed two additional types of treaties
(having economic and social impacts, or generating material commitments in trade,
investment or budget of the country) that must be subject to its procedure.32 These efforts
are in accordance with the preamble of the Constitution that clearly stated the
commitment in adhering to “the protection of rights and liberties” and “of public role and
participation” of the people in the government. Thus, to ensure the accountability,
responsiveness and openness of government’s foreign affairs administration, the types of
30

CONST. (2007), Ch. 9, §190, (Thail.) (amended 2011).
Id.
32
Expanding the language from “the change in the jurisdiction of the state” to “the change in the
extraterritorial areas over which Thailand has sovereign right or jurisdiction” may give rise to the
Governmental constitutional mandate in the eventual future claim of territories that Thailand may have
sovereign right to exercise upon. Therawat, supra note 28, at 9.
31
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treaties that are subject to the public and legislative scrutiny have been expanded as well
as the meaning of “treaty” which is intended to include any kind of international
commitments.33
Against this backdrop, given this broad language, nearly all treaties run the
potential risk of being inadvertently interpreted by the Constitutional Court to be subject
to Section 190 process. The addition of the third and fourth criteria basically serve as
“catch all” categories that do not address the extent of “extensive impacts” and “material
commitments” whereas the legislative intent is of little help since it only indicated the
purpose of setting the principle of a treaty-making process.34 Although the recent
amendment of Section 190 aims at addressing this issue by requiring legislation to
determine the types of treaties to be subject to the special treaty process,35 the solution is
deemed temporary, and can fall short of any anticipation on the emergence of the new
kinds of treaties. Section 190 has therefore shrunken the executive’s primary role in the
treaty conduct through expanding the meaning of important treaties. The making of
treaties, which had traditionally been shielded from the public eye, is now the public
subject with close supervision of the legislative and judicial bodies. The executive branch
is now deemed more accountable than ever. What could go wrong with this highly
democratic mechanism might have been beyond the anticipation of the writers as
problems became materialized under the implementation of the 2007 Constitution.

33

CONSTITUTION DRAFTING ASSEMBLY, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE THAI CONSTITUTION (2007),
available at http://www.nesac.go.th/library/Main_highlight/pdf/cons_book2550.pdf.
34
“The terms economic security and social security are also too vast and subjective, hence, a potential cause
of controversy and an open door to abusive interpretation that restrain the Government’s freedom of actions
and to a large extent compromise its stability by the constant risks of being accused of the
unconstitutionality of its actions”. Therawat, supra note 28, at 7.
35
“There shall be the law on the determination of the treaty types, negotiation framework, procedures and
methods for the conclusion of treaties having extensive impacts on national economic or social security or
generating material commitments in trade or investment…” CONST. (2007), Ch. 9, §190, ¶ 5 (Thail.)
(amended 2011) (emphasis added).
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IV. Problems in the Democratic Treaty-Making Process
Thailand has taken a progressive step to enhance the legitimacy of the
international treaty-making process. As introduced in Section II(A), the notion of “strong
democracy” and good governance have been incorporated into the Thai Constitution of
2007 by ensuring the direct involvement of the public and close supervision of other
branches in the treaty-making process.36 Under these principles, the executive treaty
power is directly held accountable to the people. Nevertheless, the implementation of the
specific treaty-making procedures under the current Constitutional mandate has posed
challenges to the government administration as well as the balance of powers among the
institutional branches. The following section will put these issues into perspective by
examining (i) internal weaknesses which concern the obstruction of effective and
responsive governmental administration to domestic needs, (ii) external weaknesses
relating to the country’s economy and credentials in the international realm as a result of
the new constitutional requirement, and the role of the courts which have aggressively
policed this constitutional commitment. Both internal and external weaknesses can
eventually lead to the undermining of certain elements of democracy and good
governance that we originally intended to secure.
A. Challenges in Practice: Obstruction to Internal and External Affairs
i. Internal Weaknesses: Ineffective and Unresponsive Administration
The primary objectives of having both horizontal (parliamentary approvals) and
vertical checks (direct public participation) are to generate a responsive, transparent and
accountable government in the sense that treaties are to be undertaken in accordance with
the will of the people and the interests of the country, and not in any particular

36

Benjamin Barber described the concept of strong democracy as a modern form of participatory
democracy which rests on the idea of a self-governing community of citizens who are united to express the
common goals and in the interest of the community. It is this method that gives rise to the legitimacy of
politics. BARBER, supra note 12, at 117.
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individuals’ favor. However, the newly designed constitutional requirements for the
treaty-making process have frustrated certain democratic goals that the process also
intends to secure. Far from improving the quality of responsiveness, these mechanisms
can result in the reduction of the administration effectiveness in taking care of the issue at
hand or other pressing matters, and in pursuing other valuable treaties that are
unquestionable beneficial to the country’s economy and foreign relations.
The new treaty-making process that allows an open-ended list of treaties to be
subject to its substantial procedure can divert government’s attention, time, energy and
resources away from other critical issues. Although the effort to tackle the vagueness of
Section 190 treaties has been made through the requirement of enacting the law that
restricts these important categories, the approach does not necessarily provide a safe
haven for any new international commitments (which tend to evolve with changing
conditions and the demands of the international environment)37 as long as the
Constitutional Court acts as the primary guardian of the treaty determination. Thus,
international agreements that bear different titles, but share the nature of the treaties listed
in the legislation would still be subject to interpretation. And whether the executive will
also retain this interpretive discretion is questionable. These Section 190 treaties are out
of the question subject to the detailed treaty-making process which can be divided into
two primary stages, prior to entering into negotiations and prior to being bound by the
treaties. Both phases require public involvement and parliamentary approvals. With this
respect, according to the constitutional requirements, it is not sufficient to make the
framework of a treaty available to the public. The government must provide information
and conduct public hearings to respond to and to receive public comments. This
requirement certainly demands more than merely a passive role of citizens in receiving

37

Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L.REV. 941, 977 (2004).
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information. Pursuant to this understanding, first of all, the government has a positive
duty to arrange and facilitate public forums to meet the constitutional obligations.
Secondly, the mandate for the parliament approvals of the treaty frameworks make
legislature responsible for keeping an eye on a wide variety of treaties (which will not
necessary be restricted by the legislation), which could either result in their paying too
much attention while piling up other issues or passing through the contents swiftly and
allowing those treaty frameworks to go unattended.38
The reduction of the effectiveness of the Thai government administration is
posing two phases of challenges; the current situation in which the government’s
resources, time and energy have been heavily invested into the constitutional
requirements of the treaty-making process in order to avoid any sort of political backlash,
and the future challenge in which the government will become further unresponsive by
being tempted to fast-forward their obligations only to satisfy the rules while ignoring the
true meaning of the procedure. A wide range of treaties could be potential candidates that
mandate the government to provide resources for the public hearings.39 There is then a
question of the effectiveness of the public participation mechanism. The quality of this
democratic mechanism will be affected as a result of the government’s unmanageable
workloads. While government resources will be drained down into the demanding treaty
38

By way of comparison in the U.S., despite the conviction in the predominant role of Congress in the
treaty-making process, most senators agree that every international agreements should not be required to
submit for advice and consent since it would be literally impossible to give all of them thoughtful
consideration. And because of the large number, many would be of a routine nature which would result in
Senate’s lack of attention. John C. Stennis & J. William Fulbright, Senators, Lecture at American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: The Role of Congress in Foreign Policy (July, 1971), in
THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY, 1971, at 5. See also LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM,
DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 58 (1990) (casting doubts on the serious scrutiny by the Senate of the
executive agreements that were required to report to Congress under the Case Act). The failure of the
legislative supremacy model in the early days brought a change of perception of executive power in
America. The overriding problem was known for Congress’ inability to get anything done. MICHAEL
RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 118 (2007).
39
Report from the Standing Committee on the Problem of the Enforcement of the Constitution of the
Kingdom of Thailand BE 2550 (Mar. 24, 2009), in PROBLEMS AND DIFFICULTIES IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF
SECTION 190 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND BE 2550, at 4-8 (2009) (reporting
comments and concerns expressed by government officers from the Ministries of Commerce, Foreign
Affairs and Defense).
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process due to the possible open-ended interpretations of the important treaties, public
comments and concerns from the hearing which are formed as part of the people’s wills
and intellects will run the risk of failing to take part in the final decision. Within this
treaty-making framework, there is no guarantee that public hearing will play much role in
shaping the treaty content. The deficiency of the existing public participation
mechanisms that encompass broad public issues (such as those affecting national budgets,
having substantial social, economic impacts or national security) is that these issues do
not provide the government enough reason and purpose to be responsive to the public
views due to the fact that there are no urgent individual needs to attend to. Thus, the
democratic dilemma here does not only include the government’s focus on satisfying its
constitutional obligation in one area which causes unresponsiveness or results in delayed
responses to other pressing issues, but also its insensitivity to the public comments in that
particular area itself.40
ii. External Weakness: The Impact on the Economy and Foreign Relations
Section 190 has been subject to criticism for its substantial burdens that must be
borne by the government which has not only caused major disruption in its
administration, but also in the pursuit of the country’s foreign diplomacy.41 The increased

Another drawback presented by “direct democracy” is the inducement of the citizens’ excessive role in
directing how to manage political and economic affairs, which sometimes render the administration
impossible to handle the demands and expenses. The situation oftentimes inadvertently results in the
staleness (indifference) of the administration due to the State’s budget issue. Direct Democracy, The
Tyranny of the Majority, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 17, 2009, available at
http://www.economist.com/world/united-states/displaystory.cfm?story_id=15127600.
41
The Constitution grants the executive branch the power to conclude treaties under the prerogative of the
King. The additional treaty-making procedures which require public hearings and a presentment of a treaty
framework to the parliament prior to a negotiation may cause major disruption in the government
administration. Particularly, given a rapid change in the matter of international relations, several treaties are
cooperative and friendly in nature. It tends to rather benefit than hurt the nation. The government should be
entrusted with full discretion when concluding such treaty is in accordance with the power originally
granted by the Constitution. Rujikej Chumkasorakit, Praden wikrao rang rathatumnoon hang ratcha
anachak thai: bot bunyad kiewkub sonthisanya nai rathatumnoon [Analysis on a referendum: Treaty Clause
in the Constitution], 24 (Working Paper, 2007). See also, supra note 39, at 4. (“Section 190 has presented
the biggest challenge to the function of the department of negotiation due to the nature of the international
transactions within the treaty-making process which requires expediency, secrecy and efficiency of the
negotiating authority. The delay caused by the complexity of the current treaty process is also seen as a
40
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uncertainty of whether a treaty in question is subject to the constitutional process has
substantially stalled the administration in the conduct of foreign affairs. Given its broad
scope of international agreements and the vague time frame of public participation,
Section 190 has slowed down the administrative process of various government agencies
as they hesitated to pursue international negotiations without several prior consultations
for fearing of the violation of the constitutional process had the agreement been cast into
Section 190.42 In fact, not only did these efforts to consult upset the country’s partners to
the agreements due to the delay, they also turned out to provide no greater comfort than
the government acting on its own when the office of the Juridical Council, which had
previously acted as a primary legal counsel of the executive branch by giving advice
regarding whether a particular agreement is subject to Section 190 treaty-making process,
later declined its role.43 The deference of its opinion was due to the role of the
Constitutional Court as the sole authoritative interpreter under the 2007 Constitution.44
Thus, despite the amendment of Section 190, paragraph 5 concerning the law on the
treaty category determination, there is little doubt that the legislation will solve the main
issue which is the control of the Constitutional Court’s interpretation.
This reaction clearly also has a detrimental effect on several beneficial agreements
such as Bilateral Air Service Agreements, Bilateral Investment Treaties or the Convention
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation which are primarily deemed to promote the
national economy, and do not normally have negative consequences.45 The process of

contradiction to the condition of the World Trade Organization membership which requires that the party
country make good faith efforts in facilitating free trade…”).
42
JUMPA, supra note 10, at 295.
43
Id (providing examples of the occasions that the Office of Juridical Council has declined its role in giving
its opinion concerning treaties that may be subject to Section 190 procedure).
44
Id.
45
Bilateral Air Service is an agreement which two nations sign to allow civil aviation between their
territories. The agreement normally commits the parties to open their routes, ports and deregulate the size of
an airline which tend to benefit the tourism and airlines industries of the countries. Bilateral Investment
Treaty (BIT) is a treaty that obligates the parties to guarantee certain rights of foreign investors in a host
country. This treaty is deemed to draw and create incentives for foreign capitals and investment. The
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these treaties, as well as others that are cooperative in nature, has been inevitably delayed.
The country thus faces losing economic opportunities that are contingent upon the entry
into force of those treaties. At the same time, many international agreements whose terms
are subject to automatic renewal at the end of their enforceable period are made
impossible under this new constitutional requirement. This does not only have certain
negative economic consequences, but also the impact on the country’s international
relations and its credibility. The example is reflected in the constitutional challenge of
Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement (JTEPA) that had set Japan off after
their nearly three years of negotiations.46 Whereas the constitutional safeguard in the area
of the treaty-making is meant to preserve the common goods, the national interests are
also at stake on the other end.
The roles of the courts in vigorously enforcing the constitutional provision are
proven to present major obstructions in government administration, and a threat to the
country’s established international relations. The erosion of the executive zone took place
through their expansive interpretation of treaties that require public hearing and
parliamentary approvals (demonstrated in the case of Joint Communiqué between
Thailand and Cambodia dated June 18, 2008) as well as approving the public hearing
standard (the Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement-JTEPA).47 The Japan-

Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation relieves an entity or an individual from paying two
separate taxes on the same property for the same purposes during the same period of time which again
provides economic incentives for foreign investments. See also, Charter Change Goes Before Parliament,
BANGKOK POST, Nov. 22, 2010, http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/207499/charter-change-goesbefore-parliament (“A foreign affairs official who is an expert on legal affairs supported the amendment of
Section 190 as a means to move forward stalled negotiations”).
46
Academics and Activists to Turn to Constitutional Court on the Unconstitutional JTEPA. PRACHATHAI
NEWS, Feb. 24, 2010, http://www.prachatai.com/english/node/300.
47
Bangkok Pundit, Yellow Shirt Turns on Abhisit, ASIAN CORRESPONDENT, Nov.24, 2010,
http://asiancorrespondent.com/42930/yellow-shirts-turn-on-abhisit/ (“finally, someone willing to
admit [that] the source of the problem is the court decision in 2008 which applied such a broad
interpretation to Section 190”). Cf., Another criticism of the Ultra Vires of the Constitutional Court also
came from the case concerning the accession of Thailand to the Bio-Diversity Convention under Section
224 of the Constitution B.E. 2540 in which the Court had decided unconstitutional for lacking
parliamentary approvals. The interpretation of the Constitutional Court was felt erroneous by inadvertently
expanding the parliamentary role in the treaty making process. Therawat, supra note 28, at 3.
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Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement (JTEPA) is the case example that involves the
demand on an Administrative Court to determine government’s standard of conduct in the
treaty-making process, specifically the holding of a public hearing. Although the
Administrative Court declined its jurisdiction, it had done so due to its lack of power on
the constitutional matter, and not on the ground that it cannot impose a public hearing
standard in the treaty-making process. 48 JTEPA, nevertheless, became the first case that
sounded the alarm of our foreign relations. The constitutional challenge of the ThaiJapanese trade agreement created tension and resentment among the Japanese negotiators
and investors as they felt deceived and dishonored.49 The outcome of the court’s decision
to withhold Joint Communiqué between Thailand and Cambodia also resulted in the
severance of Thailand-Cambodia diplomatic relations.50
The types of treaties in which public participation and legislative involvement
must at least be warranted are thus dependent upon the judiciary interpretation of Section

48

In this case, the plaintiffs representing people from various sectors alleged that their lives had been or
would be adversely affected from the conclusion of JTEPA which had not completed the public hearing
process. Despite the defendant (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)’s contention that it had assigned the
Chulalongkorn University research centre to conduct public hearings 3 days following the cabinet
decisions, the plaintiffs claimed that people were not given sufficient opportunities to participate because
the hearing was not widely announced and took place for a short period of time. Such conduct shows bad
faith of the government when it tries to exclude people from meaningful participation and discussions
which, in effect, prevent people from effectively checking the government’s exercise of power. This
constitutes “an unlawful act by an administrative agency or State official” within the meaning of Article 9
of the Act on Establishment of Administrative Court and Administrative Court Procedure B.E. 2542 (1999)
which gives rise to the Administrative Court jurisdiction. The Administrative Court of First Instance
rejected the claims and its decision was affirmed by the Supreme Administrative Court on the ground that
the conduct of foreign affairs is conferred by the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, not by any
legislation. Whereas Article 9(1) only grants the Administrative Court its jurisdiction over disputes in
which government officials act “in a manner inconsistent with the law or the form, process or procedure”,
the government’s failure to act in accordance with the constitutional requirements is out of the question falls
outside the Administrative Court’s discretion. Affirming that it had no jurisdiction according to Article 9,
the Administrative Court did not get to determine whether the public hearing claimed by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs to be meaningfully held meets the “standard” of public participation. Saan Pokklong [The
Administrative Court], Mar. 30, 2007, Ruling No. 178/2550 (Thail.), available at
http://www.admincourt.go.th/50/s50-0178-o01.pdf.
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190. Section 190 of the Thai Constitution has identified categories of the shared “vital
interests” (which should be seen as the interest of the country) in the form of different
types of international agreements, namely those affecting the Thai territories, its
sovereign rights, the laws, national economic or social securities, or generate material
commitments in trade and investments of the country. To this effect, it is up to the
Constitutional Court to decide what constitutes a treaty, and which one that must undergo
the Section 190 treaty-making process. The provision did create a big loophole providing
no clear answer to such a question, and “to interpret whether a treaty will have negative
effects on the economy and society is subject to each interpreter”.51 Thus, the process will
depend on whether the court will apply an expansive or limited interpretation. The
requirement of the legislation enactment to determine Section 190 treaty types may
provide a certain restriction on the Court’s interpretation. But the approach will only
serve as a temporary remedy as the new meanings of international terms and
commitments are meant to expand with an ever changing international environment, and
the demands of the international community.
Under the implementation of former Section 190, the case of the Joint
Communiqué between Thailand and Cambodia dated June 18, 2008 (concerning the Thai
government’s acknowledgment of Cambodia’s enlistment of the Temple of Preah Vihear
as a World Heritage site) had been interpreted by the Constitutional Court as a treaty that
affects Thailand’s “sovereign rights”, “territories” and has “extensive impacts on national
economic or social security”.52 According to the Constitutional Court’s rationale, the
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Supra note 47.
Located near the border of Thailand and Cambodia, the Temple of Preah Vihear has long been the subject
of dispute concerning its ownership. This is due to complicated history in which the French colonial map
mismatched that of the Thai, showing the line deviating from the watershed in the Preah Vihear area while
placing the entire temple on the Cambodian side. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in favour of
Cambodia, holding that Cambodia has sovereign right over the Temple of Preah Vihear. Thailand has then
made a reservation objecting such decision, but had never made an appeal. In addition, the ICJ’s failure to
specify territory borderlines over which Cambodia has sovereign right left the dispute unresolved. Temple
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content of the Joint Communiqué was a formal recognition by the Thai government of
Cambodia’s full sovereign right over the Temple and its surrounding area, which could
affect the Thai entitlement to the claim over the Temple territory which has not yet been
settled, and to its persistent objection to the International Court of Justice’s ruling in
1962, in the future.53 The possible loss of the country’s sovereignty over a territory is
sufficient to trigger the Section 190 procedural mandate. Such interpretation is of course
no longer restricted to “[a] treaty which provides for a change in the Thai territory”, but
to include those that may create the “possible loss of sovereignty on a parcel of land”.54
Although this change is meant to clarify the old term, “in jurisdiction”, it is yet a subject
of a battle between the executive who prefers a narrow interpretation and the judiciary
who is more willing to apply a broad interpretation to encompass the areas over which the
country may have possible sovereign rights.55 And as a result, under the aggressive role of
the judiciary, the new term of Section 190 (“extraterritorial areas over which Thailand
has sovereign rights or jurisdiction in accordance therewith or in accordance with
international law”) could invite an expansive judiciary interpretation to include any type
of treaty that may lead to such effect.
The same issue may also arise by the vague term “extensive social and economic
impacts” when there is no standard for the extensiveness. The process of qualifying
treaties of course involves the speculation of the impacts. Another core decision rendered
by the Constitutional Court was that the Joint Communiqué could create social impacts

of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 45 (June 15), available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/45/4873.pdf.
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Saan Rathatumnoon [The Constitutional Court], Jul. 8, 2008, Ruling No. 6-7/2551 (Thail), available at
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Therawat, supra note 28, at 9.
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Kanitta Topothai, The Jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court on the Matter of Being the International
Agreement under the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 2550 Section 190 with Regard to the
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 28 (Dec. 12, 2008) (an academic document submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the program of senior executives on criminal justice administration, National Academy
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by affecting social and economic rights of citizens living in the disputed area as well as
the relations among citizens of both countries living side by side.56 Remarked by a
foreign affairs official, “the Thai-Cambodian Joint Statement signed by then foreign
minister Noppadon Pattama and Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Sok An on June 8,
2008, in support of Phnom Penh’s plan to list Preah Vihear temple as a World Heritage
site was a victim of this differing interpretation. The Constitutional Court on July 7 in the
same year ruled the statement affected national security and society in general, even
though this was not the case”.57 Such broad criteria will eventually create all kinds of
claims upon treaties “when it does not matter whether the changes under Section 190 are
for the worse or for the better and also when many changes can affect the economic or
social lives of the people” 58 in some ways.
The amendment of Section 190 in 2011 was the evidence of these impractical
aspects of the treaty process that became obstacles to the implementation of fuller
democracy.59 Nevertheless, it is questionable whether this minor change can make a
whole difference in addressing the underlying problem, which requires balancing the
roles of the institutional branches and the public in the treaty process rather than simply
making a list of important treaties. The ruling of the Constitutional Court on the Joint
Communiqué between Thailand and Cambodia may signify the judiciary role in
upholding the participatory rights of the people and constitutional commitments of the
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political branches in the treaty-making context. Unfortunately, the approach had
inadvertently encouraged the phenomenon of ineffective administration by the judiciary’s
vigorous role which has put many government’s treaty activities on hold.60 At the same
time, the fear of political backlash which forces the government into holding a public
hearing and securing legislature’s approval only to satisfy the requirements is not going to
improve its responsiveness to social needs and concerns. At the international level,
although the judiciary can invalidate a treaty under the constitutional authority, the
country can still face international liability, and will be required to provide some sorts of
compensation, pursuant to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which also
operates as customary international law.61 Thus, even though the new legislation specifies
a list of special treaties for the purpose of Section 190 process, I personally have little
doubt that this solution will run into the same problem, which will essentially involve the
Court in the final treaty determination. And this can potentially be extended to any new
kinds of treaties that emerge after the list has been completed, as the Court remains the
sole interpretive authority. To my conclusion, because the mechanism of Section 190 is
deemed vital to the maintenance of democracy and good governance, there are thus the
issues of the treaty scope, process and the proper roles of the institutional organs and the
public that must be addressed and re-evaluated.
Overemphasizing the transparency and accountability of the treaty process may
not get us very far down the path of democracy and good governance when the
mechanism interferes with other democratic objective. Efforts to uphold certain
democratic values can be made at the expense of another. Thus, these challenges do not
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed a strong support in the amendment of Section 190 as a means to
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See The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 60, 61, 62, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8
I.L.M. 679 (1969); 63 A.J.I.L. 875,
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only present themselves in terms of practicality, but most importantly also in a form of a
threat to the democratic principle.
B. Challenge in Principle: Obstacles to Good Governance and Democracy
It must be acknowledged that democracy is committed not only to the process that
reflects people’s will, but also the outcomes that secure the people’s will.62 Democracy
therefore is not merely about ensuring accountability and transparency through the
process of self-government. It is also about listening, responding to and carrying out
people’s voices to serve its purposes. These are also some of the primary characteristics
under the principle of good governance, that is, to be responsive and effective in
managing public affairs. Assuming that the current means (Section 190) is sufficient to
guarantee these qualities in our government is out of the question. Effectiveness in
governmental administration which refers to “processes and institutions [that] produce
results that meet the needs of society…”63 has been undermined under the implementation
of Section 190 mechanism. Both internal and external challenges have clearly shown how
these missing components (responsiveness and effectiveness of the government
administration) affect the interest of the people and the country.
There are reasons why responsiveness and effectiveness must form part of our
self-governance. Democratic theory such as classicalism, republicanism or liberalism
strongly believes in the people’s involvement in the political process based not only on
political, but also social values the system of self-governance can secure, protecting
communal interest, promoting social harmony or developing individual’s moral
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capacity.64 However, the procurement of these values is highly dependent upon the
effective engagement and faith of the people in the governing process which requires a
responsive and effective administration to accomplish this task. These are the qualities
that keep our democratic ideology moving by making sure that people by feeling a sense
of belonging want to exercise their sovereign power and count on the system.
Section 190 may arguably satisfy certain elements of democracy and good
governance, specifically transparency. However, the current means seems to decrease the
odds of affecting the outcome of a policy decision by the public in the area of foreign
affairs due to the extensive obligations that have continued to disrupt governmental
function. Ironically, the improvement of our democracy has impeded the objectives in
itself. For now, the people may enjoy the expansive participatory rights, but in the long
run this safety valve can only take effects when a responsive and effective characteristic
of the state are present to ensure that the people’s feedback and intentions will form parts
of the political decisions, and that state’s policies will be guided by public opinions. Thus,
the promotion of democracy and good governance depends on this importation question
which is how to secure not just transparency and accountability of a government, but a
political environment that builds upon trust and understandings in the community, rather
than how to constantly overwhelm the administration with a variety of check mechanisms
that will only lead to the impediment of the primary objectives of our Constitution.
V. Conclusion
From the day military and tanks occupied the center of Bangkok in 2006 to the
day people roamed the streets and destroyed their home country, Thailand’s efforts to
enhance its democracy has been proven to fall short. Deeper than it appears on the surface
as a battle between political alliances, the riot has a more significant implication on the
64

For classicalism, public participation in the decision-making allows individual to be educated, to
distinguish his own impulses and desires and to pursue general interests. CAROLE PATEMAN,
PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 25 (1970).
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question of administration effectiveness and responsiveness to the demands of the rural
poor. Poverty, income disparity, poor education and health care cannot be alleviated
through simply having a transparent, but responsive and effective administration for
attention and resources to be allocated and redistributed to the areas that mostly are in
need. Internal weaknesses will continue to be the reason why people do not have faith in
the current Constitution and would rather use violence than the Constitution in the
exercise of their power. At the same time, effective external responses are as crucial as
the domestic ones in the sense that their absence could mean a loss of the country’s
credibility, diplomacy and interest upon which the country’s economy has increasingly
depended.
There is no question that Thailand through improving the level of public
participation and the involvement of the institutional branches in the area of the most
affected national interests reflect its vision in the value of democracy and good
governance. Section 190 treaty provision is an attempt to embark on the idea of making
state affairs a true public one in which the content of the future treaty is accessible to the
people and their representatives. Nevertheless, the provision has continued to pose major
obstacles to government performance. To this end, this dissertation will propose a treaty
model which focuses on the adjustment of the three primary areas within Section 190,
namely i) the treaty scope – concerning the types of treaties that must be subject to this
special process, ii) the treaty process – concerning the level of public participation and
legislative approval in the process, and iii) the proper role of the institutional branches –
concerning the competence of the executive in the determination of the special treaties,
and the manners of the legislature and judiciary involvements throughout the treatymaking process. The proposal to amend Section 190 therefore requires the re-evaluation
of the public participation scope and the consideration of the executive’s flexibility in the
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exercise of its foreign affairs power in order to maintain proper government function and
a guarantee of fuller democracy.
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Chapter II: The Political Character of Thailand
I. Introduction
It has been said that Thailand is one of a few countries in the world that has the
honor of being the country with the largest number of Constitutions, which unfortunately
provides little contribution to the quality of the country’s socio-political life. Since its
first creation in 1932, the Thai Constitution had been seen as a lifeless instrument
representing the symbol of democracy rather than an enforceable principle. A series of
these written Constitutions had been manipulated and shaped by the socio-political
interests of various factions of the ruling elites to fit their personal agenda. Constitutions
merely served as instruments written to legitimize, yet to preserve the status of the ruling
elites rather than the people’s fundamental interests. Thus, transparency and
accountability remained “rare commodities” in the public administration.
During the periods of the political struggles, the efforts to overcome these antidemocratic elements that rampaged among the ruling elites gave rise to the promulgation
of the 1997, and eventually to the 2007 Constitutions, which brought substantial changes
to the political and legal landscapes of Thailand. The 1997 Constitution has provided a
key bench mark in a reform process. The notion of the separation of powers was seriously
adopted to promote the ability of other political branches to check on the executive’s
activities. Several mechanisms were established to restrict bureaucratic powers, to better
protect individual liberties, and most important of all to improve the people’s ability to
directly scrutinize government conduct. The focus of the modern Thai Constitution is
thus centered on enhancing government’s accountability and transparency, which are also
the means of protecting civil liberties against a tyrannical form of government. The
principle of the separation of powers has never been better followed since the adoption of
the 1997 Constitution, especially when this legal instrument has officially established a
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truly independent judiciary body, known as the Constitutional Court, to rule on the
constitutionality of the other political departments’ activities. This practice has been
further emphasized in the 2007 Constitution, which does not only enjoin substantial
scrutiny of the legislature and the judiciary upon the executive, but also empowers the
people to keep an eye on their government.
With this respect, this chapter will briefly introduce the development of
Thailand’s political character since its official adoption of the first Constitution, its
struggles to fit Western ideology into the traditional Thai governing system that has long
embraced the monarchial institution, its readjustment throughout the reform periods
(Section II), followed by a summary of its institutional functions and powers under the
current Constitution (Section III). This chapter is therefore designed to provide the basic
understandings of the Thai political culture and the current political structure, which are
indispensable components in the analysis to seek a reform that can be a better suit for its
social and political environment.
II. The Evolution of the Thai Politics: From the Struggle for Power to the Struggle
for the People
Since 1932, a series of Thai Constitutions had been known to promote the steady
expansion of the Thai ruling class as well as to preserve their status. The primary
functions of the early versions of the Thai Constitutions were to legitimize the ruling
class’ power, to earn recognition from western nations, and to serve as political
machinery against their main rivalry in politics.1 Thus during this transitional period,

1

For instance, during the transitional period, an alliance between the National Assembly and the executive
was created. The composition of members of the National Assembly which came from both electoral
process and appointments had facilitated a political party to easily manipulate, manage and control the
Assembly. KOBKUA SUWANNATHAT-PIAN, KINGS, COUNTRY AND CONSTITUTIONS: THAILAND POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT 1932-2000 31-38 (2003). FRED W. RIGG, THAILAND: THE MODERNIZATION OF A
BUREAUCRATIC POLITY 152-153 (1966).

36

although it is true that political powers were retrieved from the monarch, they were rather
passed onto members of bureaucracy both civilian and military, and not onto the people.2
Under the interim Constitution of 1932, all powers once exercised by the monarch
under the traditional system of absolutism then had to be returned to the people, and
exercised through the Assembly of the People Representatives (legislature), the State
Council (executive) and the courts (judiciary).3 Nevertheless, in practice, these powers
were instead put in the hand of the new ruling elites. Rights and duties of the people
specified in the permanent 1932 Constitution were limitedly exercised solely through the
elections of representatives.4 Technically speaking, the sovereign rights of the people
were bestowed upon those who were in control of the Assembly. The power to carry out
policies rested within the political ruling party and not with the elected representative
body while media censorship was prevalent.5
The 1946 Constitution brought another major change to the political structure by
introducing bicameral Parliament consisting of the House of Representatives and the
Senate of which members are to be elected.6 Nevertheless, the government assured its
majority control in Parliament through the interim method of election which not only did
it allow the candidates to vote themselves into the Senate, but also laid down the
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This political culture was attributed from the fact that the 1932 movement was primarily led by a group of
the few educated who had the privilege to learn and import the ideology from western countries, rather than
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appointing and supervising the People’s Commissars who carried administrative responsibilities. Id. at 56.
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qualifications of voters and candidates in such a manner to provide wider participation of
its supporters.7 As history repeated itself, the power struggles among the ruling elites
continued. As a result, this Constitution was short-lived, and within a year later was
abrogated and replaced by the 1947 Provisional Constitution under the new military
leadership.8
The efforts to improve the democratic aspect of the Constitution were, however,
at least seen in the 1949 Constitution which created a control mechanism of the
legislature by way of voting no confidence in the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, as well
as expanding more rights and duties of the Thai people than any other previous versions.9
The Constitution was easily passed by majority votes in the Parliament.10 But again, the
1949 Constitution was not so welcome among those “who saw the Charter as an obstacle
to their effective participation in national affairs”11 and who felt that their interests were
being taken away. The opposition from the factions of the ruling class, therefore, became
a strong force that sealed the fate of the 1949 Constitution.
The promulgation of the 1952 Constitution was then understood to provide a solid
political ground for the military junta government who was able to nominate and select
most of the appointed members of the Assembly.12 Through this controlling method, the
position of the government became invincible, and nearly authoritarian with weak
opposition in Parliament. Under the cloak of constitutionality, the justification of the then
government was further supported by the belief that common people were not sufficiently
knowledgeable, and thus incapable of making any direct political decisions without their
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representatives. These political responsibilities thus fell upon the so-called educated and
well-informed, in other words, the ruling elites, to exercise such political power on behalf
of the people.
The tradition of the monopolization of power by the government continued from
1950s-1970s under the “Paw Khun” style of democracy (despotic paternalism) which
bequeathed the supreme power in the executive who supposedly acted as the guardian of
the people as well as their interests. Under this patriarchal system, there certainly is a
presumption that the leader must adhere to the virtue and the Buddhist principles reigning
with kindness and justice in the best interest of the people.13 The system of the separation
of powers was not only seen as unnecessary, but also antagonistic to the sacred teachings
of Buddhism of unity and affection. Since the existence of opposition parties was
perceived as a threat toward national harmonization, there was a complete absence of
“checks and balance” mechanism in the political process. The 1968 Constitution was also
described as the document of military leadership. As easily predicted, the system,
although inspired by strict moral principles in the hope to provide the nation with social
and political stability, did not make very far when such system only tempted the leader to
exploit their monopolistic position.14 This traditional Thai style democracy eventually got
brought down by widespread resentment among the intellectuals, followed by a student

The “Paw Khun” style democracy was also named as the Thai Buddhist democracy which at the time
was seen as a more preferable system to the western idea of the separation of powers, and suitable to the
Thai culture in the sense that the ruling from the top of the social hierarchy would allow an enlightened and
most capable leader to serve others (his subjects) in the service of the common good. The ruler himself
must therefore act in accordance with the Buddhist principles. The patriarchal administration was inherited
from the thirteenth century or the Sukhothai period. SUWANNATHAT-PIAN, supra note 1, at 10-11. In
accordance with the principle of “Dharmasastra”, the king’s function is to protect his people, and preserve
the sacred law. Under this theory, the monarch possesses the characteristics of a bodhisattva and a devaraja
(the goddess of mercy), and must adhere to the kingly virtue as a self-restraint mechanism in the exercise of
his power. WILLIAM J. SIFFIN, THE THAI BUREAUCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT 15
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uprising in 1973, which led Thailand into the next phase known as the period of “limited
democracy”.
Between 1970s and 1990s, Thai democracy was still far from perfect with heavy
influence of military-style administration. The emergence of the new generation together
with the growth of a politically aware community made it harder for the extremist regime
to survive. As a result, a compromise of the ruling class to adopt western-based
democracy through the re-establishment of parliamentary system, elections and political
parties was deemed necessary. Nevertheless, such system still allowed the bureaucrats,
technocrats and military to actively participate, and pursue their wealth and interests
under the disguise of democracy.15 The senate body that was entirely appointed by a
“ruling clique” neither in anyway would represent the interests of the people nor served
as a counter force to the power exercised by the executive.
Despite the existence of the Constitution, it was quite clear that its function was to
legitimize the political system, and to facilitate the exploitation of power by a certain
group of people. The term “limited democracy”, thus, basically suggested a less
accountable system in the decision-making process in which the role of the
representatives is secondary to the appointed in running the country.16 In sum, this
version of Thai democracy was proven to be no different than the previous “Paw Khun”
style as the legislature and the executive were working nearly as the same body. The only
differences were the power that changed hands and the governing style that was
transformed on its face. The power was simply transferred to the new emerging elites
“who literally bought their way into Parliament”17 continuing the cycle of corruption. The
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1991 Coup of course did not end this vicious cycle, but only to begin another round of
abuse to be pursued by a different group, yet again under the military leadership.
The arrival of the 1997 Constitution was meant to overcome past political
misconduct and to advance the country’s democratic development by focusing primarily
on improving the people’s rights and freedoms and the qualities of the political
institutions. The Constitution was designed as the “People Constitution” by incorporating
stronger checks directly from the people in addition to that of the conventional
parliamentary system, requiring a fully elected Senate body, establishing a party list
system, creating independent “watchdog” organizations, and better securing the people’s
political and civil rights.18 For instance, Section 121 required the entire two hundred
senate members to be elected by the people from seventy-six provinces. Section 214 gave
the people the right to a referendum on any issues that may affect national or public
interests. The Constitutional Court, the National Counter Corruption Commission
(NCCC), and the Election Commission (EC) were created by the Constitution as
additional control mechanisms.19 These independent agencies are empowered to conduct
an investigation, dissolve the political party or remove the person from his office. These
far-reaching efforts were also seen as novel to Thailand’s judicial reform since Thailand
had not had a legal tradition that completely separated the judiciary from the executive
branch, prior to the 1997 Constitution.
The 2007 Constitution therefore built upon the 1997 constitutional framework and
its fundamental principle that had sought to correct its weakness by securing the
institutional foundations for a more stable polity which ironically resulted in “electoral
The 1997 Constitution was regarded as the People’s Constitution for the fact that it was the first time in
history that the drafters directly engaged with the public. Regional seminars and questionnaires were used
extensively to gauge public opinion on political reform seeking to address the civil society’s interest. Erik
Martinez Kuhonta, The Paradox of Thailand’s 1997 People’s Constitution, XLVIII ASIAN SURVEY 373,
374-378 (2008).
19
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scrutiny of state powers).
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authoritarianism”.20 Thus, one of the key reforms undertaken under the 1997 Constitution
to ensure greater governmental stability became the target at which the 2007 version
aimed to break in order to improve the ability of the opposition to censure executive
power. Several aspects concerning the reconstruction of political institutions include, for
instance, the reduction of the number of the parliamentary members’ votes to launch
censure motions against a prime minister and his cabinet, the composition of appointed
senators from a special ad hoc panel, 21 the selection of the Constitutional judges entirely
by the judiciary, and making the public as the forth branch of government by providing
ample opportunities for their political participation. These mechanisms are clearly
designed to provide the people a better control over the executive’s activities, including
its authority in the realm of foreign affairs. The arrangement of the current political
structure will be elaborated in the following section.
It is indisputable that the primary objective of the 2007 Constitution is to address
the past mistakes that had allowed corruption and the absence of the true protective
mechanism of the people’s life and liberties to shape our democracy. Groups of the
privilege had been fed, empowered and expanded through the exploitation of “their
constitutions”. It is quite clear that the current Constitution is fully aware of this bitter
history. But the new challenge is yet to come. Although countering the executive power
20

The system of strong executive was created through the creation of a party list coupled with a five
percent threshold level of single-member districts, and the ninety-day rule were all meant to strengthen
institutions and government stability. The effect of the five percent threshold had effectively increased the
proportion of the dominant party’s seats while keeping out small parties that could potentially provide the
opposition making it harder to launch censure debate which requires at least two-fifths of the members of
both Houses. See Kuhonta, supra note 18, at 375 n.4 (“A five percent threshold means that a party must
receive at least five percent of total votes in order to be allotted seats in Parliament. A single-member
district is one where only one seat is contested per district, as opposed to a multi-member district where
several seats may be contested. The ninety-day rule is a rule that stipulates that a member of Parliament
(MP) has to be part of a political party for at least 90 days before registration for the next election.”).
21
The strategy was intended to correct the failure in the 1997 version, although entailing the entire Senate
body to be fully elected, that could not escape the influence of the executive, and inevitably became
political machinery for the dominant political party at that time. It has been reported that most senators that
were up for running the election and won the election had close tie with Thai Rak Thai, the leading party,
which as a result failed miserably in acting as an impartial body to check on the lower House. Id. at 384.
Charter’s Ideals Fine, but System of Senate Election Must Change, THE NATION, Apr. 23, 2006,
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2006/04/23/opinion/opinion_30002294.php.
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is the rule of thumb to keep democracy alive, we still have to keep in mind that this rule
cannot be overly followed in such a way that it would hamper the government’s effective
administration, and eventually turn democracy against us. Seeking balance in the system
is always a challenge. However, the continuing efforts in search for a better answer are a
crucial part of the legal and political evolution, and the key to the new development of
“democracy”.
III. Political Structure under the 2007 Constitution
Thailand had officially adopted the system of constitutional monarchy on June 24,
1932 (B.E. 2475) after its long tradition of absolutism by declaring the Constitution as the
supreme law of the land while the King remains the symbol and the national identity of
the country.22 Prior to this period, Thailand possessed neither a legislature nor an
executive, as all political powers were vested within the monarch. This tradition had been
the heritage of the Sukhothai Kingdom in the 12th century. Thus, the draft Constitution of
1932 signed by King Prajadhipok, created Thailand’s first system of separation of
powers, a single House legislature (People’s Assembly) with seventy appointed members.
Since the period of the first Constitution that brought Thailand the new political
character, there are a total of eighteen Constitutions partaking in the democratization
process for the past eighty years.23
Under the governance of constitutional monarchy, Thailand has followed the
principle of the separation of powers by having the Constitution prescribe functions and
powers to three institutional organs, namely the legislature, the executive and the
MANIT JUMPA, “Kwamroo beungton kiewkab rathatumnoon hang ratcha anachak thai,” translated in
BASIC KNOWLEDGE OF THE 2007 CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND 4 (2008). See AMARA
RAKSASATAYA & JAMES R. KLEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THAILAND: THE PROVISIONS AND THE
WORKING OF THE COURT 2 (Amara Raksasataya & James R. Klein eds., 2003). Under absolutism, the king
was the center of the socio-political system, and was regarded as the “Lord of Life” whose primary
function was to protect his people and preserve the law. Nevertheless, his order is absolute, and his position
is beyond challenge. SIFFIN, supra note 13, at 14-15.
23
This is the number of the Thai Constitutions that are originally drafted and passed either as provisional or
permanent Constitutions.
22
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judiciary. The Legislature is bicameral, with a fully-elected House of Representatives and
a partially-elected Senate. The Executive has the King as the chief of state and the prime
minister as the head of government. The Judiciary is composed of the Constitutional
Court, the Courts of Justice, the Administrative Courts and the Military Courts. The
primary responsibilities of these three departments were roughly prescribed under the
first Constitution, 24 which had slowly evolved into a more sophisticated and accountable
model as citizens’ participatory roles have been increased in the political process making
them a potential “fourth branch” of government. Such a progressive movement is
reflected in the differences between the very first version in which the legislature is
consisted of only the House of Representatives with limited functions25 and the later ones
that have guaranteed greater citizens’ rights and freedoms as well as their abilities to
scrutinize government’s conducts.26 The establishment of the Constitutional Court in
1998 also affirmed the effort of the political reforms to enhance the basic rights and
freedom of the Thai people.
A. The Public (Direct Participatory Roles)
Since the promulgation of the “People Constitution” (the 1997 Constitution),
there has been a drastic change in principle that embraces the sovereign right of the
people. The 1997 and 2007 Constitutions both replaced “the sovereign power comes from
the Thai people” of the 1991 version with “the sovereign power belongs to the Thai
people” to further emphasize the inviolability of the people’s fundamental rights and

24

The turning point of the Thai Constitution was said to be after World War II, where a new Constitution
(1946) was promulgated. The Constitution was considered the most democratic at that time since it had
created for the first time a bicameral legislature consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Also for the first and last time the constitution called for a fully elected Senate. JUMPA, supra note 22, at 5.
25
Id. at 6-7.
26
CONST. (2007), Ch. 5, §87 (Thail.) (providing that state policies, in principle, shall be pursued in a
manner that promotes and lends support to public participation by taking into consideration public
discussion in the determination of state policies and plans for economic and social development at both
national and local levels).
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liberties by the state,27 which is also dedicated by the entire section under Chapter III of
the 2007 Constitution.
To ensure the implementation of this fundamental principle in the primary stage,
rights and liberties in connection with information and complaints, and in connection
with assembly and association specified in Part 10 and 11 within Chapter III guarantee at
least basic civic roles in political participation.28 These are, for instance, the rights to
acquire and to have access to information in possession of government agencies, the right
to receive explanations of the on-going activities, the right to express his or her opinions
in the concerned project, or the right to peacefully form an association to convey their
political will. These freedoms are valuable in the sense that they can be exercised simply
through the people’s initiation without support by the state in the first place.
The notion of “rule by the people” has been advanced by the incorporation of
direct public participation (in the political process) into the directive principles of state
policies stipulated under Part 10, Chapter V of the current Constitution. The section
expressly required the state to promote direct participation by the people in several areas
of state affairs such as policies and plans for economic and social development at both
national and local levels, the provision of public services, and most importantly the
scrutiny of the exercise of state powers at all levels.29 New government control
mechanisms have been added to improve the ability of the people to keep an eye on their
27

CONSTITUTION DRAFTING ASSEMBLY, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE THAI CONSTITUTION 2 (2007),
available at http://www.nesac.go.th/library/Main_highlight/pdf/cons_book2550.pdf. See also CONST.
(2007), Ch. 3 (Thail.) (guaranteeing equality, personal rights and liberties, rights in the administration of
justice, rights in property, rights and liberties in occupation, liberties in expression of persons and mass
media, rights and liberties in education, rights to public health services and welfare from the state, rights in
connection with information and complaints, liberties in assembly and association, community rights and
right to protect the Constitution).
28
These rights and liberties are subject to limitations where the disclosure of the information will affect the
security of State, public safety or other individuals’ interests or unless there is a law enacted for securing
public order “during the time when the country is in state of war, or when a state of emergency or martial
law is declared”. CONST. (2007), Ch. 3 §56, 63 (Thail.). It should also be noted that the limitation of the
disclosure of public information is narrow in the sense that only those that “shall” affect the state security,
public order or individual interests can be protected. Thus, the possibility that certain information might
have such consequences will rule out the privacy of the information.
29
JUMPA, supra note 22, at 180.
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government, and to intervene in its conduct when it fails to act in accordance with the
rule of law. Governmental decisions are also required to seek public consultation under
certain circumstance.30
To ensure the exercise of state powers in accordance with this principle, the
Constitution provides direct channels for the public to actively engage in political
decisions. Pursuant to Chapter VII (Direct Political Participation by the People), Thai
people are guaranteed the right to petition the proposal of a bill to the National Assembly,
the right to lodge a complaint to remove the persons from office, and the right to a
referendum where the matter may affect “national” or “public interest” or is required by
law.31 The Constitution requires only 10,000 eligible voters to propose a bill in
Parliament whereas only 20,000 eligible voters can launch an impeachment motion
against a political officeholder.32 The required small number of participants is to facilitate
the participatory process, and to overcome the common issue of lacking sufficient
supporters which can disqualify the public initiative. The right of the people to a
referendum in national policy decisions, on the other hand, is not guaranteed by the
number of voters’ participation, but rather can be exercised through either the discretion
of the executive or legislation. Such a provision also has a strong democratic implication
in the sense that a referendum could serve as a final word for a policy decision, and not
just an advisory opinion.33
The power of the mandatory public consultation can also render certain acts of the
executive unconstitutional. A clear example is demonstrated in the treaty-making clause
(Section 190) that explicitly requires a public hearing prior to the executive’s entering
30

See CONST. (2007), Ch. 3 §66, Ch. 7 §165, Ch. 9 §190 (Thail.).
See Chapter I, Section III, A (i).
32
CONST. (2007), Ch. 7 §163-164 (Thail.). JUMPA, supra note 22, at 251.
33
Unlike the 1997 version which limits the status of the referendum to advisory opinion, this is another
distinctive feature carried under the 2007 Constitution that allows the result of the referendum to determine
the policy decision. It nevertheless depends entirely on the executive whether to adopt the recommendation
of the people. JUMPA, supra note 22, at 260-261.
31
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into a negotiation of “special treaties” (mentioned in Chapter I). A failure to conduct a
public hearing in such a circumstance provides a legal basis for the executive to be
challenged in the Constitutional Court rendering the particular treaty void, and the
government liable. However, the requirement of public consultation in the treaty-making
context does not always gives the public the control over treaty contents since the
executive still retains its discretion in adopting the people’s suggestions. But it can still
be an effective means to limit governmental authority through this power sharing
procedure which is to remind us that the “sovereign power belongs to the people”.
The effectiveness of the extensive public involvement in political affairs to ensure
transparency in governmental administration is unquestionable. However, its
effectiveness to ensure government’s accountability and responsiveness may not be
entirely clear. As mentioned, the constitutional duty of government generally does not go
beyond providing resources for public participation. And for the government to give
serious thoughts to the public inputs is outside the constitutional mandate. The
government’s careful consideration of public opinion is another question that requires us
to examine further to ensure the effective implementation of this democratic mechanism,
and is to be addressed in Chapter III.
B. The Legislature
Under the Constitution of 2007, the legislature is known as the National
Assembly consisting of two chambers; namely the Senate (the Upper House) and the
House of Representatives (the Lower House) whose members cannot simultaneously
assume both positions.34 The House of Representatives has 480 members, 400 of whom
are directly elected from constituent districts and the remainder drawn proportionally

34

CONST. (2007), Ch. 6 §88(Thail.).
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from party lists.35 The Senate is a non-partisan body with 150 members, 76 of whom are
directly elected (one per province).36 The remaining 74 are appointed by a panel
comprised of judges and senior independent officials from a list of candidates compiled
by the Election Commission by taking into consideration equality and fairness of persons
represented from various sectors as well as those from the socially underprivileged.37 The
candidates must also demonstrate the knowledge, expertise or experience suitable to the
duty of senators.
i. Accountability
In addition to the power of the judiciary in the appointment of the Senate body,
the legislature can face accountability through the power of the prime minister
(executive) to dissolve the House of Representatives for a new election under Section 108
and the power of the Constitutional Court (judiciary) to remove a person’s membership
of the House of Representatives under Section 106 and the Senate under Section 119
respectively. In addition, pursuant to Section 91, either the members themselves of both
Houses or an independent constitutional agency such as the Election Commission of not
less than one-tenth of the entire number may lodge a complaint with the House President
in the removal of the other member, which is to be deferred to the final decision of the
Constitutional Court.
ii. Roles and Functions
The Parliament or the National Assembly is the law-making arm of the
government with the primary responsibility to enact organic laws and legislation of the
country. The legislative branch of government (National Assembly) consists of the two
35

The Constitution of 2007 has reduced the number of the members of the House from 500 to 480. In
addition, in the event that results in members of the House of Representatives
being less than four hundred and eighty in number but being not less than ninety five percent of the total
number of members of the House of Representatives, it shall be deemed that members in such number duly
form the House of Representatives. Id., Ch. 6 §93.
36
Id., Ch. 6 §111.
37
Id., Ch. 6 §113.
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legislative bodies (the House of Representatives and the Senate), each of which has its
own responsibilities. Their primary law-making duty is enumerated in Chapter VI, Part 7
of the 2007 Constitution.38 The National Assembly is also charged with functions to
scrutinize and control the government administration, to approve matters of major
concerns, and to appoint or remove government officials of the Constitution.39 These
responsibilities go along with the principle of “checks and balances” to ensure that
government acts transparently and accountably in accordance with the national policy
and the people’s interest.
The increased parliamentary role in the political decision-making process has
become a key element to improving the democratic character of the Thai Constitution.
Typically, the parliament’s common duties are to provide approvals for matters of
national interests, namely the country’s budget and spending, the government’s decision
to declare war and to make treaties. Within the current Constitution, the scope of some of
these common duties have been broadened through redefining what it means to be
“matters of major importance”, particularly in the treaty-making area. The addition of the
special categories of treaties that must be subject to the new treaty-making mechanism
pursuant to Section 190 was the product of this meaning expansion.
The traditional role of the parliament in the treaty-making process had been
deemed supplementary as ones being called upon to approve treaties in limited cases.40
The structure of the executive’s treaty power can be viewed as a negative list approach in
38

Id., Ch. 6 §142-150. The procedure of the enactment of legislation can be initiated by the Council of
Ministers, the members of the House of Representatives, the Court, or the public (not less than 10,000 of
the eligible voters). The proposed bill must first be submitted to the House of Representatives for debate,
amendment and vote. After it has been approved by the House of Representatives, the bill is then forwarded
to the Senate. If the bill is disapproved, the amended bill will be withheld and returned to the House of
Representatives for further consideration. The bill proceeds to the next stage once the Senate approves it.
After the bill has been approved by both houses, the prime minister then presents it to the King for his
assent (signature) which shall come into force upon its publication in Government Gazette.
39
For detailed roles and functions of the Parliament, see http://www.parliament.go.th/main01.php
40
Jaturon Therawat, Roles of the Parliament in Treaty Making Process under the Thai Constitution 2 (Nov.
21, 2008) (Working Paper, on file with the King Prajadhipok’s Institute), available at
http://www.kpi.ac.th/kpith/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=264&Itemid=9.
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which plenary power in the making of treaties is vested in the executive unless stipulated
in the exceptions under the Constitution. This tradition has continued since the very first
Constitution of 1932 (B.E. 2475) of which Section 54 required that any treaty providing
for changes in the Thai territories or requiring the enactment of an Act for its implementation
must be approved by the House of Representatives. A series of the Thai Constitutions have

demonstrated this traditional approach as follows.41
Constitution of 1946 (B.E. 2489), Section 76 provides that “any treaty providing
for changes in the Thai territories or requiring the enactment of an Act for its implementation
must be approved by the National Assembly”.

Constitution of 1949 (B.E. 2492), Section 154 provides that “any treaty providing
for changes in the Thai territories or requiring the enactment of an Act for its implementation
must be approved by the National Assembly”

Constitution of 1968 (B.E. 2511), Section 150 provides that “any treaty providing
for changes in the Thai territories or requiring the enactment of an Act for its implementation
must be approved by the National Assembly”

Constitution of 1974 (B.E. 2517), Section 195 provides that “any treaty providing
for changes in the Thai territories or extraterritorial areas over which Thailand has sovereign
rights, or requiring the enactment of an Act for its implementation, or treaty of military alliance
must be approved by the National Assembly”

Constitution of 1978 (B.E. 2521), Section 162 provides that “any treaty providing
for changes in the Thai territories or extraterritorial areas over which Thailand has sovereign

41

Kanitta Topothai, The Jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court on the Matter of Being the International
Agreement under the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 2550 Section 190 with Regard to the
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 14 (Dec. 12, 2008) (an academic document submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the program of senior executives on criminal justice administration, National
Academy of Criminal Justice) (on file with the Library of Courts of Justice),
http://elib.coj.go.th/managecourt/data/c12_4.pdf (providing a source of a series of the constitutional
provisions on treaty power).
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rights , or requiring the enactment of an Act for its implementation must be approved by the

National Assembly”
Constitution of 1991 (B.E. 2534), Section 178 provides that “any treaty providing
for changes in the Thai territories or extraterritorial areas over which Thailand has sovereign
rights , or requiring the enactment of an Act for its implementation must be approved by the

National Assembly”
Constitution of 1997 (B.E. 2540), Section 224 provides that “any treaty providing
for changes in the Thai territories or extraterritorial areas over which Thailand has sovereign
rights, or requiring the enactment of an Act for its implementation must be approved by the

National Assembly”
Not until the Constitution of 2007 (B.E. 2550) had substantial changes been made
to the participatory role of the parliament and the public in the treaty process. As
presented in Chapter I, the new requirement of the participation from both Houses before
and after a treaty negotiation process, although aiming at strengthening the legislative
function (as a scrutinizer who represents the people’s interests), poses a new set of
democratic challenges. The balance of the legislative involvement in the treaty-making
process must be sought and maintained without compromising other democratic values to
ensure the practicality and the effectiveness in the administration of the executive and the
function of the legislature itself.
C. The Executive
The Executive is composed of the King serving as the chief of state, the Prime
Minister as the head of government, and the Council of Ministers as the cabinet. Pursuant
to Chapter 9 of the 2007 Constitution, the prime minister is elected from among the
members of the House of Representatives following national elections for the House of
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Representatives.42 The leader of the party positioned to organize a majority coalition
generally becomes the prime minister by the King’s appointment (for formality), who
also appoints no more than thirty-five other ministers to constitute the Council of
Ministers.43 The prime minister term is also limited to two four-year.44
i. Accountability
The executive is directly accountable to the Parliament. Pursuant to Section 176,
upon coming into power, the Cabinet must state its policies and explain its operations to
the National Assembly within fifteen days following the date it takes office in accordance
with the directive principles of fundamental State policies under Section 75.45 Despite the
restriction on passing the no confidence vote by the National Assembly during this early
process, the Constitution did state that the prime minister and each minister must be
individually and collectively responsible to the National Assembly for the policies they
had delivered, which can subject them to a later challenge. Thus, the “ministership” may
be terminated under the circumstances in which members of the House of
Representatives pass a vote of no confidence pursuant to Section 158 and 159 by a simple
majority vote or three-fifth of the members of the Senate passing a resolution for the
removal of the minister in question.46
During the periods of the massive political reforms, whether or not members of
the executive body can continue to hold their offices can also be subject to public
CONST. (2007), Ch. 9 §171 (Thail.) (“The Prime Minister must be a member of the House of
Representatives appointed under section 172. The President of the House of Representatives shall
countersign the Royal Command appointing the Prime Minister”).
43
Id., See also JUMPA, supra note 22, at 273.
44
The Constitution of 2007 added the new rule which limits the term of the prime minister to two
consecutive terms or eight years designed to eliminate the concentration of power. Constitution Drafting
Committee, “Sarasamkan kong rangrathatumnoon chabab mai B.E. 2540,” translated in THE SUBSTANCE
OF THE DRAFT OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION 128 (2007).
45
Nevertheless, no vote of confidence can be passed since this process is intended for government to
prepare plans for the administration of the State affairs for the purpose of determining guidance on the
discharge of official duties for each year in accordance with section 76. CONST. (2007), Ch. 9 §176 (Thail.).
46
There are, in fact, other causes for the termination of the ministership such as death, resignation or
criminal conviction. What is mentioned here is the termination primarily caused by the direct accountability
of the executive to the legislature.
42
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approval since the people is endowed with the right to lodge a complaint to remove the
persons from office. Under the 2007 Constitution, only 20,000 eligible voters are
required in order to launch an impeachment motion against a political officeholder.47
ii. Roles and Functions
Within the executive body, the Monarch serves as the symbol of the country, and
has no actual role in politics. The primary roles of the King is to approve or disapprove
bills adopted by the Parliament (the National Assembly),48 and to appoint the prime
minister and the cabinet as a matter of formality. Bills passed by both Houses of
Representatives and the Senate can only become law upon approval of the bill by the
King. Bills do not become effective as laws without the approval of the King, unless later
re-affirmed, and ratified by the Parliament.49
The Prime Minister is the Head of Government whose primary responsibilities are
to administer all government agencies except the courts and the legislative bodies. The
Council of Ministers or the Cabinet is in charge of all the day-to-day government
activities, except those of the Parliament and the Courts. The Cabinet sets governmental
policy and goals. The individual ministers and deputy ministers will carry out those
policies and goals within their own designated ministries. The individual ministers head
up their respective departments by providing policy direction to the permanent officials
who, in turn, give direction to the various supervisors and other leaders within their
department. In addition, all ministers and deputy ministers sit as members of the Council
of Ministries, which normally meets once a week to establish government policy on any

47

CONST. (2007), Ch. 7 §163-164 (Thail.).
Id., Ch. 6 §150.
49
The bill must be presented to the King for his approval. If the King disapproves a bill as a proposed law,
the bill is returned to the Parliament to consider the King's objections. If the parliament nonetheless
approves the law again, by at least a two-third vote of both houses of the parliament, the bill is returned to
the King for reconsideration. If the King still declines to sign the bill into a law, the Prime Minister is
authorized to promulgate the bill as a law by publishing it in the Government Gazette, the official
newspaper of the Government equivalent to the King’s assent. Id., §151.
48
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issues requiring government attention. The Council of Ministries has the power to submit
urgent legislation (Emergency Decree) to the King for immediate implementation by
Royal Decree, to be followed by the submission for the consideration of the Parliament
within three days.50 Once such a proposal has been adopted by Royal Decree, it is the law
of Thailand unless overturned by an action of the Parliament. The Council of Ministers
also prepares and proposes the country’s budget spending to the Parliament.51
Being the constitutional monarchy, the executive powers are, in theory, the
prerogative of the King. These rights include the power to issue an Emergency Decree
(Section 187), to declare the martial law (Section 188), to declare war (Section 189), and
to conclude treaties with other nations and international organizations (Section 190).
These functions, in practice, are within the primary responsibility of the Cabinet, some of
which are directly accountable to the Parliament such as the power to declare war
requiring two-thirds votes of the members of both Houses to give the approval, and the
power to conclude treaties involving both substantial parliamentary and public
consultations in the process.
The 2007 Constitution brought a drastic change to the relationship between the
political branches and the public, especially in the treaty-making realm. Pursuant to
Section 190, the power to make certain treaties is no longer exclusive to the executive.
The greater participation of the legislature and the public are deemed necessary, and
required for the important treaties to take effects.52 The requirements of an initial public
hearing as well as parliamentary approvals prior and after the treaty negotiation, albeit
50

JUMPA, supra note 22, at 176.
Id. at 264.
52
Prior to undertaking a treaty negotiation of any treaty specified under paragraph two,
(1) The Council of Ministers shall provide information and cause to be conducted public hearings, and
shall give the National Assembly explanations on such treaty.
(2) For this purpose, the Council of Ministers shall submit to the National Assembly a framework for
negotiations for approval.
When the treaty under paragraph two has been signed, the Council of Minister shall, prior to the declaration
of intention to be bound thereby, make details thereof publicly accessible… CONST. (2007), Ch. 9 §190,
(Thail.) (amended 2011).
51
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improving the transparency of government administration in the treaty-making process,
have been cast doubts in terms of its practicality and the effectiveness in the
implementation of democracy and good governance. Controlling executive activity does
not necessarily mean reducing its capability to carry out an effective administration. This
rationale is something that the new mechanism must take into consideration since the
quality of the executive function also plays a vital role in supporting the democratic
characteristic of the public administration.
D. The Judiciary
Blending the principles of traditional Thai and Western laws, Thailand's judicial
system is composed of the Constitutional Court, the Courts of Justice, the Administrative
Courts and the Military Courts. The new court system which guarantees greater
independence from political influence by transferring powers to administer all courts
away from the executive branch to the judiciary has been established under the 2007
Constitution.53 Nevertheless, all judges are appointed by the King. And the King's
appointments to the Constitutional Court are made upon the advice of the Senate in which
the nine Constitutional Court judges are drawn from the Supreme Court of Justice and
Supreme Administrative Court as well as from among substantive experts in law and
social sciences outside the judiciary.54
Under the 2007 Constitution, the Constitutional Court is the highest court of
appeals, although its jurisdiction is limited to clearly-defined constitutional issues. Its
members are nominated by a committee of judges, leaders in parliament, and senior
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The executive branch had had a traditional role in administering all courts. However, under the new court
system, the Ministry of Justice (Judiciary) is now the sole organ overseeing agencies within the judicial
process such as the National Police, the Attorney-General’s office, the Correction Department.
RAKSASATAYA & KLEIN, supra note 22, at 25.
54
Pursuant to Section 204, the Constitutional Court shall consists of the President and eight other judges of
which three judges shall come from the Supreme Court of Justice, two judges from the Supreme
Administrative Court, two quailed persons from a legal field, and two others from the field of political
science, public administration or other social science. CONST. (2007), Ch. 10 §204 (Thail.).
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independent officials, whose nominees are confirmed by the Senate and appointed by the
King. The Courts of Justice have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases (consisting of
general courts, juvenile and family courts and specialized courts) and are organized,
pursuant to Section 219, in three tiers: Courts of First Instance, the Court of Appeals, and
the Supreme Court of Justice.55 Administrative courts have jurisdiction over suits
between private parties and the government, and cases in which one government entity is
suing another.56 In several southern provinces where Muslims constitute the majority of
the population, Islamic law and custom were applicable to matrimonial and inheritance
matters among the Muslims. Provincial Islamic Committees therefore have jurisdiction,
but limited to that over probate, family, marriage, and divorce cases.
The primary role of the judiciary is adjudication. Due to its nature that directly
affects rights and liberty of the people, the branch must be guaranteed of its
independence, and free from any political interference.57 Thus, to assure the
independence of this organ in the adjudication, three principles have been established;
first prohibiting the legislature and the executive from interfering with judges and the
judiciary either directly or indirectly by precluding the ability of the executive to remove
judges such as other government officials, secondly prohibiting internal interference
(within the organ) by preserving the autonomy of each judge in their respective case, and
thirdly prohibiting the withdrawal or transfer of the pending case by a higher-ranking
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Id., §219.
See Article 9 of the Act on Establishment of Administrative Court and Administrative Court Procedure
B.E. 2542 (1999), http://www.admincourt.go.th/amc_eng/02-LAW/laws/Act-01-04-47.pdf.
(“Administrative Court ha[s] the competence to try and adjudicate or give orders over… (1) the case
involving a dispute in relation to an unlawful act by an administrative agency or State official, whether in
connection with the issuance of a by-law or order or in connection with other act…”).
57
Pursuant to this principle, the Office of the Judiciary under the Ministry of Justice which is an
organization and a juristic person has become the sole organ responsible for the administration works of all
the Courts of Justice. http://www.coj.go.th/eng/thejudiciary.htm#t5.2.
56
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official’s order to another judge. The case that is being considered must be concluded and
complete by the same judge.58
To improve the independence of the branch, the Constitutional Court was
formally established under the 1997 Constitution, and came to replace a traditional
constitutional body known as “Constitutional Council” which was claimed to lack
complete independence for having persons of other political branches in the body.59 The
1978 Constitution, for instance, provided the composition of the Constitutional Council
to include the President of the National Assembly and other appointments by the National
Assembly.60 With the promulgation of the 1997 Constitution, the Constitutional Court
was elected as an independent organization responsible for scrutinizing government
conduct as well as upholding the democratic principles laid down under the Constitution.
The 2007 Constitution has since continued this readjustment by prohibiting the selection
of the President and judges of the Constitutional Court from any government officials or
state agencies to maintain the independence of the Constitutional Court.61
i. Accountability: Constitutional Court
Under the Constitution, the King’s assent is required in the appointment and the
removal of judges, except in the case of the Constitutional Court judges where advice of
the Senate must also be required (Section 204). In practice, the selection committee for
judges of the Constitutional Court is consisted of the judiciary (the President of the
Supreme Court of Justice and the President of the Supreme Administrative Court), the
executive (the President of the House of Representatives and the Leader of the
Opposition in the House of Representatives) and the President of a constitutional
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independent organ while the Senate is required for a sitting to pass a resolution approving
the selected persons (Section 206).
One of the grounds for vacation of the members of the Constitutional Court is
through the Senate passing a resolution pursuant to Section 274. The resolution of the
Senate under this section is deemed final and no request for the removal of such a person
from office can be made on the same ground. Thus, it can be said that the power to
appoint and remove the constitutional court judges rest in the legislative body whereas
the role of the executive has substantially decreased in such a process to ensure that the
decision to be rendered against the executive body is made impartially and
independently.
ii. Roles and Functions: Constitutional Court
The Constitutional Court generally has jurisdiction over the constitutionality of
parliamentary acts, royal decrees, draft legislation made by political parties and members
of the National Assembly, disputes concerning violations of individual rights guaranteed
under the Constitution as a result of the legislation in contrary to the supreme law of land
(Section 212), as well as the conflict of powers and duties between at least two political
organs being the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers or non-judicial
constitutional organs (Section 214).62 With this respect, the jurisdiction of the
Constitutional Court is set forth in four areas; firstly determining the constitutionality of
statutes and the organic law bill, secondly considering the qualifications of a member of
the National Assembly, a minister and any person holding public offices, thirdly deciding
on issues concerning the powers and duties of political organizations under the

RAKSASATAYA & KLEIN, supra note 53 (“the Constitutional Court shall substantively pursue the
following duties; (1) consideration and adjudication of any provision of law, rule and regulation as being
contrary or inconsistent with the Constitution; (2) consideration of disputes among constitutional
organizations as to their powers and duties”). Other functions include making recommendations to the
National Assembly and the government in the amendment of the present Constitution.
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Constitution, and fourthly having other jurisdictions as stipulated by the Constitution and
organic laws.63
Since the Constitution prescribes powers and duties to the constitutional
organizations, it is deemed important that there must be an organ to decide on the issue in
relations to the performance and powers of these organizations. Section 214, then
becomes the key provision that explicitly assigns this role to the Constitutional Court. To
the significance of Section 214, the power granted to the Constitutional Court to resolve
“political questions” pertaining to the allocation of powers and competence between the
legislature and the executive has also been read along with Section 190 that explicitly
grants the Constitutional Court, for the first time, the power to resolve disputes
concerning the types of treaties that must undergo the special treaty process, which in a
way determines the executive’s authority in the treaty-making process.64 Pursuant to this
Section, the Constitutional Court has the final word to decide whether the treaty in
question and the act of the executive are constitutional by circumventing such a process
or in other words, whether the executive is competent to solely execute the treaty without
parliamentary and public involvements.
It is indisputable that resolving the issues of political powers is one of the primary
functions of the Constitutional Court as reflected in Section 190 and specifically in 214.
Nevertheless, these assigned duties may not be as simple as they may appear in the
constitutional text. Judicial intervention in the political branch’s administration and
decisions to ensure their transparency and accountability also brought other challenges
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that bear the cost of other democratic values.65 Entrusting the power entirely to interpret
duties and functions of government in one independent organ seems to be a
democratically-sound solution to curtail the government’s ability in determining its own
competence. However, in practice, this judicial function which allows the court to have a
final word on who gets to do what may also put many activities of the political
departments on hold as a lack of the other political branch’s participation in such an
activity may provide a ground for a constitutional challenge. As presented in Chapter I,
the extensive judicial interference may become a major impediment to the effectiveness
of government administration which is also a required component for the administration
to be responsive to the social needs. At the same time, the missing component in its
jurisdiction to address a substantive guarantee violation by a treaty raises a serious
concern about the proper role of the Constitutional Court and balance of the judiciary
function. Thus, the removal of the judicial role from the political process will not provide
us a better answer either since such an argument will only bring down the democratic
character of our governing system. Rather the degree of its involvement must be
elaborated.
Therefore, the issues of judicial intervention and the executive autonomy must be
addressed, especially when they have significant implications upon the people’s interests.
As part of this dissertation analysis, the level and manner in which the judiciary should be
involved (the appropriateness of the Constitutional Court’s roles and functions), to at best
safeguard the people’s constitutional rights, to assure the executive autonomy and to
maintain the balance of powers among the institutional branches in this realm will be
examined and suggested in Chapter IV (the Separation of Powers) and V (the TreatyMaking Model) respectively.
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IV. Conclusion
Since the drastic change in the 1930s up until the adoption of the 1997
Constitution, Thailand’s political reforms had been accused of hypocrisy in which an
emphasis was placed on the appearance of a process (a constitution, Parliament, political
parties and an election), rather than a principle. Despite the incorporation of the
separation of powers doctrine, “the charter actually gave the Assembly no more real
power than it gave to the king”.66 Independent organizations to represent public interests
remained weak politically while the acclaimed “free press” was typically controlled by
influential officers to promote their personal agenda. The principle and the true objectives
of democracy (life and liberties of the people) were lost in the process. These were the
early challenges that the Thai had struggled to overcome over a sixty year period.
However, through the arrival of the modern reforms that attempted to seal these
loopholes (political exploitation) and to uphold the basic socio-political rights and
privileges of the people, a new form of challenge that has another democratic implication
has emerged.
Although the focus has now shifted to the enforcement of the very fundamental
principle of democracy under the current Constitution by incorporating direct democracy
(public consultation) in several areas of political affairs, facilitating strenuous checks
from the legislature and other independent agencies, curtailing the executive decisionmaking authority, and reinforcing judicial policing power, there is yet the question of
practicality, and how the new approach can achieve its objectives realistically,
particularly in the treaty-making process. As part of the efforts to undertake serious
political reforms, Section 190 has proven to be the most advanced, yet daunting treaty
provision. On an international scale, the obstruction of the administration effectiveness
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has adverse implications for the country’s political and economic opportunities in the
pursuit of foreign relations and the maintenance of its foreign diplomacy, whereas on a
domestic scale, this outcome threatens the government’s responsiveness to social
concerns. Maintaining the executive’s primary role and authority in the area of foreign
affairs is still arguably crucial, but cannot be overly emphasized to prevent the repetition
of our past mistakes. Balance in the exercise of the executive’s foreign affairs power
must be sought and established. The legislative and judicial controls over the executive’s
conduct must be effectively implemented. At the same time, the role of the public in the
political process which is instrumental to the cultivation of the self-governing process
must therefore be emphasized in a tactful way through an effective public participation
mechanism. How to sustain and nurture the democratic principle in the treaty-making
process will require us to look back at the process or the means itself to bring about the
constitutional ultimate goals. The rest of the chapters will therefore dedicate to the
analysis of our means.
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Chapter III: On Thailand’s Democracy (The Public Role)
I. Introduction
With the implementation of the improved check mechanisms as laid down in
Chapter II, the Thai Constitution is believed to enhance political equality by expanding
people’s rights to political participation in various areas of public affairs. Thailand’s
efforts to advance its democracy through improving the level of public participation in
the most affected areas of national interests reflect its vision in the value of participatory
democracy. Increasing the role of public participation is not only believed to serve the
social purposes (individual capacity-building and social understanding development), but
also the legitimacy of politics.
Unfortunately, inserting mechanisms into the Constitution may not be a sufficient
guarantee of procuring civil rights and liberties, given that several factors cannot be
corrected simply through a change in a political structure. A mixture of issues which have
arisen in modern Thai politics range from political passivity of those who have little to
care about less immediate concerns to deep social fragmentation driven by those who are
gravely affected, but inadequately accommodated. The people’s feeling of being
disregarded and disenfranchised also has much to do with the effectiveness of the
administration. In light of these weaknesses, the concept of liberalism must be
strengthened in the context of Thai political participation. To meet these challenges will
require us to look at the root causes in order to understand human psychology and to
secure an effectual vehicle (governmental function) in the delivery of our objectives.
Despite various criticisms, I see the advantages of the liberal ideology as a way of
generating an approach to better enforce people’s participatory rights, which has become
one of the primary challenges of our time.
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With this respect, this chapter seeks to raise practical aspects of liberalism (to be
advanced in the application of a treaty-making model in Chapter V) in response to the
weaknesses posed by public participation in the context of Thai democracy through the
examination of various political theories and the root causes of the modern challenges.
The following section briefly introduces the issues of public participation under the
current Constitution. Section III will walk us through the idea of direct participation
portrayed by each school of thought, namely republican, liberal, elitist and participatory
models which present certain elements that can provide positive changes to the Thai
democracy. While these democratic models attempt to explain the extent of civic roles in
political arenas in the most effective fashion, each by itself may not provide an adequate
respond to Thailand’s current political issues. Following along the path, Section IV will
then present the condition of Thailand’s democracy in correspondence with Chapter II
and its evolution from the early elitist to a participatory-based form, which has yet
continued to pose the same set of problems concerning citizens’ certain attitudes toward
politics (whether apathy or aggression) caused by a mistrust in their government and the
absence of certain qualities in the administration. These questions must be addressed
through an understanding of our cultural traits and the development of the social
discipline, and by balancing government functions to generate the type of governing
process that, in turn, fosters the “citizenship” character of the people. In connection with
such arguments, Section V elaborates justifications for the employment of a liberal
element and a set of participatory mechanisms to enhance the function of public
participation which I believe the Constitution is lacking in this participatory mode. And
last but not least, Section VI will serve as a conclusion – a summary of a better solution.
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II. Modern Challenges
Since the arrival of the 1997 Constitution, Thailand has taken an aggressive move
to advance the country’s democratic development by focusing primarily on improving the
people’s rights, government accountability and the integrity of political institutions
through the incorporation of a strong check and balance system directly from the people
in addition to that of the conventional parliamentary system.1 Thailand clearly perceived
direct political participation by the people to be a supplemental mechanism of ensuring
the quality of “self-government”. Public participation has, therefore, dramatically gained
a major role in several areas of public affairs, and as a matter of a State’s fundamental
principle. The public participation mechanisms will be further elaborated in Section IV, B
(ii).
Despite the benefits that public participation has to offer, there are several general
claims against this concept.2 This section will focus on some of the primary claims that
are directly applicable to Thailand’s current democracy condition as partially laid out in
Chapter I. These are the issue of citizens’ passivity in the area of “remote politics”, deep
social division aggravated by the discontentment of personally affected, but inadequately
accommodated individuals and the ineffectiveness of the administration.
A. Passivity, Low Level of Energy and Thoughts, Weak Sense of Social
Responsibility
The apathetic, less-informed and non-energized characters of the average citizens
in the realm of politics is a typical claim asserted by elitism and pluralism which perceive

1

Pursuant to the Constitution of 1997, important democratic mechanisms such as the system of a fully
elected Senate, the establishment of a party list system, the creation of independent “watchdog”
organizations, and the better procurement of the people’s political and civil rights were put in place.
2
These claims are, for instance, permission to allow a small percentage of citizens to pass legislation
through initiatives (Gilbert Hahn & Stephen C. Morton, Initiative and Referendum, Do They Encourage or
Impair Better State Government? 5(4) FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 937(1977)), the incompatibility with the ideal of
consensus government (MADS QVORTRUP, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF REFERENDUM 9 (2002)), the rigidity
of its outcome by providing no opportunity for amending a measure or arriving at a compromised solution
(JAMES BRYCE, MODERN DEMOCRACIES 159 (1921)), and exacerbation of conflicts (DAVID B. MAGLEBY,
DIRECT LEGISLATION, VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 181 (1984).
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public affairs as a business of bureaucrats and experts. According to their views, the
complexity of modern society, economy and social issues result in a pattern of citizens’
disengagement, which justifies the comprehensive roles of the wisest and the most
experienced in directing those of lesser knowledge and skills. Schumpeter especially cast
doubts on the level of political commitment among the average citizens as national issues
tend to be so remote that most people “hardly have a sense of reality”, in contrary to a
business world that their lives directly depend upon.
As much as I would like to deny this claim, I must admit that Thailand’s political
climate, from a certain angle, does not depart from this understanding. From the
beginning of the 1932 peaceful revolution led by the educated few and army officers, the
practice of “self-governance” was ruled by a facade of parliamentary system in which
“few bothered to vote, electoral competition was at a minimum, and the government
appointed half the members of parliament”3. For a long time, fierce political battles
among the ruling class had effectively excluded the people’s political participation. This
is not to blame the elites, but also the low civic spirit within the Thai people themselves
that had fueled these vicious cycles. The evolution of the Thai political system was
remarked as the system of “passivity of the overwhelming majority of the people”4. It is a
remarkable phenomenon to those who witnessed a series of dramatic events in the early
days in which the Thai people served as no more than the spectators of heated political
scenes.
Today, one may easily argue that the level of energy and a democratic mindset
among the people have been increased with the implementation of a new set of check
mechanisms. Nevertheless, the political energy has been unleashed into the wrong
channel, and in a rather destructive manner while leaving a formal public forum of
3
4

Donald Hindley, Thailand: The Politics of Passivity, 41(3) PAC. AFF. 355, 356 (1968).
Id. at 359.
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discussion empty and unattended. The outbreak of the bloody protest is just a form of
aggression and violence, and not rationality found in a democratic activity. Despite the
(detrimental) activism, citizens’ passivity still reigns in areas of national concern which is
where their understandings and intellectual minds could have been at their best use. In the
end, the question as to why people would rather use violence in search for a better answer
to their livelihood than delivering their opinions on the “national issue” ought to be clear
by now. This answer should alarm us about the type of issues that immediately demand
public participation to redirect the people’s energy in a constructive manner, and the type
of democratic mechanisms that can effectively accommodate the people’s concerns to
relieve this tension.
B. A Source of Deepening Social Divisions
According to pluralism, public participation can bring conflict to the surface,
deepening social divisions rather than uniting them. The cause for concern is especially
that of a polarized society which is easily fueled rather by rage than rationality.
According to David Magleby’s study, direct democracy (referendums on legislation)
“intensifies conflict and leads to a politics of confrontation.”5 Along this line, elitism
described the unfit character of average citizens for state affairs by referring to “the
emotionality of the masses” that tends to impair their judgment in politics, and
consequently weakens its stability. Extensive participation may radically transform
politics into a battlefield causing undue disruption and, in an extreme case, fanaticism.6
For pluralism, a certain degree of citizens’ passivity is actually preferable in order to
secure a stable political environment.
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MAGLEBY, supra note 2, at 181.
DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 204 (2nd ed., 1996), See also Berelson B, Democratic Theory and
Public Opinion 16(3) PUB. OPINION Q. 313-330 (1952). QVORTRUP, supra note 2, at 87 (“The prejudice of
the people is far stronger than those of the privileged classes; they are far more vulgar; and they are far
mote dangerous because they are apt to run counter scientific conclusion”).
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The issue of social fragmentation in Thailand is at its peak since the bloodless
coup of 2006. The country has been broken into two. Violence that led to the military
crackdown in the summer of 2010 was a failure of reconciliation attempts. At the deepest
level of the social disharmony, freedom of speech and assembly were mobilized by the
people to channel their anger, resentment and hatred as opposed to reason and
understanding. People’s political judgments and decisions are based on their political
alliance and loyalty. On the surface of this fragmentation, the colors that each side
attaches itself to may symbolize their political alliance. However, the root causes of the
divergence are rather driven by economic and social inequalities that have rampaged
among the lower class.7 The side that the rural people take merely suggests whom they
perceived to have better responses to their demands.8 Politics of the rich in the past has
worsened the economic and social conditions of the poor.9 The country’s harmony had
continued to crack until it was finally broken in the summer of 2010. The seriousness of
the situation raises questions on scholars’ minds whether public participation will serve
as a tool of compromise or a sword, and whether people will turn a public forum into
another battlefield. There is a dilemma. However, to completely deny a “public space”
will only suppress this tension, and eventually encourage violent political participation
outside regulated forums and institutions.
There is of course a pressing need to respond to this challenge. To my
understanding, public participation is not exactly the cause of violence, but only a

Sanitsuda Ekachai, Thailand’s Shocking Inequity Statistics, BANGKOK POST, Nov. 30, 2009,
http://www.bangkokpost.com/blogs/index.php/2009/11/30/thailand-s-shocking-inequity-statistics?blog=64
. (A shocking statistic revealed that “the top 20% own 69% of the country's assets while the bottom 20%
own only 1%. Among the farming families, nearly 20% of them are landless, or about 811,871 families,
while 1-1.5 million farming families are tenants or struggling with insufficient land. On income
distribution, the top 20% enjoy more than 50% of the gross domestic product while the bottom 20% only
4%”)
8
Martinez Kuhonta, The Paradox of Thailand’s 1997 People’s Constitution, XLVIII ASIAN SURVEY 373,
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See The Implications of Colored Movements, BANGKOK POST, Sept. 23, 2010,
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channel for people to express their senses of exclusion and under-accommodation. The
root cause is rather the unresponsiveness of the government to their (primarily) economic
and social problems that they felt had received better responses by the previous
administration. Nevertheless, to open up a wide variety for the cause of public
participation to be conducted without specificity is not going to address these personal
high demands either. Thus, how to design a forum of public deliberation that can create a
positive atmosphere in the society and foster the community is a question for a
constitutional designer to contemplate.
C. A Source of the Ineffectiveness of Government Function
In the challenge of a democratic practice, we constantly face the question of
whether it is feasible to extend citizens’ rights to public participation in all areas of state
affairs, especially when societies are densely populated, complex and heterogeneous.
Besides the problems of factions (differences of interests) as foreseen by Madison, the
issue then boils down to the institution that takes charge. Elitism has been the strongest
proponent for the argument concerning the ineffective operation of an administration
under direct democracy (public participation). From Max Weber’s position, elitism
advocated that direct democracy is unfavorable, let alone impossible, because, in a
heterogeneous society, it would only lead to ineffective administration and political
instability.10
In the context of the Thai democracy, this challenge has presented itself in a form
of the opposition party’s extensive demands of public participation on all kinds of issues
(under the broad criteria provided by the Constitution) that the government finds
impossible to catch up with, as a way to discredit and destabilize the administration. The
consequence is that the Constitution can subject the government to many methods and
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levels of public participation while the government, nevertheless, can neglect as many
citizens’ comments as it wishes while managing to satisfy the constitutional
requirements. The challenge of the opposition, however, has not necessarily guaranteed
the responsiveness of the government, and even disrupted the smooth operation,
particularly in the treaty-making process. The scenario has stalled the government’s
function by either their paying too much attention to holding all types of public
participation to avoid the opposition’s claim while piling up other issues, or doing it
frivolously and allowing the important concerns of citizens to go unattended.
Maintaining an effective and efficient government is a pre-requisite for the
function of democracy. In my view, these qualities form part of a “responsive”
administration (as a primary character of effective representation) because for a
government to be receptive to people’s needs and critiques, it does require a wellfunctioned, ready-to-handle type of government.
III. Political Theory: Governing Principles from Different Schools of Thoughts
(Ideas Concerning Political Participation addressed by each school)
Political theorists came up with several approaches to define “democracy”
whether by political conditions or principles. However, by looking at its Greek roots,
democracy does not only serve as an end objective, but also as a means of a governing
procedure11, in which power is to be exercised by the people to form the state and decide
on policy decisions.12 Thus from an understanding of the meaning of “democracy”, it at
least suggests the rights of the people to take part in the political process to ensure that

“Demos” simply means people and “kratia” is to rule, which gives a general meaning of “rule by the
people”. MICHAEL SAWARD, THE TERMS OF DEMOCRACY 8 (1998).
12
GIOVANNI SARTORI, DEMOCRATIC THEORY 3 (1962), See also, Id., at 15 (suggesting that democracy is
generally understood as “a political system in which the citizens themselves have an equal effective input
into the making of binding collective decisions. [W]hereas a non-democratic system gives power to the
hands of certain individuals to make binding decisions without any accountability to citizens”).
11
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their voices be heard and their views be taken into account.13 And to secure these rights, a
government must be established by “deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed”.14 Thus, ultimate authority and sovereignty lie in the people who gave their
consent through political participation upon which legitimate government rests.15
This method of self-rule on which democracy is based upon seems to entail public
participation by reminding us that representation can be improved by citizen deliberation
and reciprocal communications between a government and people. This section, I have
selected four different models of democracy, namely republican, liberal, elitist and
participatory which portrayed, and in some cases, delimited the ideas concerning public
participation. And how this self-rule principle is carried out by each school also extends
to the role of public participation that each of them regards in relations to the function of
democracy. From a minimalist perspective in a civic role advanced by elitism to the
extended notion of civic virtue in developmental republicanism, these models have
presented their elements throughout the evolution of Thai politics. My mission is to
analyze the weaknesses, and to seek an equation among these models for the right fit for
the Thai democracy in response to the challenges of my generation.
A. Republican
Republicanism believed in the freedom of a political community based on selfgovernment in which citizens are endowed with the right to directly participate in
government. Similar to the classical model, republicanism approves of public spirit - the
willingness of a person to set aside his personal interests in the pursuit of the public ones.
The fundamental principle of this developmental model is to secure a form of association
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that will defend “the good” of all members by a collective force and unity.16 It holds the
ideal of strong and collective identifications of the people by the principle and communal
values they share. This is a crucial role that Republicanism believes public participation
can play in the development of individuality by placing the community’s interest ahead
of anything else, and by relinquishing personal desires and preferences.
Advanced by Jean Jacque Rousseau, public participation is believed to contribute
to the formation of capable citizenry in the governance of state affairs by enhancing an
individual’s sense of social responsibility and creating concerns for public issues. He
placed a wider role of public participation by perceiving it as “central to the
establishment and maintenance of a democratic polity”.17 With this respect, there is the
need for “psychological connections” among the people within the system they live in
order to form a community, and to gain the full potential and benefits of democracy.18
According to this view, citizens’ deliberations on public issues can help creating people’s
sense of belonging, which in turn will provide long-term incentives for them to protect
communal interests. Public participation, hence, serves more than simply a protective tool
against tyranny, but also a constructive mechanism that unites individuals’ goals.19
The presumption about the qualities of individuals required for effective selfgovernance may be challenged given the current condition of Thai politics, in which
members lack sufficient incentive to deliver a collective decision. Although Rousseau
acknowledged that “this was democracy for small states”, arguing that a small scale
politics is more manageable in terms of the amount of public issues that also immediately
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touch upon people’s lives, with a smaller group of people to reconcile,20 it does not mean
that this model should not be applied in the case of a deeply divided society. Its
motivational assumptions (public virtue and the common good notions) are essential to
reduce controversies and relieve social tension. It is of course a matter of providing a
participatory framework guided by the idea of Republicanism that would motivate people
to contribute to matters that they are sure can make changes to their lives and to resolve
their differences. Nevertheless, providing public forums for broad national issues may not
necessarily create a “republican” environment. Careful consideration to reshape the
issues for public participation is required to help develop the right mindset toward this
Republican orientation.
B. Liberal
Liberalism perceives human beings as free and equal individuals. Although a state
must retain a monopoly power to provide a basis for private transaction, its capability to
regulate must be constrained to minimize the negative effects of their policy decisions
upon personal rights and freedoms of individuals, the primary interests to be safeguarded
under the notion of liberalism. The authority bestowed by individuals on government is
thus for the pursuit of the essential purposes of the governed, namely the preservation of
“life, liberty and estate”.21 It is a protective model which seeks both to restrict the power
of state, and define a private sphere by using democratic mechanisms primarily to protect
and promote individual interests. 22 Liberalism’s aim is, therefore, to secure the political
conditions that are necessary for the exercise of personal freedom.
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According to John Locke, “the institution of government can and should be
conceived as an instrument for the defense of the life, liberty and estate of its citizens”.23
The boundary of each individual is respected through the principle of morality that
encouraged individuals to preserve each other’s liberty.24 Thus, liberalism under Locke’s
philosophy is not entirely self-indulging that is merely centered on personal rights,
interests and concerns. His idea demanded that people take into consideration other’s
fundamental rights and justice when weighing against one’s own. With this respect, the
liberal concept does not only focus on the pursuit of individual satisfaction, but also the
moral development of individuals. This is also the way John Stuart Mill defined “liberty”
that one is free to pursue so long as it does not cause harm to others, deprive others of
theirs or impede their ability to obtain it.25
Liberalism may perceive citizens’ involvement in political affairs as necessary to
guard their human dignity, social justice, and to guide their own destiny as people are the
best defenders of their own rights. But the emphasis on the pursuit of individual interests
is the weakness of liberalism that needs to be carefully addressed in order to provide a
possible answer to our current challenges (citizens’ apathy, social division, unresponsive
administration). The focus of the liberal approach can induce public activism by
encouraging the expression of personal needs and desires, which must be subject to
limitation (delineate the scope) to create compromise among the community members
and an administration which is capable of handling all the important issues. Thus, the
strength of liberalism is reflected in the value it places on collectively protecting
individuals’ fundamental justice (rights to life, liberty and security) that everyone equally
shares. This is especially the case, as Mill argued, “when people are engaged in the
imposes limits by providing the very framework for the respect of “human rights” which are regarded as
being non-negotiable assets”).
23
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resolution or problems affecting themselves or the whole collectively, energies [will be]
unleashed which enhance the likelihood of the creation of imaginative solutions and
successful strategies”.26 Liberty, by itself, may not be sufficient to guarantee “human
excellence”. However, liberty pursued and facilitated through a proper means can bring
about the development of independent, autonomous and rational minds necessary for a
formation of a strong community. These means will be discussed later in the chapter.
C. Elitist
Elitism is on the other end of the spectrum, which sees the limitation of political
participation by the people as necessary. A very low level of civic involvement in
political activities has been suggested by its governing term which limitedly defines
democracy as an “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the
people’s vote”27. Elitism sees the impracticability of direct democracy and the necessity
of effective and centralized organization in order to handle the issues of mass society.
The growth of technical experts, skillful bureaucrats and a hierarchical political structure
then render the exclusion of most citizens’ political roles inescapable. Thus, with a low
estimation of individuals’ intellectual capacities and enthusiasm, political participation is
a function of the upper class. Citizens’ right to political participation has been limited to
an electoral process where competitive parties and strong leadership take the lead in
shaping people’s interests and public policy. The development of commerce, social
structure and human conditions render elitism justifications for making the ability of

Under Mill’s philosophy, vigorous protection of individual liberty enables a person to “flourish” and to
fully pursue his political and economic freedom which, in return, can benefit all in the long run. HELD,
supra note 6, at 104 (emphasis added).
27
Amy Gutmann, The Disharmony of Democracy, in NEMOS: DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY 129 (John W.
Chapman and Ian Shapiro, eds) (Vol. XXXV 1993) (quoting JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM,
SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 269 (1943).
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citizens to replace one government by another the sole channel of restraining
governmental power.
David Held may agree with the conditions of modern societies that demand quite
a level of experts, but not with those of humans that it should circumscribe citizens’ role
in partaking in political decisions. Held suggested that citizens’ passivity, apathy and
ignorance do not create the pattern of the upper class politics, but are rather the product
of this exclusivity. To many people who have little interest in political activities, they
“simply do so precisely because they experience politics as remote, and because they feel
[that] it does not directly touch their lives or that they are powerless to affect its
course”28. He further emphasized that the more the issues immediately affect people’s
lives, and the more those affected are assured that their inputs will be taken into account,
the more successfully direct public participation will serve its purposes. From this
perspective, citizens’ activism may require an involvement of personal interests, and a
responsive administration to create trust within the system in order to foster involved
citizens in the long run which is crucial to the success of direct democracy.
In sum, elitism may provide one easy solution to the politics of a mass, complex
society by putting issues in the hand of a capable few who make decisions on behalf of
their constituents. The model was, in fact, reflected in the early pattern of Thai politics.
The system of the “capable” may guarantee convenience in government administration,
but not necessarily responsiveness as the Thai ruling elites continued to exploit people’s
indifferent political attitudes. A stable political environment is not to be expected either.
With the current political condition, social fragmentation will only be worsened when
people’s interests, especially the rural poor continue to be inadequately addressed.
Similarly to the issue of passivity raised by Held, emotionality of the mass may not be the
28

Joseph Schumpeter himself saw this similar problem that as long as people view domestic and foreign
affairs as remote issues, they will continue to disengage, and “without a sense of responsibility that comes
from immediate involvement, ignorance persists” HELD, supra note 6, at 175-181.
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cause for elitism’s justification, but the consequence of its “remote democracy”. Elitism
does not provide us enough reasons why we should keep the majority of the people
uninformed, passive and socially irresponsible when there is neither a guarantee of a
responsive government nor peaceful politics. Elitism merely exploits the electorate’s
weaknesses that are susceptible to strong influence of their leaders without seeking to
improve human conditions to become more capable simply because this is what the
system thrives on. As reflected in the Thailand’s political evolution, this model is out of
the question a major failure for the Thai-style bureaucracy.
Elitism, nonetheless, at least pointed out human flaws that we can seek to
overcome through the design of an appropriate mechanism, and the understanding of a
human nature. Preparing social conditions, besides providing resources and opportunities,
is arguably as crucial for effective public participation since it takes a democratic
political structure (opportunity and resources), effective governmental function
(immediate response) and mentally active citizens altogether to form fuller democracy.
D. Participatory
Participatory democracy offers a broader range of civic engagement by enhancing
the role of citizens in managing public affairs. The model shares certain ideology with
classicalism in terms of equality and respect among citizens by their ability to directly
participate in all areas of public affairs. Participatory democracy reinforces the idea of
direct “self-governance” which replaces the roles of political ruling class by those of the
people. It recognizes certain political conditions of modern politics that can be resolved
through civic education, attitudes and actions under the mode of direct participation.29
Only the transformation and the expansion of understandings among citizens that takes
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place during the process can make them discover the commonality of their purposes. And
therefore, in contrast to republicanism, community grows out of this process, and not the
other way around.
Participatory democracy provides a full spectrum of public participation. This
type of direct democracy extends and, in fact, encourages people’s participation beyond
the public realm. The development of “citizenship” and the formation of a community
can take place in a private sphere such as workplaces or local organizations. The practical
aspect of this model is its emphasis on the transformative process at the local scale by
creating a training ground for individuals to take advantage of the available participatory
mechanism in the exercise of their control and judgment over decisions that may affect
their personal lives and community. 30 This practice also helps lifting a restrictive role of
citizens due to their lack of interest in national politics in the long run. A certain
limitation is also suggested, under this model, in correspondence with the exercise of a
local autonomy in a sense that the action of public participation is not necessarily
required at every level and in every instance, but rather frequently enough when
significant decisions are being made ,31 (which, in this case, are those affecting us
personally and our community).
In sum, whether participatory mode of democracy supports public participation in
a public or private sphere, one of its primary objectives is to cultivate civic ideals, and
develop an individual’s judgment in the direction of the community. However, the
dangers of adopting the model in a full range to apply to all kinds of public issues (as
Thailand is currently facing) are the citizens’ apathy in complex matters, the inability of a
government to follow through its obligations and the citizens’ discontentment in
personally affected areas that have not received adequate attention. The transformation
30
31
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process toward a civic community thus depends heavily upon people’s taking appropriate
actions, a government’s good response and not merely the implementation of an
institutional framework. The real challenge here is how to induce people to deliberate,
and to eventually speak for the interest of the community. As Held suggested, by giving
people good enough reasons to care about politics (through personal incentives and a
responsive government), you may be halfway to creating a community (as public
participation becomes more successful in serving its purposes). Thailand’s current
political and social conditions can benefit from the model through the idea of embarking
on small-scale concerns such as the issues of personal justice and community livelihood
which may make it easier on us to grasp common action amidst the social conflict. This
can serve as a foundation for civic action and responsibility at the national level “where
participation is harder, but the stakes are much higher”.32
IV. Thailand’s Democracy Condition: From Elitism to Participatory Model
A. Political Development: Sources of Political inequality
The year 1932 marked an important change in the political system of Thailand
both for the better and for the worse. The introduction of the principle of separation of
powers under the sovereign rights of the people has also invited the system of elite
favoritism in which politics is the business of the upper class. The Constitution, although
emphasized in the preamble that the “sovereign power comes from the Thai people”,33
helped institutionalize a hierarchical political structure in which only knowledgeable
bureaucrats took charge in the administration. There was no direct public participation in
political affairs in the early constitutions. Rights and duties of the people specified in the
permanent 1932 Constitution were limitedly exercised solely through the elections of
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79

representatives.34 Later constitutions were drawn in such a way that would allow the
government to take control of the Parliament one way or another. The 1946 Constitution,
for instance, allowed the candidates to vote themselves into the Senate, and provided the
qualifications of voters and candidates that facilitated a wider participation of its
supporters.35 In the same manner, the Constitution of 1952 gave ways to the military
government to nominate and select most of the appointed members of the Assembly.36 A
lack of education and understanding in the new form of governance were the primary
justifications for the common people to be excluded that unfortunately made elitism a
perfect fit for the early model of Thailand’s democracy. These factors became major
causes that led to the pattern of political exploitation.
It can be said that political inequality and political exploitation are causes and
consequences in themselves. The development of Thailand’s democracy has shown that
political inequality causes political exploitation, which in turn aggravates the condition of
political inequality. Despite a series of Constitutions, it was clear that running the country
was a matter of the upper class. Each constitution was primarily designed by a particular
group either to fit their personal agenda or to prevent the surge of its rivalry without
paying adequate attention to the fundamental principle, e.g. people’s life and liberty. Thai
Constitutions were not taken seriously as binding documents in the sense that whenever
there is a shift in power among the ruling elites, the Constitution was suspended to permit
new rules in favor of those in power. The purpose of its Constitution rather served as a
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tool to institutionalize elitism by supporting an ongoing power struggle among various
factions of the ruling elites in order to legitimize the politics of their time.37
Nonetheless, despite the improvement of the Constitutional mechanisms that
renders the government’s exercise of power directly accountable to the people in the vast
areas of national interests, the outcome falls short. Not only do the mechanisms provide
no guarantee for better responsiveness of government’s administration, but also worsen
its efficiency. Social unrest, violence and hatred among the people which had been
previously fueled by cycles of political and social inequalities are not resolved by the new
mechanisms. It is, on the contrary, seen as a legitimate source of the people’s power to
roam the streets. Passive political culture has obviously taken its toll on us by widening
the gap between “the haves” and “the have-nots” while perpetuating a pattern of
unresponsive administration. Consequently, when people decided to speak up, they used
violence rather than words to communicate their troubles.
i. Elitism and Cultural Discipline: Deferential Mindset
The idea of elitist governing style in the early days was reflected in a form of
monarchy, the system in which the ruling class gave directions and made decisions for
the people. Thailand’s long tradition of absolutism under which the king was a patriarchal
figure, who subsumed all the powers within him, had shaped Thailand’s social structure
in a form of class divisions. The instant change of its governing form in 1932 was
substantial to a formation of the political structure, but was not quite at the social level.
The deferential mindset of the people in public affairs, especially in the early period,
cannot be blamed on anything else but the patriarchal role of the benevolent monarch and
the social status of individuals that had designated their roles within a hierarchical
structure.
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Elitism suggested that the absence of substantial civic engagement in the
governing process was crucial for the stability of the system. In comparison to the system
of absolute monarchy, the relationship between the king and his subjects which was more
of a family-oriented form based on unity and affection literally reduced the role of Thai
people in public affairs to “the governed” who were subject to the governor’s decisions.38
Neither political mechanisms nor people acted as internal checks.39 This was due to the
fact that the Buddhist moral rules operated as constraints upon the exercise of his
absolute power. The deferential posture of the people was made stronger, especially when
the king’s absolute power was perceived less as a threat, and more of a mental shelter and
protection of their livelihood. In addition, Thailand’s old feudal system which allowed
individuals’ status to be marked by their entitlements to the pieces of property also played
a significant role in designating social responsibilities of each individual and the scope of
their roles in public affairs.40 Thus, class divisions were seen as an effective way for
nobility to assert their power and control over resources and manpower. Civic roles were
essentially limited to no more than carrying out decisions that had already been made for
them.
The product of passivity and apathy were the results of the old style elitism.
Although this was what Held suggested in the elitist democracy model, both governing

The concept of the “Lord of Life” pertains to nothing (about absolute or arbitrary power of life and death
over his subjects) more than his moral obligations to perform certain social tasks to satisfy his people’s
needs. DAVID M. ENGEL, LAW AND KINGSHIP IN THAILAND DURING THE REIGN OF KING CHULALONGKORN
2 (Alton L. Becker et. al., 1975).
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self-restriction, non-anger, non-violence, forbearance and non-obstruction. Id. at 4-5. See also DAVID K.
WYATT, THE POLITICS OF REFORMS IN THAILAND 8 (New Heaven, 1969) (suggesting the effect of the
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styles share the common character which focus on excluding people from forming their
thoughts and taking part in political decision. A long range of a hierarchical system had
forged certain political culture in the Thai people’s blood. Under the benevolent monarch,
powers exercised by the king were justifiable to the people whereas citizens’ roles were
best played (as understood among the people) by rules within their designated realms of
responsibilities. Under such a circumstance, their needs to stand up and speak for their
interests seemed unnecessary as decisions were to be made for them accordingly. Their
limited freedoms were directions and decisions to be followed (obligations) in exchange
for a protection of the communal interests. Despite this positive interaction between the
ruler and the ruled, the hierarchical structure did not disappear without leaving certain
conditions in a cultural trait. Not only did the system strip away the people’s roles in
politics, but also their political mentality. The absence of political equality in the early
Thai democracy further contributed to a passive nature among the average citizens when
it came to deliberating policy decisions. People would still do it, not because they
realized the importance of the rights they currently possessed, but simply because they
were asked to do so. Political inequality is easily aggravated under such conditions. It is
not surprising why politics easily fell into the hands of those who understood the culture
too well, and decided to act on it. Thailand’s democratization in 1932 may be known as
one of the shortest and bloodless revolutions. New political institutions were set up
overnight. However, as Sartori suggested for a democratic culture to take root, it could
take up to a generation. And it is up to us to ensure that the process takes place.
ii. “Transform-Placements Process”
In his essay, Ian Shapiro described Huntington’s theory of democratic transitions
under four different accounts; two of which are “transformations” and “replacements”.
The former refers to the scenario in which democracy is endowed by the elites in power,
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whereas the latter requires the opposition to take the lead.41 In either case, the scenarios
suggested that the adoption of democracy is possible in the exclusion of the lower class.
Thai democracy is a complex situation. It did involve a mixture of the efforts of a
new wave (the educated few) and the understanding Monarch to come to terms with the
necessity of the country’s new political system.42 Thus, on one hand, the process is
transformative in the sense that the Monarch willingly gave up his absolute power, and
allowed it to be returned to the people, while he still served as their mental shelter and the
symbol of national unity. And on the others, this substantial political reform was led and
proposed by a group of high ranking colonels and the educated upper middle class.
Although it is true that the movement was also driven by resentment among government
officials who had been laid off due to worldwide economic recession at that time,43 the
fact that the opposition group pursued an immediate action by using the military instead
of public mobilization is evidence that they acknowledged that a royalist mindset still
reigned in the general public (a lack of popular will towards the reform), especially in the
lower class and the underprivileged.44
The resolution of the country by employing legal means (drafting the
Constitution) without taking into account social factors was a risky business as the
absence of strong political will of the people has later contributed to the vicious cycle of
political exploitation by a ruling class. The fact that the 1932 movement was primarily
led by a group of the educated few who had the privilege to learn and import the ideology
from Western countries, rather than those of the lower class, industrial workers or
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publicly supported organizations suggested the absence of a democratic mindset of the
general public, which significantly forged a form of elitism.45
iii. Direct Adoption of Western Democracy: the Establishment of Forms
rather than Principle
The adoption of Western-based democracy which took shape only in the forms
(parties, elections and parliament) rather than principle brought negative consequences.46
As Giovanni Sartori suggested, imitation of a political form that has been invented
somewhere is not hard to do, but it never guaranteed a survival of democracy. Thus,
despite the establishment of a parliamentary system, elections and political parties, the
elitist system has allowed bureaucrats to actively participate and pursue their interests
under the cloak of democracy. This is obviously the advantage that elitist democracy
offered to the ruling class by limiting the people’s political participation.
While weak political will of the common people was more prevalent at that time,
there was a question of the fitness of the newly adopted Western ideology to the Thai
political culture and the social structure. In his Majesty’s remark (King Prajadhipok), his
deepest concern was that the Government might not employ proper methods of
administration compatible with “individual freedom and the principle of justice” for the
people.47 As a result, the powers that must be returned to the people who had little idea
what to do with it were simply changed hands to the new ruling elites under the disguise
of democracy. The sovereign rights of the people were bestowed upon those who were in
control of the Assembly. Whereas rights and duties of the people specified in the
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148-149. See also Ulrich K. Preuss, The Exercise of Constituent Power in Central and Eastern Europe, in
THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 213-216 (Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker, eds., 2007).
46
Supra note 41 at 92 (1996) (suggesting how instant adoption of democratic practices does not necessarily
form a democratic culture). Giovanni Sartori, How Far Can Free Gov. Travel? in DEMOCRACY: A READER
50-51(Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner eds., 2009) (describing preconditions of democracy, and that
copying democratic forms are not sufficient to procure democracy).
47
Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University, Data Paper no. 26, 1974 (citing King’s Prajadhipok’s
abdication statement expressing his concern on the incompatibility of the government administration with
individual freedoms and principles of justice).

85

permanent 1932 Constitution were limitedly exercised solely through the elections of
representatives, the National Assembly was heavily controlled by the government to
maintain its position.48 A lack of the people’s political will and participation was a
contributing factor to the abuse of power of the ruling class to enrich their wealth, and
preserve their status. The cycles of military intervention were the evidence of this fact
that it did not end the country’s ill fate, but rather opened up another opportunity for the
new ruling class to step in.
iv. Unresponsive and Ineffective Administration
The failure of Thailand’s democracy which heavily relied on the elitist democracy
led to a weak enforcement of the democratic principle while overemphasizing the process
(having various mechanisms and political institutions) that had been put in place only to
benefit a particular group.49 The weak enforcement also had much to do with the Thai
people’s mindset that allowed the practice of political exploitations to persist whereas the
establishment of a formal process such as a constitution, Parliament, political parties, and
election served nothing more than to verify the position of those in power.
These are the sources of unresponsive administration in which the government’s
high-handed method had primarily been made against its opponent with little regard to
people’s interests and their well-being. Decisions were made and resources were
allocated in favor of those in power which further aggravated political and social
inequalities. Transparency and honesty remained rare qualities in government
administration. Corruption had thus rampaged among ruling elites.50 Thus, the claim of a
responsive administration, if any to be made, is for the rich.
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Arguably, the early challenges that the Thais had struggled to overcome over
decades may have been alleviated. Nevertheless, a new form of bureaucratic inefficiency
has also emerged by the arrival of the modern reforms that attempt to seal these
loopholes, and to uphold the basic socio-political rights and freedoms of the people. The
recent version of the Thai Constitution may have been devoted to promoting
accountability and transparency in government administration by incorporating direct
democracy (public consultation) in vast areas of political affairs as well as facilitating
strenuous checks from the legislature and other independent agencies. There is yet the
question of practicality, and whether the drastic approach will, in turn, further undercut
the effectiveness of an administration, which is already lacking. The requirement of
extensive public participations in all kinds of national issues may satisfy a core
democratic element (self-governance), but is deemed inadequate if its effect causes
failure in government’s policy decisions to reflect any of citizens’ opinions and concerns.
The emergence of the new rights in political participation is a sharp contrast to the
traditional constitutions that solely emphasized an electoral process as a means to control
the government’s exercise of power. The new rights affirm the principle of political
equality and justice. It is then left to the people to exercise and enforce these rights with
appreciation and responsibility. And it is up to us to redesign the participatory
mechanisms to keep the people within this line. These are cultural, political and social
issues that cannot be addressed merely through a change of a political structure, but
through a new creation of cultural and social disciplines.

nepotism. Boris Podobnik et al., Influence of Corruption on Economic Growth Rate and Foreign
Investment, 63 THE EUR. PHYS. J. B 547 (2008), available at http://polymer.bu.edu/hes/articles/psnis08.pdf.
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B. Emergence of Participatory Model under the Emphasis of “Civic Virtue”
i. Constitutional Reforms (1997 and 2007 models) and the Public Spirit
The arrivals of the 1997 and 2007 Constitutions brought about periods of major
political reforms51 that had incorporated the concept of participatory democracy with an
emphasis on the people’s deliberation in the interests of the nation. Thus, the
Constitutions are not only meant to combat the country’s past failure by focusing
primarily on improving the people’s participatory rights in the political decision-making
process (in addition to the checks under a conventional parliamentary system) to induce
government accountability and transparency, but also to create a stronger sense of public
spirit.52 Although previous Constitutions spelled out a certain degree of civic duties, no
constitution can make it clearer than that of the 2007 version in the requirement of a
person’s duty to defend the country and “to safeguard national interests.” Thus, the new
Constitution may generously provide people with participatory rights in the political
process (to be described in the following section), but it does also require a higher form
of participation in which Rousseau believed through “stressing the centrality of
obligations and duties [of the people] to the public realm.”53 These collective obligations
are fundamentally reflected, for instance, in Section 67 in the national conservation and
protection of the environment, Section 71 in defense of the country’s national interests,
Section 87 in the participation concerning the determination of policies and plans for
national economic and social development, and Section 190 in the involvement of treaties
affecting national sovereign rights and jurisdiction, economic, social security, trade and
budget of the country. By shaping the issues that are nationally-centered to be subject to
51
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public deliberation, the Constitution does not only seek to foster an active and involved
citizenry, but also implies its faith in the people’s public spirit to come forward with a
united goal to make their decisions based upon “the common good”.
ii. What do the Participatory Rights Cover?
A broad framework to promote public participation in political decision-making,
state plan and policy and in the scrutiny of the exercise of the government powers has
been laid down in the 2007 Constitution as a matter of principle. Chapter V, Part 10 (the
directive principles of state policies in relation to public participation) established the
purposes and general areas of public participation that the state must accommodate. The
provision also requires the state to provide resources and education in the promotion of
this political right. This broad framework, therefore, laid a strong foundation for several
other sections in the implementation of public participation for national interests.
The guarantee of public engagement in political realm is certainly not limited to
liberties in connection with assembly and association (Chapter III, Part 11). Chapter VII
provides substantial rights to the people for their direct political participation (in addition
to petition for the proposal of a bill to the National Assembly, to lodge a complaint to
remove the persons from office) in a referendum where the matter may affect “national”
or “public interest” or is required by law. This general term has become a rule of thumb
which can trigger the people’s right to political participation as long as issues affecting
national interests or the common good are implicated. The new public rights are,
therefore, included in several policy decision-makings such as in the areas of foreign
affairs and environmental protection. The following sections are operated in accordance
with the directive principles of state policies in relation to public participation.
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Section 165 (Chapter VII) specifies circumstances under which a referendum
may be conducted, in the case where the Council of Ministers is of the opinion that any
issue may affect national or public interests.54
Section 190 (Chapter IX) requires public hearing in a treaty-making process for
any treaty which “provides for a change in the Thai territories or extraterritorial areas
over which Thailand has sovereign rights…or has extensive impacts on national
economic or social security or generates material commitments in trade, investment or
budgets of the country.”55
Section 66 (Chapter III) endows the right of a community to participate in the
conservation, preservation and exploitation of natural resources, and in the protection,
promotion and preservation of the quality of the environment. According to this
provision, public consultation must be made prior to undertaking any project or activity
which may seriously affect the community with respect to the quality of the environment,
natural resources and health.56
iii. “Developmental” Element under Participatory Democracy
From its framework to specific provisions, the Thai Constitution can be described
as aspiring toward participatory democracy by focusing on the people’s rights to selfgoverning through a means of direct political participation other than an electoral
process. Nevertheless, the Constitution’s specific reference to civic duties (Chapter IV)
and to specific provisions (Chapter VII, Section 66, 165 and 190) concerning political
participation in the issues of national concerns as described (e.g. to petition to remove
officers, to deliberate on a treaty that has extensive impacts on national economic or
social security) presents a certain element of republicanism by demanding a collective
role of the people to address, strictly speaking, non-private issues. Thus, matters affecting
54
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national or public interests which require individuals’ decisions to be based on what is
best for the country (rather than personal preference) establish a system of cooperation.
And it is this system that republicanism strives for. Thus, the current Thai Constitution
does not only adopt the idea of participatory democracy (forms of direct democracy in
several areas of political decision-making), but also place an emphasis on the
developmental element stressed in the republican model by subjecting concerned national
issues ranging from environmental conservation to foreign policy to public deliberation
in the creation of “concerned citizens”.
The adoption of participatory democracy is clearly established in the
Constitution’s principle which seeks to promote civic roles in the governing process and
to emphasize that “the sovereign power belongs to the Thai people”. The directive
principles of state policies fully embrace the notion of strong democracy by specifically
requiring the state’s roles not only in promoting public participation at all decisionmaking levels, but also in providing civic education for political development. Civic
education and well-informed citizens remain ones of the most important ingredients
stressed by participatory democracy that made citizens capable of transforming one’s
interest into a community’s.57 The extent of this type of direct democracy goes beyond an
electoral process, and is not only limited to a “consultative”, but is also an “initiative
process”. The entire constitutional chapter on direct political participation by the people
has dedicated to empowering people to propose a bill and to remove misbehaving officers
from the office. Thus, through these different types of processes, the participatory model
is clearly adopted under the Constitution to generate people’s stronger political will
power in directing the fate of their community.

57

BARBER, supra note 29, at 117.

91

Beneath the participatory model, an element of republicanism is arguably present
in terms of the types of issues to be subject to public participation, which in a way
demands a community mindset of participants to solve problems that may be remotely
out of their concerns. These issues are those affecting public interests: territorial
demarcation and sovereignty, national budgets, economic and social security and so on.
The presumption is there in the qualities of individuals required for effective selfgovernance, and that people aspire to “think community” to begin with. Opportunities for
public participation (public issue formulation) then become the formation of “a society in
which the affairs of the state are integrated into the affairs of ordinary citizens”.58 In my
view, the aspect of the participatory process that stresses a collective decision-making of
the people in the issues that concern the nation as a whole (civic virtue) rather than
individuals requires a high degree of a citizen’s communal mindset. Individuals’ aims
and wishes are cast away by issues framed toward social responsibility and the pursuit of
public wellness. This specific aspect of the Thai’s participatory democracy can be seen as
inspired by republicanism.
iv. Weaknesses: Potential Tensions between the Two Models and Rethinking
Constitutional Provisions
Despite the mixed elements of the Thai Constitution, republicanism and
participatory democracy operate on different presumptions and principles. Whereas the
former is based on politics of homogeneity, the latter recognizes one of the most
important conditions of modern politics; competing interests, conflicts and pluralism. The
function of public participation under participatory democracy is rather employed to
reconcile these differences than to forge consensus based upon previous norms.59 Both
models are clearly different in terms of their means in the pursuit of their social ends. The
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version of direct democracy by Benjamin Barber, thus, rejects a republican approach
based on its collectivist, unitary aspects and the idea of civic virtue community through a
believe that individuals’ interests must be first recognized and transformed, only then a
community can later be created. This is, however, what might be missing from the idea
that the current Constitution embraces as it requires people to deliberate with a public
mind, and to think collectively in the interest of the country. Its focus of public
consultation at a national level, without paying adequate attention to small scale issues,
may increase the degree of this ideological tension, and jeopardize participatory principle
itself. What we might be implementing here is pushing this deeply divided society to
address highly collective and extremely political issues. Whereas there is an absence of
public participation in the areas of economic and social concerns at individuals’ level,
these are inadequately provided at a local scale.60 The path to fully appreciate the benefits
of participatory democracy requires us to rethink and redesign the scope of public
participation.
The problems of the Thai democracy that encompasses various dimensions,
citizens’ apathy in politics, serious social fragmentation or administration inefficiency are
legitimate reasons to undertake another round of constitutional adjustment by shifting
public participation’s focus more on the issues that affect individuals’ fundamental rights
and local communities’ rights. This is the area where the idea of liberalism can help
bridging the gap between participatory and republican models by raising the issue
concerning fundamental justice (life, liberty and security interest) that each individual
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shares to develop into a common understanding. Barber may reject liberalism based on
the argument of self-consummation. However, there is a tactful element that lies in this
individualistic character which can have positive impacts on Thai democracy. The
importance of shifting the scope of public participation to focus on individual
fundamental interests, and the role that liberalism can play in order to reconcile these
differences will be further elaborated in the following section.
The current approach may seem generous in its terms for inviting political
participation by the people to address all kinds of complex national issues. It is, however,
inadequate to overcome specific weaknesses posed in the modern Thai society. In the
path toward building citizens’ strong commitment to make a public choice and creating a
community, individual needs and differences must be first recognized, shared and
understood by others. The following section seeks to resolve the tension between the two
ideologies by suggesting how the incorporation of liberalism can come into play to help
bridging the gap, and to overcome these specific challenges.
V. Toward Cultural Reform and Creation of a New Social Discipline through
Strengthening Political Participation Instrument
Because of the weaknesses of public participation set forth in the first section, this
republican-mixed participatory form is deemed inadequate in response to these modern
challenges. Adopting a liberal component in participatory democracy is required, and
does not necessarily replace the republican values. On the contrary, my arguments in the
following section will show how this approach can enhance the quality of a “citizenship”
(informed, socially responsible and rational) by breaking a certain aspect of cultural
barriers and a negative social discipline.
Liberalism underlines the importance of an individual’s fundamental rights to
make us realize the values of the rights we hold to begin with. It is the notion that will
make us understand that our rights are as important and as uninfringeable as others. Thus,
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in the exercise of one’s personal freedom, one cannot do so without disregarding his or
her community. Liberalism, to my understanding, does not go so far that it legitimizes the
supremacy of one’s interest over another’s. Liberalism requires us to recognize each
individual’s interest and prioritize it in accordance with its necessity on the basis of
mutual understandings and compromises. Through this mode of participation, democracy
will turn into a project that forges ordinary citizens’ potentiality through self-discovery of
their personal needs, and eventually the realization of the common concerns.
A. The Need to Break Cultural and Social Barriers to Fully Embrace Democratic
Principles
A series of constitutional reforms have been undertaken primarily aiming at
deconstructing and reconstructing Thailand’s political structure (the establishment of
various democratic forms). Despite the transformations of its legal and political
landscape, the conduct and political will of the people in the pursuit of this path may only
be enhanced if facilitated by effective mechanisms. An emphasis on a liberal component
within participatory democracy is a way to create active citizenship and a new social
discipline that teaches them to deliberate on the basis of rationality, and to give faith in
the governing system. It is, therefore, my understanding that the improvement of
Thailand’s democracy condition does not solely depend upon a change in the political
structure, but also the cultural and social aspects to be addressed in the context of
liberalism.
B. Justification for Incorporating Liberalism into Participatory Democracy: the
Affirmation of Fundamental Rights
The attack on liberalism oftentimes relies on the assumption of the pursuit of pure
self-interest, rather than of the community as a whole. The typical claim lies in the heart
of human nature which is based on self-satisfaction, self-fulfillment and a desire for
personal gains. For better or worse, this is the reality we must acknowledge. My take on
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the incorporation of the liberal approach into public participation, of course, does not
approve of all sorts of unlimited personal freedoms and individuals’ rights, but rather of
those that need to be protected. Here, we are talking about the protection of negative
freedom, freedom from interference of one’s fundamental rights and liberties. When it
comes to the issues surrounding individuals’ fundamental justice (human rights, life,
liberty and security interests), no matter how diversified the community is, we cannot
deny that all equally share the same type of legitimate interest and the desire to secure a
livelihood.
The deficiency of the existing public participation mechanisms that encompass
broad public issues (such as those affecting national budgets, having substantial social,
economic impacts or national security) is that they sometimes do not give people enough
reasons to be active and to become concerned citizens, while at worst failing to
accommodate those who might be personally affected. With the dramatic increase in
numbers of the “qualified issues” for public participation, there is also a question of how
well numerous public hearings will respect and reflect people’s opinions, if at all. Can the
government meaningfully follow through with this constitutional obligation, especially
given that there is no follow-up process? In contrast to the matter of individuals’
fundamental rights, high-profile national issues arguably tend to produce less responsive
administration with regard to public opinion due to the fact that there are no individual
needs to serve, no specific misery to attend to, and no one to contest this government’s
failure. Benjamin Barber referred to this scenario as political hypocrisy in which political
elites throw referenda at the people, and overwhelm them with all kinds of complex mass
society problems.61 The process therefore leads to further passivity through self-

Barber’s claim, however, rather pointed out to the problem of a lack of information, full debate and
insulation from money and media that prevent people from fuller and effective participation. Because the
active, engaged and civic-minded characters of citizens have been presumed, the argument for strong
61
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perpetuating ignorance in the areas of “remote politics” while building up tensions for
better responses in the areas of “daily politics”.
To get people to come forward and deliberate in accordance with our democratic
purposes, the process must create a system that fosters civic activity and trust among the
constituents (among the people, and between the people and the government). The
justifications for adopting the specific aspect of liberal ideology (in the protection of
individuals’ life, fundamental liberty and security) is, therefore, to form this meaningful
decision-making process by the people through (i) breaking the pattern of passivity, (ii)
keeping the executive truly accountable and responsive to its constituents, (iii) generating
compromise within the society, and (iv) developing the “will power” as opposed to the
“want” as part of the social harmony process. The approach seeks to break the barrier
between liberalism and democracy by using liberal elements to recover its moral
dimension. When the system is designed to cultivate individuals’ motivations and
intellects, only then the maintenance of liberty and individual development “can be fully
achieved with the direct and continuous involvement of citizens in the regulation of
society and state”62.
i. Breaking the Pattern of Passivity
It has been said that for democracy to be meaningfully implemented, there needs
to be more than simply political rights and public space. People themselves must exercise
these powers actively and caringly.63 In the absence of the energy and the civic spirit, the
function of democracy is deemed to diminish. Citizens’ attitude toward politics can be a
barrier to its development when citizens fail to act upon which the circumstances so
require.

democracy fails to address another crucial issue that deals with individuals’ incentives. BARBER, supra note
29, at 154.
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HELD, supra note 6, at 267.
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ALAN KEENAN, DEMOCRACY IN QUESTION 7 (2003).
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In light of this difficulty, the theory of a “civic reserve” developed by Gabriel
Almond and Sidney Verba suggested that citizens, while generally uninterested in public
affairs, will be able to “mobilize resources if…their interests are threatened.”64 By the
same token, Carol Pateman supported that the pattern of citizens’ apathy and ignorance
can be broken by “making democracy count in people’s everyday life”65. She
acknowledged the weaknesses of the human nature that any decision would not be made
as effectively as “in those nearer home”, and that people will learn to participate from
issues that they are most interested in and likely to have a better grasp of which are those
“immediately touch their lives”.66 According to this logic, strong motivations and passion
of the people to play their parts in public realm are simply generated from policy
decisions or governmental actions that directly affect or threaten their personal justice.
Thus, one of the simplest ways to overcome people’s passivity and indifference in
politics is to let them address and manage their affairs through issues that are individually
or community related. Following the “civic reserve” theory, citizens’ activism and
interests in politics are generally heightened when they personally feel that there is a need
to take action.
In response to the question of a constitutional mechanism, these rationales require
that we readjust the scope of public participation by prioritizing those who are to be
personally affected by government’s undertakings to get their words out in a formal
hearing process prior to the project. The strategy is thus to extend the method of
democratic control to the areas upon which people’s livelihood depend. Although this
view sounds somewhat self-indulgent in a sense that people’s active and effective
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participation requires a subject of discussion that they personally care about or have a
reason to be interested in, it is by no means that an end result will always be selfsatisfactory, especially when the surrounding issues concern an individual’s fundamental
rights. No matter how self-interest driven one can be, the matter that requires immediate
attention justifies individuals’ articulation of their personal needs and concerns. It is one
of the easiest starts to prepare people to articulate their personal needs in a way of a
public spirit. My intention is to propose a basic solution that can serve as a stepping stone
toward a more ambitious goal such as national politics. Before then, the character of an
active, concerned and informed citizen must be nurtured. And we can leave the elitism’
claim behind that because of the passive and apathetic characters that citizens in general
possess, people should be kept in their private realm. Besides, legitimacy in policy
decisions will be automatically improved as those personally affected can exercise the
right to express their problems and propose solutions of their own.67
ii. Keeping the Executive Fit
The primary arguments for limiting the scope of public participation to issues that
immediately concern individuals’ fundamental rights go directly to support the function
of democracy in two ways. One is necessary for securing effective and responsive
administration, and the other is for inducing and maintaining active roles of citizens in
the political realm. The latter effect is also contingent upon the former. Public
participation can serve as a safety valve to secure people’s interests only when a
responsive character of the state is present to guarantee that people’s feedback will form
parts of the political decisions, and that state’s policies will be guided by public opinions.
The same holds true for the maintenance of effective public participation that can protect
individuals’ justice and the quality of one’s citizenship as “engaged citizens”. Thus,
Shapiro criticized Gutmann and Thompson’s false presumption on the legitimacy of deliberative process
concerning the health care issue that involved less than twenty percent of affected population. IAN
SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 29 (3rd ed. 2006).
67
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framing issues to enable public participation to serve specific purposes, to have real
impacts on people, and to be practically feasible are crucial to what type of effects we
wish public participation to have upon the people. This certainly requires us to refrain
from generating all kinds of high-profile, complex and random issues for public
consultation. Even Benjamin Barber in his book, Strong Democracy, suggested its own
version of limitation by pointing out that direct self-governance of citizens does not
necessarily take place “at every level and in every instance, but frequently enough and in
particular when basic policies are being decided and when significant power is being
deployed”.68 And with my own interpretation, the “basic policies” and “significant
power” here refer to fundamental issues surrounding individuals’ life, liberty and
security.
The concern of the effectiveness of government administration addresses the issue
of public participation process on two grounds: first, the areas of public participation and
secondly, the manner in which to institute. The issues of fundamental individual rights
are increasingly important in the treaty-making context and especially crucial in the
health and environment related legislation enactment that demands a highly responsive
administration. By cutting down the potential issues to be subject to participation process
may not be sufficient to secure the type of administration that we want, a formal hearing
which allows an appeal process is necessary to make sure that people were listened and
the government’s decision is carefully observed. It is true that the issue of individuals’
fundamental interest already provides government a specific purpose to be attentive. This
follow-up process will serve as a formal safeguard in addition to such rationality.
The process of public participation requires people to come forward and
deliberate. But it takes a responsive and effective administration for public participation
BARBER, supra note 29, at 151 (“Government by the people directly…was of course impractical if not
impossible for any society of substantial population”). Supra note 13, at 9.
68
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to fully serve its function - effective in the sense that a government can manage its
resources and handle the mandatory requirements, and responsive in a way that it can
truly incorporate public feedback into policy decisions.69 Keeping the scope of the issues
broad thus runs the risk of producing dysfunctional administration through the
cumulative consequences of all sorts of initiatives that a state finds impossible to catch up
with.70 The reduction in the effectiveness of the Thai government is posing challenges
such as unmanageable workloads and irresponsible administration (temptation to fastforward their obligations only to satisfy the rules while ignoring the true meaning of the
procedure), especially in the absence of any formal follow-up process.71
Centering issues on individuals’ fundamental rights and guaranteeing a responsive
formal process help create people’s trust in government and faith in democracy by
showing them that democracy is not simply an abstract notion, but a process in which
their actions can make a difference. Public participation oftentimes fails to transform
conflicts into a solution primarily because the citizens’ compromised position fails to
form part of the political decisions. It then becomes simply a meaningless tool that draws
people together just so they can find out later on that their share of concerns have been
given up for something else that they did not negotiate for.72 Using public participation to
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address broad political issues such as matters affecting a national budget, social security
and so on can give rise to such problems, especially when the reflection of citizens’ input
in the national issues is commonly minimal.
David Held emphasized the significance of maintaining the effectiveness of
public participation by pointing out that if people have reasons to believe that their inputs
are unlikely to be taken seriously, incorporated or weighed equally as those of public
authorities, it is less likely of course that people will count on the system or find the
government trustworthy.73 The result will further undermine the participation mechanism
itself making it more difficult, if not impossible, to maintain an engaged role of citizens.
iii. A Path Toward Compromise, not Consensus
The path to generate consensus among people’s political views on the issues of
national concerns or the “common good” can be impractical. Besides posing a challenge
to public participation in terms of citizens’ apathy, broad political, social or economic
issues also run a greater risk of creating diversion and aversion among the people,
especially in a highly polarized society. Tocqueville, in fact, asserted the reason why
high-profile or broad issues will not produce effective public participation due to its
tendency to intensify social conflicts driven by participants’ biases, political alliance and
emotion.74 Its danger lies in the unlimited scope and imprudent application of public
participation. Overload of information and extreme publicity concerning a national issue
often cause citizens to be “exposed to so many opinions and so many facts that they are
reduced to choosing at random”75 as opposed to their sense of rationality. This is the
scenario that wide open national issues tend to produce: confrontation and hostility.
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Many are sensitive matters which somehow, to great amount of people, serve as an
implication for their political alliance that will only exacerbate their inability to accept
their internal differences (ideas or political views). The current approach may presume
that participants will enter into a forum with an impartial, open mind concerning their
solutions, but it is hardly the case, given Thailand’s recent political situation.
How can a specific, individual-related issue open up people’s minds? The
argument is drawn from a distinctive characteristic that the concept of individuals’ life,
liberty and security possessed. Unlike general political issues, its dramatic impact on
people’s lives can more easily call upon communal sympathy and understandings. A
hearing process which invites and responds to affected individuals is crucial to a path to
reconciliation. A guarantee of a responsive process to individuals’ fundamental justice is
a way of recognizing the differences and diversity of needs that are so crucial that they
cannot simply be denied of their existence. The approach does not try to accommodate
every single interest, but to ensure that the interests affected are acknowledged and
articulated in search of compromise and understandings among equal citizens.76 This
follows: “[a] richer understanding of process of democratic discussion results if we
assume that differences…function as a resource for public reason rather than as divisions
that public reason transcends”.77 The pressure for consensus, particularly required for
issues of national concerns, is generally a suppression rather than a transformation of a
conflict between individual interests and civic virtue. As previously asserted, the liberal
mode of participation which narrows down the issue of public consultation will seek to
generate compromise, rather than consensus based on mutual respect and understandings
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under the principle that one’s individual rights cannot prevail when such an assertion
infringes upon another’s. The decision one makes will require him to be grounded upon a
moral principle (which can sometimes even be one’s personal preference). It can help
generate community awareness through developing citizens’ compassion and mutual
understandings. This process forms a basis for harmony which allows people to fully
participate in their daily politics, and to relate to each other in positive ways. With the
right mechanism, the country can be led away from internal diversion and toward the rule
of law. Argued by Richard Arneson, in Liberal Democratic Community, liberalism may
present individual conflicts in the short run, but it protects all citizens’ stake “in the
maintenance of an open society for goal formation”78 as a building block for tolerance
and wide individual liberty.
iv. Developmental Driven
Both John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas believed that the priority of basic liberal
principle must be given since its protection provides the framework for the exercise of
free public reason, the framework in which citizens’ reasonableness and rationality thrive
on. This concept of political justice, by giving people a sense of security in their affected
rights through a guarantee of a responsive public hearing, enables them to express and
transform their understanding of the good through political interactions in the long run.79
Public participation may oftentimes be seen as a conflicting principle of individualism
that primarily seeks to protect individual’s preferences and freedoms rather than to
promote consensus on public issues.80 Nonetheless, the process of public participation
that is based on the concept of fundamental rights to life, liberty and security will
encourage individuals “to view one another as being entitled to universal moral respect
78
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and egalitarian reciprocity”81 enabling the protection of fundamental justice for all. The
issue oftentimes brings the scenario in which a person comes to realize how his personal
interest encompasses others with whom he is associated with. What I view as my
livelihood may also be others’, and together is the community’s. This type of self-interest
can generate a share understanding among those who bear the same fate. A collective
goal need not be “common”, but can be an interest all can share.82 The process, therefore,
does not only induce the desire of an individual to speak up, but also brings about the
recognition of moral rights among the affected citizens in that particular community.
Dialogues in the liberal mode, I must argue, helps humans understand each other’s
circumstances, prioritize pains felt by him and the members of his community, and
develop sympathy toward one another. The liberal mode of participation that focuses on
the very fundamental issues thus encourages the deliberation of one’s personal needs; a
process that allows individuals to discuss, to share, to be informed, and to form a rational
choice capable of making a joint decision.83
Participation in politics “called upon citizens to weigh interests not his own; to be
guided…by another rule than his private partialities; to apply, at every turn, principles
and maxims which have for their reason of existence the common good”.84 I can only
validate the argument that political participation is believed to hold this intrinsic value for
the development of individuality when the type of political participation can truly unleash
individual energies, and render a meaningful process. It is, therefore, a matter of
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designing a process that will induce and draw the people to come together in the first
place to make such transformation happen.
VI. Patching Up Pieces
Social issues that have rampaged in the Thai society are not novel problems of
democracy. In fact, Thailand seems to pick up all the possibilities (unfavorable
conditions) that could leave public participation the least feasible alternative - citizens’
passivity in national issues, serious social tension and ineffective administration. Despite
its sharp teeth, the Thai Constitution, to my understanding, is only half-way operational,
and has not yet effectively enforced these mechanisms. Instead of fostering the quality of
citizenship and democracy, public participation has widened the gap between the most
experienced and the less capable by further encouraging a sense of apathy while
disconnecting the affected constituents from the system. In addition, the broad realm of
public consultation has presented threats to the effectiveness of governmental functions
in such a way that the means of direct participation does not serve its original purpose,
but is merely a shield in a battlefield of politics.
To this end, if the existing machinery (public participation) cannot serve its
function, and may in fact worsen the social conditions, it is time not for the abandonment,
but the readjustment. Different models of democracy as mentioned each have great
features to offer. It is unnecessary to be critical of one, and not another, and to solely rely
upon a single model. Participatory democracy has laid a strong foundation under the
current Constitution, but to make it work may require a seed of liberalism and a balance
in elitism’s claim (effective administration) to finally achieve the ideology of
republicanism (a sense of community and citizenship). As much as narrowing down the
sphere of public participation to a very fundamental issue must be undertaken, a
responsive mechanism must be guaranteed. Greater emphasis should be placed on the

106

necessity to define and delimit the sphere of politics to unleash, direct and foster
individual energies in the civil society into the right channel.85 Cutting down issues does
not only mean allowing the government to focus on, and respond to a very fundamental
one, but also creating greater trust among the people and of the people in the political
process. John Stuart Mill also pointed out that there is a way to incorporate and transform
individual liberty into a building block for utilitarianism, the greatest good of all.
In sum, this is not simply a proposal to a legal reform, but also a cultural one.
When a Constitution gets ahead of the people, it is our task to slow the process down to
allow them to move along. To leave it up to the people to catch up with the system, to my
belief, is a major flaw since this can be another cycle of political development in the
absence of the “necessary will” of the people (that is, the will to undertake the right
political action) to entail a proper function of democracy, which may lead us back to
where we started. Promotion of political equality cannot be made simply by adopting a
new political structure, but also cultural reform through creating a new social discipline.86
We surely do not wish that this instrument to be just an empty process only to fulfill the
definition of a democratic nation.

A triumph liberal way of thinking, “a sense that limiting excesses of government and protecting
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Chapter IV: On the Separation of Powers (The State’s Organs)
I. Introduction
The common understanding of executive efficiency which can sometimes be
narrowly interpreted as administrative “convenience”1 led to the emergence of various
forms of democratic mechanisms to ensure greater diligence on the part of the
government, and to prevent the abuse of power as a result of the branch having all the
powers and accessible resources at hand. The emphasis of the people’s broad
participatory rights in the political decision-making process as introduced in Chapter III
was one of the examples that affected the priority of the administrative efficiency of the
executive in the governing process. The concern is nevertheless conceivable because the
term “convenience” can result in the disregard of the public views and representation (the
involvement of legislature) simply to get things done, and the tendency toward power
monopolization by that particular branch in the absence of political barriers. The notion
of checks and balances introduced under the separation of powers doctrine has therefore
been argued to counter such effects, and to create accountable and responsible
governance rather than to facilitate the political process, in other words, the function of
administration.
Against this backdrop, this chapter will present another perspective in regard to
the relationship between the separation of powers doctrine and the administration
efficiency that should be in a positive manner by promoting both efficiency and
accountability qualities in the governing process. And it is not necessary that we must
give up one quality for another. In fact, the emphasis on the central role of the executive
in the realm of foreign affairs is to respect the division of powers under the principle of
checks and balances. The interference by other branches (checks), although legitimized
1

LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 35 n. (1990) (citing Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926)).
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under the separation of powers principle, cannot exceed the necessary level because
efficiency requires a sufficient level of the executive autonomy in the foreign affairs
conduct along with the consideration of judicial deference under particular
circumstances. My argument by no means suggests that check mechanisms must be
deprived for the benefit of the executive branch’s political independence. These roles,
functions and responsibilities of each branch are carefully divided and prescribed under a
constitution. My position here is only to point out that it is crucial for this instrumental
framework to ensure both political autonomy and accountability of the public institutions.
Because when the constitutional structure allows too much boundary crossing among
branches, it can undermine the autonomy and undercuts the effective function of the
political departments, which constitutes an element of our democracy.
This chapter will introduce the concept of the separation of powers doctrine and
its relevance to the preservation of the executive’s foreign affairs authority (Section I) by
examining the structure of the Thai and the U.S. Constitutions and the operation of the
two systems under this principle which demonstrate the predominant roles of the
executive in foreign relations (Section II). Arguably, although the structure of the Thai
Constitution allows a broader exercise of the executive’s foreign power, the U.S
Presidential role in the realm of foreign affairs is nonetheless rather prominent in practice
than textually stipulated.2 However, there is a certain aspect of the Thai Constitution that
may have made its implementation a challenge to this tradition. These are the increasing

2

Although the President exercises a broad foreign affairs power derived from Article II, his power is not
exclusive as the Senate’s coordinate power of “advice and consent” is required in treaty policymaking,
either by participating in negotiations, by providing advice on foreign policy, or by using its veto power to
force the President senatorial policy. John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-SelfExecution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM.L. REV. 1955, 1963 (1999). See also, Arthur
Bestor, Respective Roles of Senate and President in the Making and Abrogation of Treaties-The Original
Intent of the Framers of the Constitution Historically Examined, 55 WASH. L.REV. 1, 117-20 (1979). The
Thai Constitution, on the other hand, vests the executive with a broad treaty power with a few exceptions.
Jaturon Therawat, Roles of the Parliament in Treaty Making Process under the Thai Constitution 2 (Nov.
21, 2008) (Working Paper, on file with the King Prajadhipok’s Institute), available at
http://www.kpi.ac.th/kpith/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=264&Itemid=9
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roles of the legislative and judiciary interventions that have threatened the effective
function of the executive in the treaty-making process. Against this unconventional
practice, there are good rationales behind the proposition of centralized executive foreign
affairs authority. The institutional structure, expertise, efficiency and credibility are the
leading qualities that make the branch a good fit for the foreign affairs administrator
(Section III). At the same time, in the absence of sufficiently strong domestic
implications, these justifications also suggest limited responsibility of the legislature in
the realm of foreign relations. And last but not least, the consideration of limited judicial
review to support the primary authority of the executive in this area will be examined
(Section IV). Although the judiciary is considered an appropriate body to enforce our
constitutional process, there are certain factors like decisions that involve foreign policy
determination, the allocation of state organ powers, and important individual rights
concerns that can come into play in determining an appropriate level of judicial
involvement. These are thus key elements to the improvement of a balanced interaction
among the institutional branches in the area of foreign affairs.
II. The Separation of Powers Principle
Advanced by Montesquieu, the separation of powers doctrine is also known as the
system of “checks and balances” among the three branches of government, namely the
legislature, the executive and the judiciary, which is designed to divide government
functions, and eliminate the concentration of power.3 The framers’ constitutionalism was

Elliot L. Richardson, Checks and Balances in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT.’L L. 736 (1989). The
term "trias politica" or "separation of powers" was coined by Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La
Brède et de Montesquieu, an 18th century French social and political philosopher. Under his model, the
political authority of the state is divided into legislative, executive and judicial powers. He asserted that, to
most effectively promote liberty, these three powers must be separate and acting independently. An
Overview on the Separation of Powers, National Conference of State Legislature,
http://www.ncsl.org/LegislaturesElections/OrganizationProcedureFacilities/SeparationofPowersOverview/t
abid/13543/Default.aspx. The search to divide government by function was also undertaken by the work of
John Locke in his Second Treatise of Government to distinguish between the legislative and executive
powers. Montesquieu also adopted Locke’s understanding of the executive power as “composed of a
foreign affairs power”. Yoo, supra note 2, at 1993.
3
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committed to limited government through this governing method to ensure that such
powers only come to exist through the prescription of a constitution which assigns
functions and allocates powers to each branch. The legislature holds the power to regulate
through making, amending and abrogating laws. The executive branch has the duties to
execute the laws, take care of the daily administration, and also serve as the guardian of
the economy and internal security. And the judiciary has the primary function to enforce
the laws, and resolve disputes. These governmental powers and responsibilities are to be
set apart, and exercised independently to allow effective checks among these institutions
to occur.4 As Montesquieu observed, the executive and the legislative powers, when
falling into the same hand, can lead to a tyrannical form of government.5 Thus, the basic
idea of the doctrine is to ensure the independence of the branches and the decentralization
of powers.
The interaction among these branches is deemed crucial not only to the
effectiveness of the check system, but also “the practical working of government”.6 The
term “practical working” was, however, argued as operational and feasibly functional
rather than a “mere convenience” of a particular branch.7 Although Justice Brandeis’
opinion in Myers v. United States suggested the preclusion of the efficiency argument as
the primary objective of the separation of powers doctrine which should aim at protecting
against the abuse of power,8 the efficiency of governmental functions may at least be
perceived through the independence of the three institutions in the deliberation of their
own judgments and decisions. The argument for administrative efficiency and
effectiveness as I advocated in the previous chapter is necessary, and does not fall to the
4

Richardson, supra note 3. See also HENKIN, supra note 1, at 7.
Richardson, supra note 3, at 737.
6
Id. at 736
7
Id. (citing O’donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933).
8
Justice Brandeis wrote “the doctrine of separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not
to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power”. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 35 n.
(citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926)).
5
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same level as the claim of “convenience”. These terms (effectiveness and efficiency)
have been defined by United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the
Pacific (UNESCAP) as ones of the eight primary characteristics of good governance and
the principle of democracy.9 Efficiency thus bears a much greater quality than mere
convenience by fostering a political condition that could yield a responsible and
responsive administration. 10
Along with the principle of separation of powers, governmental functionality
should therefore be taken into consideration, and balanced against the need for
governmental checks. Although, the primary objective of institutional independence is to
enable each branch to effectively police one another rather than to facilitate the
interaction among the branches,11 the checks system however cannot be so overbearing
that it impedes with the government’s necessary functions or its primary authority. In
fact, a practical approach as opposed to a rigid one was adopted to enable the realistic
operation of government administration throughout the American history.12 In the
maintenance of balance and appropriate checks, a flexible approach which refers to
sufficient discretionary power to be exercised by a particular branch without interference
of another as a matter of decision-making is adopted.13 Thus, the powers properly
belonging to one branch should not constantly be directed and disrupted by other
9

See Chapter I, Section III, A
According to dictionary definitions, “efficiency” means “performing or functioning in the best possible
manner with the least waste of time and effort” by “having and using requisite knowledge, skill, and
industry”. The term also connotes being competent and capable. “Convenience”, on the other hand, bears
merely the character of being “at hand, favorable, easy, and comfortable for use”. Thus efficient
administration refers to the condition in which the political branch can exercise its power in its best capable
manner to serve public needs with little consumption of time, energy and resources. The convenience of
administration may only require government works to get done with not much of an effort as well as the
quality of work.
11
Yoo, supra note 2, at 1992 (“By establishing a separation of powers, Locke sought to subject the power to
regulate individual conduct to rules that would ensure accountability and fair process”).
12
MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 36-37 (1990).
13
“Functions have been allowed to courts as to which Congress itself might have legislated; matters have
been withdrawn from courts and vested in the executive; laws have been sustained which are contingent
upon executive judgment on highly complicated facts…Enforcement of a rigid conception of separation of
powers would make modern government impossible”. Id (citing The Federalist No. 37 (J. Madison)). See
also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 165-166, 170 (1803).
10
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departments.14 This flexibility reduces the potential collision among these institutions and
the restraint of the executive’s power. In light of the modern treaty practice, the current
arrangement may have gone too far to the extent that the curtailing of the executive’s
authority in the realm of foreign affairs gave rise to several political and social issues as
laid down in Chapter I and III. Thus, for Thailand, which has long maintained the
tradition of having the executive as the leading organ in the conduct of foreign policy, its
new constitutional framework that has diverted the treaty-making practice from a
practical approach (in the procurement of administrative effectiveness) is becoming a
subject of controversy.
In my view, this functional consideration is needed in order to preserve the quality
of the executive administration. Strenuous checks from the legislature and the judiciary
can pose a potential threat to the effectiveness in the formulation of foreign policy and
the conduct of foreign relations. There is also the danger of the legislature’s failure in
giving careful consideration to several different issues, which will undermine the
underlying function of the branch itself.15 And because the purpose of the separation of
powers doctrine is to create the system in which three branches can effectively police one
another’s usage of power, restoring the constitutional balance among the branches may
also deem necessary to preserve this objective.
The consequences of the principles of separation of powers can be frictions and
result in inefficiencies. And it is the price that people have to pay to ensure that
government is acting in the best interest of the people, as one may argue. But the question
is whether it is necessary that national interests and democratic values in the conduct of
foreign affairs can only be attained and maintained through the adoption of excessive
As Madison suggested, the most crucial task, in his view, is “to provide practical security for each
against the invasion of the others” THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 250 (J. Madison) (emphasis added).
15
John C. Stennis & J. William Fulbright, Senators, Lecture at American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research: The Role of Congress in Foreign Policy (July, 1971), in The Role of Congress in Foreign
Policy, 1971, at 5. See also HENKIN, supra note 1, at 58.
14
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legislative and judiciary interventions to control the exercise of the executive’s foreign
power. These interests, I must argue, will rather be best preserved when the executive,
legislature and judiciary operate as partners within the framework of the constitution. The
interaction must not simply be an attempt by each branch to assert its own power. The
resolution is rather to secure legislature consultation and judicial reviews in a proper
balance, and to maintain mutual respect among the branches.16 Under the constitution, the
executive is vested with certain political powers enabling it to have broad discretion on
matters concerning diplomacy and foreign relations. The central roles of the executive
and the consideration of judicial limits in foreign affairs are crucial to the effectiveness of
these executive functions. Constant interference of other branches, in the name of
national interests, can yield the opposite outcomes like embarrassment, indecisive foreign
policy, loss of political supports and economic benefits or even severance of foreign
relations. Thus, the argument against administration efficiency cannot be sustained when
efficiency does not simply mean “convenience” for a particular branch, but has
significant implications for vital national interest and the maintenance of our democratic
values.
As a matter of principle, democracy should be invoked to guide the construction
of our Constitution by establishing the institutions and procedures that will “promote
maximum attention to the will of the people…”17 Along this line, for the operation of the
separation of powers doctrine to promote this democratic objective by providing a
support for a constitutional foundation, a respect of the division of powers must be
observed. This goes back to my original argument reasoning why effective administration
is crucial for the government to be more responsive to its people and to act in the best

16

HENKIN, supra note 1, at 28. See also Stennis & Fulbright, Senators, Lecture at American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research: The Role of Congress in Foreign Policy (July, 1971), in THE ROLE OF
CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 15, at 39.
17
HENKIN, supra note 1, at 37.
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interest of the country. This underlying rationale should be taken into consideration as a
guiding principle to our constitutional procedures, and to our treaty-making process.18
III. Constitutions under the Separation of Powers Doctrine (Roles and
Responsibilities of the Political Organs in the Realm of Foreign Affairs)
A. Thailand’s Experience: The Executive’s Foreign Power in the Historical Context
As partially introduced in Chapter I, Thailand’s treaty-making experience was
overwhelmingly executive authoritative. Throughout the Thai history, Thailand had
maintained a long tradition of Kingship under which the Kings took their leads in the
country’s, which was not limited to the conduct of diplomacy and foreign relations, but
the overall public affairs. Under the absolute monarchy system, foreign affairs power was
vested entirely in the monarch who was the sole authority in the pursuit of foreign
relations and treaty-makings.19 They, themselves, were rulers, ambassadors and
diplomats. They made decisions whom to establish and cultivate friendly relations with.20
Trade and exchange of diplomacy, especially under the reign of King Narai (1656-1688),
made Ayudhya exceptionally one of the most powerful and prosperous kingdoms in the
seventeenth century.21 It was so astounding that the royalist French remarked as “there is
no state that is more monarchial than Siam.”22

HENKIN, Supra note 1, at 38 (“For the large twilight zone where text is silent, where original intent is
uncertain, where history is ambiguous, the principles and the values of democracy may be determinative”).
19
Diplomatic History of Thailand, http://www.mfa.go.th/web/2680.php. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
20
“King Ramkhamhaeng of Sukhothai (1279-1300) was proficient in the art of cultivating friendly
relations. He has been often described as a brilliant diplomat”. The period was proclaimed the golden era of
the Sino-Thai trade relations. Id. For records of Thailand’s past foreign relations, see LEIGH MONROE,
NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE : FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED
KINGDOM 173-181 (Leigh Monroe et al., eds.1995). See also Borwornsak Uwanno & Wayne D. Burns, The
Thai Constitution of 1997 Sources and Process, http://www.thailawforum.com/articles/constburns1.html.
21
The age of commerce and prosperity first arrived in the early seventeenth century. The kings welcomed
new knowledge, exchanged embassies with the Netherlands, France and Persia as well as borrowing
western custom, culture, architecture and lifestyle. CHRIS BAKER & PASUK PHONGPAICHIT, A HISTORY OF
THAILAND 14 (2005).
22
Id. at 15 (citing FRANCOIS CARON & JOOST SCHOUTEN, A TRUE DESCRIPTION OF THE MIGHTY KINGDOMS
OF JAPAN AND SIAM 128 (John Villiers ed., 1986) (1671)). See also, Sompong Sucharitkul, National Treaty
Law and Practice: Thailand, in National Treaty Law and Practice 687, 703 (Duncan B. Hollis et al., eds.
2005).
18
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Although, through administrative reforms in the early Ayudhya period, the
governing system was divided into four separate departments having the department of
treasury (also known as “Krom Phra Khlang”) oversee foreign affairs and policy, the
final determination of foreign policy and the treaty negotiations, including the reception
of foreign envoys were still rested with the King. A centralized and functionally
specialized administrative organization was created. 23 This tradition had been carried
over to the Bangkok period (Ratanakosin, 1782).24 The responsibilities for the conduct of
foreign affairs, especially the initiations and the conclusions of treaties, were solely
administered by the department of treasury and its sub-division (Krom Tha), which later
became an independent body assuming the status equivalent to that of a Ministry.25
In sum, the powers to conduct foreign policy, relations and the overall affairs had
predominantly been exercised by the executive under the prerogative of the King. The
long tradition of having the focal role of the divine monarch in the administration
certainly has a certain degree of influence upon Thailand’s current political culture and
social structure.26 Despite the declining political role of the monarchy, administering
foreign power through one primary organ remains the core of the Thai bureaucracy. After
all, the power to conclude a peace treaty, armistice or other treaties with other countries
or international organizations is the prerogative of the King who exercises his executive

23

See Chapter III, Section IV, A. Stennis & Fulbright, Senators, Lecture at American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research: The Role of Congress in Foreign Policy (July, 1971), in THE ROLE OF
CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 15. WILLIAM J. SIFFIN, THE THAI BUREAUCRACY:
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT 20 (1966). The centralized administration was formulated by
King Trailok who tried to transform the political structure by drawing from Khmer practice. FRED W.
RIGGS, THAILAND: THE MODERNIZATION OF A BUREAUCRATIC POLITY 70 (1966).
24
Despite the efforts of modernization, the centralized power of monarchy was displaced by office-holding
elites as the core of bureaucracy while the monarch continued its role in legitimizing politics. RIGGS, supra
note 23, at 92.
25
Krom Tha (meaning “port” in Thai used to deal with port activities) has ever since gained its new status
as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand. Supra note 19. SIFFIN, supra note 23.
26
See Chapter III, Section IV, A (describing social structure and political culture as sources of political
inequality).
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power through the Council of Ministers pursuant to Section 190.27 Thus, the historical
context may establish the tradition and practices, but in the continuation of political
modernization, it is the Constitution that prescribes the power structure, and designates
the division of labor for the public institutions.
B. Foreign Powers Vested under the Thai Constitution
Not until the first Constitution of Thailand (June 24, 1932) had the treaty-making
practice been formalized while the role of the monarch become more or less than a
symbol of the supreme authority.28 Although the treaty-making process has been changed
back and forth throughout a series of Constitutions, the tradition that remains unaltered is
the predominant role of the executive that takes up the primary responsibilities in the
realm of foreign affairs.29 The plenary power of the executive in the conduct of foreign
relations may be implied under the Chapter of Council of Ministers (IX), but its plenary
treaty power has been clearly worded pursuant to Section 190.
It may be true that the parliament still enjoys a certain amount of control over the
areas that involve international relations such as through its budgetary appropriation or
war declaration authorities. There was, however, little evidence that the parliament
sought to exercise its control or exert its influence through these channels. While the
legislative authorization concerning budget spending can be overridden by the executive
under certain circumstance, the war declaration which had barely been issued by the
parliament was secretly nullified by the executive during the Second World War.30 Thus,

CONST. (2007), Ch. 1 §3, (Thail.) (“The sovereign power belongs to the Thai people. The King as Head
of the State shall exercise such power through the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers and the
Courts in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.”)
28
MONROE, supra note 20, at 177.
29
Therawat, supra note 2, at 2. Kanitta Topothai, The Jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court on the Matter
of Being the International Agreement under the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 2550
Section 190 with Regard to the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 26 (Dec. 12, 2008) (an academic document
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the program of senior executives on criminal justice
administration, National Academy of Criminal Justice) (on file with the Library of Courts of Justice),
http://elib.coj.go.th/managecourt/data/c12_4.pdf. See Chapter II, Section III, B (ii).
30
BAKER & PHONGPAICHIT, supra note 21, at 135-139. Sucharitkul, supra note 22, at 695.
27
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arguably the participation of the legislature in the shaping of a national foreign policy
remains limited. This discretionary power is still well preserved within the sphere of the
executive.
Under the power granted by the Constitution, the legislature’s primary duties are
to legislate and enact organic laws as well as annual appropriation bills which make it the
central authorities in the authorization of the country’s budgets, spending and finance.31
This specific power may also imply its ability to allocate and control governmental
budgets concerning foreign affairs. Matters such as the budget allocation for treaty
negotiations or the amount of foreign aids and international organization membership
fees to be incurred must be eventually considered and approved by both Houses.
Nonetheless, the legislative control of foreign affairs in terms of national spending does
not go beyond the time of normalcy such as the “state of war” or “arm conflicts”. Section
169 clearly provides certain flexibilities by granting special powers to the Council of
Ministers in the exercise of its foreign affairs power “to transfer or relocate the
expenditure determined for any Government agency or State enterprise for use in a
different item from that previously determined in the Annual Appropriations Act”32 In
such event, the only obligation that the executive has towards the legislature is its report
to the National Assembly without any authorization required.
Other areas of the legislature’s foreign affairs participation come from Section
189 and 190 of Chapter IX which provide for the powers to declare war and to make
treaties respectively. The war declaration provision requires that the prerogative to
declare war be subject to the approval of the national Assembly with “votes of not less
than two-thirds of the total number of the existing number of both Houses”.33 However,
the war declaration clause has rarely been invoked, and did not come up since the Second
31

CONST. (2007), Ch. 8 § 168, 169 (Thail.).
Id. § 169.
33
Id. § 189.
32
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World War during which formal approval was granted. During the war period, although a
declaration was issued, it was never officially delivered or even secretly refused to
deliver to the U.S. government by the Thai ambassador, Seni Pramoj and the senior
statesman, Pridi Panomyoung.34 The decision taken up by H.E. Pramoj rendered the war
declaration null and void, which had saved the country from being the defeated nation
and being treated as the U.S.’ enemy. H.E. Pramoj was later invited to return to become a
Prime Minister in Thailand who fronted the peace negotiations.35 And again the incidence
carries significant implications for the executive role in the shaping of foreign policy and
the control of foreign affairs.
Other significant diplomatic functions that are silent under the Thai Constitution
are normally assumed to be the sole responsibility of the executive. The absence of the
textual stipulation does not impair the executive’s exercise of its foreign affairs power or
deprive it from these essential functions. The period during the 1930s marked another
crucial diplomatic mission of the government to resolve a dispute concerning territories
lost to other states by the treaty of 1900s during the colonial period.36 Led by the military
wing in the People’s Party, the Thai delegates travelled to Paris to present their map and
to reclaim the territories.37 The attempts to unify the country and strengthen its image
while making other nations recognize Thailand as an independent nation were undertaken
as part of the government campaign. How the government wanted foreign nations to
34

The decision of the Thai ambassador in Washington, Seni Pramoj, to withhold the declaration of war
from delivering to the U.S. government led the U.S. to refrain declaring war on Thailand. The group called
the Free Thai Movement (Seri Thai) comprising of Thai students in the U.S. was formed with the assistance
of Seni to resist the Japanese. At the end of the war period, the Japanese surrendered. It was the dramatic,
righteous decision of the ambassador that saved the country. The declaration of war was deemed illegal,
null, and void. It also repudiated all agreements made with Japan by the formal government. Barbara Leitch
LePoer, Thailand: A Country Study, Library of Congress (1987), http://countrystudies.us/thailand/. See also
BAKER & PHONGPAICHIT, supra note 21, at 135-139.
35
H.E. Pramoj invitation to become the Prime Minister of Thailand at the time was due to the fear of the
British retaliation and the threat of its domination aftermath, especially when Thailand was seen as a
valuable rice supplier for the devastated colonial territories. His return was thus to strengthen the Thai
position and U.S support in the opposition of any return of colonial influence. BAKER & PHONGPAICHIT,
supra note 21, at 137.
36
Id. at 131-133.
37
Id. at 131.
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perceive Thailand is arguably our foreign policy. The executive by assuming this strong
role throughout the Thai history has become the forefront of a foreign policy shaper, and
has continued to do so in the realm of foreign affairs through diplomatic consultations
and treaty making.
Despite the understanding that the executive is not the sole organ that undertakes
responsibilities concerning the making of treaties, it has nevertheless been the primary
branch that undertakes all of the treaty negotiations. This treaty power is clearly granted
to the Council of Ministers under Section 190. 38 Although, the treaty clause accompanied
certain conditions that would subject specific treaties to the supervision of the legislature
and a public hearing, these are rather treated as exceptions to the executive plenary
power.39 In addition, a series of the Thai Constitutions suggested the preliminary role of
the Parliament in the treaty-making process.40 It can also be deduced from the fact that
the provisions on such prerogative of the King to conclude the treaties have always been
stipulated under the Chapter dealing with the Council of Ministers, and that the treatymaking-power is vested in the Executive Power, while the Legislative Power intervenes
only in a form of an approval or disapproval to the conclusion of the treaties under
limited circumstances. And apparently, these cases were rather seen as exceptional, and
did not arise as often to trigger the requirement of the parliamentary approval.41 All in all,

38

Treaty-making power is vested under the Chapter dealing with the Council of Ministers as stipulated in
the following text; “[t]he King has the prerogative to conclude a peace treaty, armistice and other treaties
with other countries or international organizations”. CONST. (2007), Ch 9, § 190 (Thail.) (amended 2011).
39
Rujikej Chumkasorakit, Praden wikrao rang rathatumnoon hang ratcha anachak thai: bot bunyad
kiewkub sonthisanya nai rathatumnoon [Analysis on a referendum: Treaty Clause in the Constitution], 24
(Working Paper, 2007). See also Therawat, supra note 2, at 2 (The Constitution grants the executive branch
substantial powers to undertake and conclude treaties whereas the role of the parliament in the participation
of such process was rather seen as “supplementary”).
40
Specifically, a treaty that requires the enactment of an implementing Act for its implementation must be
approved by the National Assembly. See, e.g., CONST. (1932), Ch. 4 § 54 (Thail.) (repealed 1946), CONST.
(1946), Ch. 4 § 75-76 (Thail.) (repealed 1947), CONST. (1949), Ch. 7 § 153-154 (Thail.) (repealed 1951),
CONST. (1991), Ch 7 § 156, 177-178 (Thail.) (repealed 1997).
41
Although many treaties and international agreements were not subject to prior approval of the Parliament
at the beginning of the negotiation, they might still be required to go through the ratification and
implementation process after they had been concluded. These are such as Agreement on the Promotion and
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the executive retained the authorities and the primary responsibilities in initiating
negotiations, concluding and even terminating treaties and international agreements.
Up until recently, this tradition has been altered by the increased participation of
the parliamentary and judiciary roles in the treaty-making process. Such change took
place through constitutional reforms by broadening the scope of the legislature’s
supervision on treaties and the judiciary policing power on the government’s observation
of the constitutional process. Treaties that will create certain conditions in addition to
those providing for a change in the Thai territories or the jurisdiction of the State or
requiring the enactment of an Act for its implementation must follow a specific treaty-making

procedure. Thus, the authority to make treaties which was primarily and originally vested
in the executive must now be shared with the Parliament under additional specified
circumstances whereas the Constitutional Court can exercise its jurisdiction over the
question of the validity of the treaty in question. 42
These substantial changes have affected the traditional role of the executive in the
treaty-making process. 43 The broad language under the new treaty-making provision

Protection of Investment. Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Economic Agreement,
http://www.mfa.go.th/web/2693.php.
42
Although it may be true that, in the absence of the new provision, the Constitutional Court may still hold
a judicial power to decide on the issue concerning the allocation of powers between political branches in
accordance with its general jurisdiction under Section 266 of the 1997 Constitution, but the introduction of
the additional types of treaty will also mean expanding the judiciary policing power to assure the
conformity of the executive branch to the Constitution. Topothai, supra note 29, at 14. See also CONST.
(1997), Ch. 8 §266 (Thail.) (repealed 2006).
43
These obligations are reflected under Section 190 of the 2007 Constitution as follows;
A treaty which:
(1) Provides for change in the Thai territories or extraterritorial areas over which Thailand has
sovereign rights or jurisdiction in accordance therewith or in accordance with international law
(2) Requires the enactment of an Act for the implementation thereof
(3) Has extensive impacts on national economic or social security, or
(4) Generates material commitments in trade, investment or budget of the country. 43
Prior to undertaking a treaty negotiation of any treaty specified under paragraph two,
(1) The Council of Ministers shall provide information and cause to be conducted public hearings,
and shall give the National Assembly explanations on such treaty.
(2) For this purpose, the Council of Ministers shall submit to the National Assembly a framework for
negotiations for approval.
(3) When the treaty under paragraph two has been signed, the Council of Minister shall, prior to the
declaration of intention to be bound thereby, make details thereof publicly accessible…
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referring to treaties that are subject to legislature and judiciary checks seems to wither
away the executive powers in the making of international commitments,44 in particular
Article 216, paragraph 5 which binds the decision of the Constitutional Court upon the
National Assembly, Council of Ministers and other State organs.45
Nevertheless, those special categories of treaties should still be treated as an
exception rather than a rule (a general application to all types of treaties) considering our
history and practices in the treaty-making process. Under the current constitutional
structure, the executive still retains plenary powers in the conduct of foreign affairs,
whereas only under certain circumstances where its role can only be limited and
intercepted by other branches. Clearly, the original intent of the constitutional text was
not meant to alter the executive’s primary role in the conduct of foreign relations, and
was expected only to increase accountability and transparency of the administration in the
area where vital national interests could be at stake. However, the general and vague
language referring to special categories of treaties is rather problematic as it has created
potential shifts in the balance of powers between the executive and the legislature
through advancing legislature’s roles in the uncommon area of treaties that have
inadvertently been interpreted by the Constitutional Court to fall under the special
categories.46 The problem of this potential shift of balance of power that the Thai
Constitution might create has a strong implication on the principle of separation of
powers, which will require us to address through the adoption of the centralized executive

In the case where there arises a problematic issue under paragraph two, the power to make the
determination thereon shall be vested in the Constitutional Court. CONST. (2007), Ch. 9 §190 (Thail.)
(amended 2011).
44
The language of Section 190 has been widely criticized for its imprecision and vagueness which create
substantial obligations on the executive’s side altering its traditional role in the realm of foreign affairs. It
was also seen as an erosion of the executive’s treaty-making power which was not intended, but inevitably
consequential. Therawat, supra note 2.
45
“The decision of the Constitutional Court shall be deemed final and binding on the National Assembly,
Council of Ministers, Courts and other State organs”. CONST. (2007), Ch. 10 §216 (Thail.).
46
Bangkok Pundit, Yellow Shirt Turns on Abhisit, Asian Correspondent, Nov.24, 2010,
http://asiancorrespondent.com/42930/yellow-shirts-turn-on-abhisit/
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foreign power (CEFP) and the consideration of judicial limits to restore the efficient and
practical function of the executive branch.
C. The U.S. Experience: Foreign Powers Vested under the U.S. Constitution
Although there is a sharp contrast between the U.S. and the Thai constitutions
structurally and traditionally, it can be said that the two countries share common treaty
experiences and practices in terms of the presence of the executive’s prominent role in
the realm of foreign affairs.47 The active role of the President in the conduct of foreign
relations in the past has created both criticism and recognition. There certainly are good
reasons, despite the structural limitation of the U.S. Constitution48, why the executive has
successfully maintained its primary role in the conduct of foreign affairs. Unlike the Thai
Constitution which explicitly grants plenary power to the executive while providing
specific exceptions for the involvement of the legislature, the division of labor among
branches under the U.S. Constitution is subject to greater controversy,49 especially
concerning the legislature and the executive roles in the formulation of foreign policy.
It has been argued that the U.S. Constitution grants Congress substantial powers
in the area of foreign affairs.50 The sources of Congressional powers in this realm
principally came from, for instance, the commerce clause (duty to collect taxes and to
For claims of the unrestrained executive power in foreign affairs, see Phillip R. Trimble, The President’s
Foreign Affairs Power, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 39 (Louis Henkin et al. eds.,
1990), Stennis & Fulbright, Senators, Lecture at American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research:
The Role of Congress in Foreign Policy (July, 1971), in THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY, supra
note 15, at 11-15, 49-72. Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President Almost Always Wins in Foreign Affairs, in
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 158-173 (David Gray Adler &
Larry N. George eds.,1996). GLENNON, supra note 12, at 164-191.
48
Trimble, The President’s Foreign Affairs Power, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION,
supra note 47, at 40 (arguing the President prerogative in the realm of foreign affairs is mostly about
influence rather than law since legally Congress has virtual plenary authority over all aspects of foreign
affairs).
49
Justice Jackson refers the area of foreign affairs as “the twilight zone” in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer where there is a large uncertainty concerning the distribution of authorities between the President
and Congress. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 18. GLENNON, supra note 12, at 10-11 (quoting Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[P]residential powers are not fixed,
but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress”).
50
Stennis & Fulbright, Senators, Lecture at American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: The
Role of Congress in Foreign Policy (July, 1971), in THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY, supra
note 15 (Arguing the usurpations of the powers of congress in foreign affairs).
47
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regulate foreign commerce), the declaration of war clause and the treaty clause (advice
and consent of Senate).51 There are also other expressed Congressional powers that imply
its involvement in the realm of foreign affairs.52 The President, although acting as a
Commander-in-chief under the Constitution, is not the only sole organ in the conduct of
foreign relations. His decisions are contingent upon Congress authorization of military
and foreign aid spending. Congress may prohibit or limit the President’s directly by
legislation or denying of funds through appropriation clause.53 The ability of the
President to direct and control foreign affairs matters seems to have been limited by
conditions imposed under these clauses, which subject him to the scrutiny of the
legislature.
Despite several restrictions on the foreign affairs powers of the President imposed
by the Constitution, this understanding does not necessarily reduce the executive’s
essential role in the foreign administration. Under Article II, section 2 of the U.S.
Constitution, the President can make treaties (with the advice and consent of two-thirds
the Senate). He is the Commander-in Chief of the armed forces. He also appoints
ambassadors (with Senate advice and consent), receives ambassadors and other officers
including those in the conduct of foreign affairs.54 These functions were, however, argued
by Professor Henkin, as “duties” or assignments rather than “powers”. Even if they were
powers, these are only good for conducting foreign relations, and not to formulate foreign
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U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3 and 11, art. II. § 2, cl. 2 (respectively). GLENNON, supra note 12, at16.
The implied foreign affairs powers include the power to tax and spend for the common defense and the
general welfare, to coin and regulate foreign coins, to raise and support army, and to make laws necessary
and proper to carry out their powers. See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 1, 5, 12 and 18. See also HENKIN, supra
note 1, at 18-19.
53
Congress can pass legislation directly affecting foreign policy upon its own initiatives or upon the
recommendation of the executive. Each year, Congress authorizes and funds programs that directly affect
the relations of the U.S. with other nations. Stennis & Fulbright, Senators, Lecture at American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research: The Role of Congress in Foreign Policy (July, 1971), in THE ROLE OF
CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 15, at 2-3, 8-10. See also HENKIN, supra note 1, at 32.
54
U.S. CONST. art. II § 2, cl. 1, 2. See also HENKIN, supra note 1, at 19.
52
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policy. 55 Yet, it seems that the line between conducting foreign relations and shaping
foreign policy is rather thin. How one can conduct foreign relations without having
abilities to direct or influence foreign policy is questionable. After all, the authority to
recognize or disestablish foreign relations with another nation is part of a national foreign
policy. In addition, although the treaties clause requires the advice and consent of the
Senate, it is the President who makes treaties, and the power to make treaties is the power
to negotiate, to communicate and to articulate policy intentions.56 Furthermore, whether
the treaty will be undertaken is entirely within the President’s discretion.57 Therefore, the
argument that the conduct of foreign relations bares no relations to shaping foreign policy
does not carry much weight. At the very least, it should be acknowledged that the powers
vested under Article II have strong implications for the President’s role in the shaping of
foreign policy.
Although the Constitution enumerates and allocates some foreign affairs powers
(commerce, war and treaties) to the political branches, many powers that are indisputably
foreign affairs in nature are not stipulated,58 these include the making of foreign policy.
In such a case, these powers may also be implicitly inherent in the President from the fact
that Article II, section 1 of the Constitution vested all the executive power in the
President whereas Article I, section 1 conferred upon Congress legislative powers “herein
granted” under the Constitution. Thus, under this argument, the Presidential power is not
only limited to those expressly enumerated, but will also include independent and
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HENKIN, supra note 1, at 37-38.
GLENNON, supra note 12, at 165.
57
“It is the President who makes treaties, if the Senate consents; the Senate cannot make a treaty. The
President need not make a treaty even if the Senate or Congress demands it”. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 37-38 (Clarendon Press 1996)(1990).
58
GLENNON, supra note 12, at 148 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 310
(1936)) (“The President’s power as ‘sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations…would seem to include the authority to decide on behalf of the United States to terminate a treaty
that no longer serves the national interest…”).
56
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substantive powers to determine the condition of the nation in its foreign relations.59 The
Court in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. in fact supported the presidential plenary
power by claiming that President is “the sole organ of the nation in its external
relations”60 Such reading that entrusts with the President all executive authorities with a
few explicit exceptions 61 that give Congress direct controls over his decisions may
coincide with the understanding of the Thai constitutional structure, which confers a large
amount of foreign affairs power to the executive.
Whichever reading may be, it is undisputable that presidential powers in the
conduct of diplomacy are extensive.62 This is also because “[d]iplomacy requires a long
term perspective, and Congress tends to be influenced by short-term interests”.63
Diplomatic matters are thus usually deferred to presidential leadership. The President’s
sole and exclusive authority over diplomacy ranges from recognizing states and
governments, maintaining diplomatic relations, conducting negotiations to initiating
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HENKIN, supra note 57, at 39. See also, A. HAMILTON, WORKS 76, 81 (Hamilton ed. 1851). Ariel N.
Lavinbuk, Rethinking Early Judicial Involvement in Foreign Affairs: An Empirical Study of the Supreme
Court's Docket, 114(4) Yale L.J. 855, 865 (2005) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 165-66
(1803)) (“ By the constitution of the United States, the president is invested with certain important political
powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in
his political character and to his own conscience....”).
60
Harold Hongju Koh, Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade Policymaking after I.N.S v. Chadha,
18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1191, 1193 (1986)). Plenary presidential power means “one that is not
susceptible of congressional limitation”. GLENNON, supra note 12, at 20 n.98 (The maintenance of the
executive exclusive authority in the international field is to accord the branch “a degree of discretion and
freedom from statutory restriction…”).
61
HENKIN, supra note 1, at 37. See also THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 5: 162 (P. L. Ford ed.,1892).
62
Alexander Hamilton believed that the responsibilities and powers lay with the President, except as
expressed in the Constitution. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 22. See also Theodore Roosevelt’s stewardship
theory. THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 271-272 (1913). Despite the President’s broad range
of foreign affairs power, this by no means suggests that his power is unrestrained and without limit. Only in
a few cases had any court invalidated an act of Congress on the ground that it violated general presidential
foreign affairs power. As Justice Jackson stated in his concurrent opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, the President may never act to the contrary of an Act of Congress. GLENNON, supra note 12, at
13. The scope of the executive power is also limited when it comes to treaty interpretation. “The
President’s semantic denomination of his act cannot by itself control the procedure constitutionally
required”. GLENNON, supra note 12, at 134.
63
Trimble, The President’s Foreign Affairs Power, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION,
supra note 47, at 42 (arguing on the executive usurpation of congressional prerogatives). .
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informal decisions or actions in the construction of foreign policy and so on.64 These are
presidential realms which are not subject to congressional interference. Congress may,
however, influence the executive by requiring it to take certain values into account in
formulating foreign policy position.65 The President’s concurrent power with Congress
must of course still be acknowledged.66 But to deny the significant role of the executive
in this realm is to deny reality. It should rather be understood that the President makes
foreign policy by conducting foreign relations, negotiating international agreements and
treaties, whereas Congress executes the policy by giving effects to the concluded treaties
(enacting legislations and implementing treaties), and by appropriating funds to support
the executive decisions.67
The negotiation function and the ability to control official communication with
foreign governments become additional key elements to presidential leadership in the
realm of foreign affairs.68 Although treaties are subject to advice and consent of the
Senate, the Senate was originally expected to act in an executive capacity whose body is
smaller and less representative than the entire Congress.69 Furthermore, treaties are
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HENKIN, supra note 1, at 32. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (recalling President Franklin
Roosevelt’s recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933).
65
Trimble, The President’s Foreign Affairs Power, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION,
supra note 47, at 45.
66
Michael J. Glennon, Foreign Affairs and the Political Question Doctrine, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION 98, 112 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1990). When the President acts pursuant to an
express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he
possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. When the President acts in absence of either
a congressional grant or denial or authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers. This is the
zone of twilight “in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority”. But the President may act in
external affairs based upon his independent authority without congressional authorization, but not to the
contrary of an Act of Congress. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-638 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring). However, the presidential foreign relations power may extend to action
inconsistent with the act of Congress when there is a presence of emergency. Dames & Moore v. Regan,
453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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HENKIN, supra note 57, at 83.
68
Trimble, The President’s Foreign Affairs Power, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION,
supra note 47, at 44. See also, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
69
Not until Amendment XVII had the Senate been elected by popular votes, the framers’ intent by having
not specified the entire congressional role suggested that the treaty-making process would be undertaken by
the President and a small Congressional body which is less accountable and less democratic in character.
HENKIN, supra note 1, at 49. For amendments history, see
http://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm#amdt_17_%281913%29.
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certainly not the only means taken by the President to generate the U.S. international
obligations and foreign policy deliberations. An executive agreement has served as
another channel of communication which can presumably be drawn from plenary
executive diplomatic powers which was left out from the U.S. Constitutional process.70
This power to relying on his sole authority to make certain executive agreements has
been argued to derive from the “Executive powers”. Whether this power is legitimate is a
subject of controversy, but what is certainly the case is that executive agreements have
ever since taken substantial roles in the U.S. foreign relations, and almost replaced a
formal treaty-making process.71 Despite a substantive distinction that has been drawn
between a treaty and an executive agreement to restrict the making of executive
agreements,72 over the past sixty years, the decline of a formal treaty making process
which requires a great deal of Congressional roles suggested the expansion of presidential
authority in the conduct of foreign affairs.
Looking beyond the constitutional text and into the historical context, Alexander
Hamilton early set forth on the view of the executive power in the conduct of foreign
relations by referring to “the grand design of the Constitution” which presumably vests
all the responsibilities of foreign relations in the President under the “Executive power”
Although presidential agreements are not mentioned in the Constitution, “the framers clearly understood
that nations make some agreements that are not treaties, and they could not help but anticipate tacit,
informal understandings by the President…” HENKIN, supra note 1, at 55. The Restatement states that the
President “may make an international agreement dealing with any matter that falls within his independent
powers under the Constitution”. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 303(4)). Constitution
only refers to “treaties” that require the advice and consent of the Senate, and not international agreements.
GLENNON, supra note 12, at 178-180 (“The Supreme Court has upheld the use of executive agreements to
carry out what appears to be plenary presidential power…”).
71
These include military commitment in 1953 that was made in the form of an executive agreement, peace
treaties that have been altered by subsequent executive agreements, and other formal treaties such as the
North Atlantic Treaty Status of Forces Agreement whose supplementary agreements were simply approved
without ratification by the U.S. Stennis & Fulbright, Senators, Lecture at American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research: The Role of Congress in Foreign Policy (July, 1971), in THE ROLE OF CONGRESS
IN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 15, at 49-60. See also HENKIN, supra note 57, at 219.
72
A treaty is referred as “the proper instrument for contracting important, substantive agreements” whereas
an executive agreement is generally understood as “an instrument for the conduct of routine and essentially
nonpolitical business with foreign countries”. Stennis & Fulbright, Senators, Lecture at American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: The Role of Congress in Foreign Policy (July, 1971), in
THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 15, at 49.
70
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whereas Congress only possesses specific foreign affairs powers granted by the
Constitution.73 The Constitution may confer certain foreign powers to both executive
and legislative. But making treaties, declaring war and peace, approving expenditures
are certainly not the only matters concerning foreign affairs. In the absence of the textual
authority, the executive’s role has arguably continued to fill in the gap.
Despite the uncertainties of textual interpretations and the framers’ intent
concerning the allocation of foreign affairs powers, experiences have provided us with
some answers. Throughout the American history, we have witnessed the President’s
foreign affairs power “took root and grew” while “Congress contributed to the steady
growth...” 74 There certainly are factors that gave rise to the centralized executive foreign
power phenomenon, which remind us why the executive should be the primary body that
articulates our foreign policy and conducts our foreign relations. This question will be
examined in the following section as to why this is the case, and should be the case for a
successful implementation of foreign policy. President Roosevelt recognized this
important function of the executive as he once asserted that the President himself can
determine foreign policy…, can communicate that policy as ‘sole organ’, can implement
it as ‘the executive’, and can enforce it as Commander in Chief”.75 This rationale also has
a significant implication for the respect of the division of labor among the institutional
branches which is deemed crucial to support the important functions of the executive, the
maintenance of foreign diplomacy, and the procurement of national interest.

Hamilton’s broad interpretation of the presidential foreign relations power was nevertheless opposed by
James Madison who favored presidential enumerated foreign powers. Hamilton made the argument in
support of President Washington’s authority to declare neutrality of the United States in the war between
England and France. Hamilton read the executive power clause in Article II of the Constitution as a grant
to the President of all executive power and insisted that executive power included the control of foreign
relations. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 21-22 (emphasis added).
74
It has been said that the growth was due to Congress’ acknowledgement of the President’s diplomatic
expertise and its own sense of inadequacy in terms of information and experiences. Id. at 28.
75
Id. at 29.
73
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IV. The Centralized Executive Foreign Powers (CEFP)
Despite the fact that certain constitutions such as the Thai Constitution allocates
substantial and considerable amount of foreign affairs power to the executive, there is a
conviction that the legislature should still maintain a significant role in the conduct of
foreign relations to preserve the system of checks and balances that would protect
“against undue concentration of power and unwise decision”,76 which basically is what
the principle of separation of powers is intended to guard against. That being said does
not suggest that legislature can and should penetrate in every foreign policy decisions that
the executive undertakes because what the principle of separation of powers aims at
preserving is also the essential function and autonomy of each branch. The power
properly belonging to one branch ought not to be administered or interfered by the
other.77 The excessive control of the legislature can certainly impede an effective
administration as well as generating powerful influence of the legislative branch in area
of foreign affairs. By the same token, the absolute independence of the executive in the
exercise of foreign affairs power, in the absence of any control or check from other
institutions, will create an issue of accountability and transparency within the political
system. Therefore, the solution, suggested by Senator Stennis, is rather to secure
legislature consultation in a proper balance, and maintain mutual respect between the two
branches for the successful implementation of foreign policy.78 Legislature’s participation
will be required under important circumstances, but cannot exceed the necessity that its
role overrides the executive’s function. Imbalanced interference is a lack of proper
interaction which weakens the principle of separation of powers. What is “proper” and
76

Stennis, Stennis & Fulbright, Senators, Lecture at American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research: The Role of Congress in Foreign Policy (July, 1971), in THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN FOREIGN
POLICY, supra note 15, at 3.
77
Supra note 14.
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Stennis & Fulbright, Senators, Lecture at American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: The
Role of Congress in Foreign Policy (July, 1971), in THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY, supra
note 15, at 21.
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how much is “balance” certainly deals with the question of where these constitutional
boundary lines should be drawn among the three institutional branches.
A. Limited Legislative Functions in Foreign Affairs
Constitution normally grants powers to the legislature to primarily deal with
domestic issues rather than foreign policy.79 And, in the realm of foreign affairs, how
much the executive should defer the matter or seek advice from the legislature often
depends on the degree of impact felt by the domestic. Certain circumstances prescribed
by the Constitutions such as military spending abroad or war declaration for instance,
may arguably demand legislative controls primarily because these activities require
substantial extraction of people’ taxes which affect local spending. Thus, the legislature
as a representative body of the people’s interests should at least be able to address how
those taxes may be spent in the area where little return is expected to the people and the
country’s economy.80 This interpretation, however, may be a broad application of the
legislature’s role in foreign policy decision-making by stretching the link of domestic
impacts. There is a difficulty for such a broad justification as any minimal connection to
be made with domestic matters is an excuse for the legislature to step in, and take control
over the decision. A stronger connection may be required to warrant the necessity of the

GLENNON, supra note 12, at 30. Yoo, supra note 2, at 1994 (pointing out William Blackstone’s analysis
on the executive’s federative power that foreign affairs “was the quintessential executive function”). The
executive authority is the “federative power” necessary to govern “the power of war and peace, leagues and
alliances, and all the transactions with all persons and communities without the commonwealth”. JOHN
LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §143-146 (Regnery ed., 1956).
80
The same is true with the Presidential role in domestic affairs. The mere fact that the act is connected to
foreign affairs does not necessarily make it an “executive power”. Cf., MICHAEL RAMSEY, THE
CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 107 (2007). Stennis & Fulbright, Senators, Lecture at
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: The Role of Congress in Foreign Policy (July,
1971), in THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 15, at 39 (citing THE PAPER OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, vol. 15, 397 (Jelian P. Boyd ed., 1995)) (“We have already given in example one effectual
check to the Dog of war by transferring the power of letting him loose from the Executive to the Legislative
body, from those who are to spend to those who are to pay”). In 1969, the Senate adopted the non-binding
“National Commitments Resolution” declaring that the President could not commit the armed forces or
financial resources of the United States without Senate consent or congressional approval. However, the
attempt to regulate the executive agreement committing of arm forces only went as far as requiring
periodical reports from the President. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 58. See also S. Res. 85, 91st Cong., 1st
sess., Cong. Rec. (1969).
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legislature’s involvement.81 At a closer case, certain international commitments that have
direct impact upon individuals’ fundamental interest or the livelihood of local
communities, which will be further discussed in Chapter V (concerning the treaty-making
standard), should provide a stronger justification for the legislature’s involvement in the
process. Nevertheless, such authorization does not suggest the legislature’s absolute
control over the conduct of foreign relations. The legislative role in foreign affairs has
limitation. Without significant domestic implications, the role of legislature in the
formulation of foreign policy and the conduct of foreign relations can diminish.82 The
ability to direct and control external affairs may fall outside the legislature’s realm of
responsibility. And, this is also due to the view that it is not in the legislature position “to
conduct a ‘day-to-day’ diplomacy and foreign policy business of the nation”.83
In my view, the issue of the legislature’s constitutional boundary in the realm of
foreign affairs ultimately will require us to weigh internal impact, especially when it
involves individuals’ fundamental interest against the needs of the executive to maintain
its efficient function in the conduct of foreign relations. Drawing a definite boundary
among the branches in a fuzzy area like foreign affairs is a challenging, if not impossible
task. But again, to confirm my previous point, when a clearer line has been drawn, the
executive administration will not be constantly disrupted, and will only be subject to
It must also be acknowledged that domestic connection is not the primary rationale for legislature’s
participation in important foreign policy such as war declaration or military spending. It is rather the power
granted under a constitution which involves budgetary appropriation authority of legislature that, in fact,
dictates its role. Thus, my argument is not intended to prove that the constitution is wrong in granting such
authority to the legislature since this is an appropriate branch, as being a representative body of the people,
to possess the authority. My point was rather if the “domestic impact” rationale is to be made as a sole
justification for the involvement of the legislature in the conduct of foreign affairs, a strong sufficient
connection must be shown to prevent excessive interference of the executive’s function.
82
Pursuant to Locke, Montesquieu and Blackstone’s thinking, it is especially the case that the line between
the executive’s treaty-making power and the legislative control over domestic regulation is to be drawn.
Yoo, supra note 2, at 1997.
83
Id. at 1991 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 147 (Regnery ed., 1955))
(“Foreign affairs, by contrast, ‘are much less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive laws’
because ‘what is to be done in reference to foreigners’, since it was dependent on their actions, ‘must be left
in great part to the prudence of those who have this power committed to them’”). Stennis & Fulbright,
Senators, Lecture at American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: The Role of Congress in
Foreign Policy (July, 1971), in THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 15, at 23.
81
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scrutiny under the situation in which there is a real demand for it. Legislature
consultation can certainly play an important role in such circumstance.
The participation of the legislature may be crucial in the conduct of foreign affairs
to help protect citizens’ interests against adverse impacts that may have resulted from the
country’s commitment abroad. Such a condition gives a strong, legitimate reason for the
involvement of this body in which citizens’ interests are collectively represented.
Arguably, in the treaty context, the legislative role in the making of a treaty should still
be limited, if not entirely abstained, in the absence of a strong direct domestic impact,
because this check mechanism (extensive participation of the legislature), while
attempting to shield the domestic from these potential harms, would also prevent political
and economic opportunities that could have gained through the country’s pursuit of
international treaties. Thus, the arguments for broad foreign affairs power for the
executive are still understood as necessary to expedite treaty relations in the fast-moving
global environment, to maintain the integrity of the national foreign policy and to avoid
serious international embarrassment.
B. Why Foreign Affairs Should Be the Matter of the Executive?
Justice Sutherland rendered his opinion in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.
that “[h]e, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which
prevail in foreign countries. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his
agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials…”84 These are the quality
and characteristics that the executive possesses, which gives the branch the advantage in
the pursuit of foreign relations. The Court in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp was
aware of presidential plenary power in external affairs through the recognitions of this
quality. The primary arguments that had been made for the centralized executive foreign
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GLENNON, supra note 12, at 27 (citing U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)).
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policymaking (CEFP) took into account the executive’s important characteristics. These
include its institutional structure (which is known for its “unitary political entity with
indivisible national interest” and also designed to insulate from external interference), its
leadership character, its capacities and expertise (by possessing experience, resources and
secret information), its policy evaluation capabilities (that the legislative may lack due to
other overwhelming tasks), and its efficiency.85
i. Institutional Structure
Foreign policy issues, in general, are considered national problems which are
more efficient to be tackled by “one voice”. The approach also requires compromises of
competing interests to promote the overall national one.86 In terms of structural
efficiency, the internal organization of the executive institutions fosters this condition by
allowing it to function independently, and thus gives it the ability to articulate and deliver
foreign policy in one voice. The legislature, on the other hand, representing various
interests ranged from individuals to corporate entities, accounting for various initiatives,
can find itself caught up with responsibilities to respond to various demands, thus make it
more difficult to generate a coherent position.87 For instance during the post-Vietnam
War period, congressional reforms driven by congressional interest and activism in
foreign policy ironically left Congress “too decentralized and democratized to generate
its own coherent program”.88 The structural reforms inside Congress also accompanied
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Larry N. George, Democratic Theory and Foreign Policy, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 59-63 (David Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds.,1996).
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George, Democratic Theory and Foreign Policy, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF
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other issues such as overlapping functions and a lack of coordination among the
committees from both houses.89 The internal hierarchy of the executive has continued to
benefit foreign policy formation and execution. The ability of the branch to easily form a
consensus allowing its decision to be easily solidified and quickly dispatched is a crucial
factor for the executive to act responsively and efficiently in the field of international
affairs, whereas the legislature may find it difficult to arrive at a decision in a timely
manner, especially in times of crisis.90
The structural efficiency argument, however, can be countered by the fact that
such a system will only promote unaccountable executive foreign policy making,
especially in a treaty process. To the critics, the legislature serves as the body of public
expression and interests. The approach of the multi-branched participation in the process
can therefore help lessen the likelihood of unpopular policies which can incur costs in
credibility.91 Although it is important that various domestic interests represented by the
legislature should reflect in foreign policy and the treaty texts, the accommodation of all
the constituents would be unrealistic. This expectation can generate internal conflicts,
weaken foreign policy, and hamper the efficiency of the administration.92 As mentioned,
the parameter of foreign affairs is larger than what people normally assume.93 Even in the
realm of a treaty-making, what is considered as a “treaty” to be subject to the scrutiny of
the legislature and the public domain can be broad 94 and can prolong the entire process
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when involving the legislative control and public participation in every one of them.
Seeking consultations in the treaty process must, therefore, be maintained in moderation
and in a reasonable manner by taking into account the level of domestic impacts and the
internal structure of the legislature to prevent conflicts and fracture in the foreign policy
interests. The argument for strenuous checks after all undermines the ability of the
executive to come up with a concrete position that represents the overall public interest
while overlooking the significance of what really is the nation’s long-term interest.
ii. Appealing Characters
The qualities that make the executive the best suited in the conduct of foreign
affairs have long been widely recognized. A belief in the executive leadership in foreign
affairs was held firmly by Alexander Hamilton as he stated that the “energy in the
executive is a leading character in the definition of good government”.95 There are other
characters praised by scholars who feel that foreign affairs should be the matter of the
executive. Professor Arthus Maass, for instance, referred the character of the President to
be “a powerful magnet, constantly attracting proposals…” which makes him as equally
good as a primary initiator of legislation.96 These are the qualities that can appeal to
foreign governments of a particular negotiation position. Such a character also facilitates
the executive’s capacity to centralize and coordinate the foreign policy decision-making
process, and can energize and direct policy through speed and efficiency.97 Thus, in an
international crisis, this is the organ that has the leadership quality (energy, expertise and
the capacity) and credibility that the legislature may not have to handle the problem.98
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This is an important character that contributes to establishing a country’s international
credibility and good foreign relations.
iii. Expertise
Both Thailand’s and the U.S.’ foreign affairs experiences have demonstrated the
leading roles of the executive branches in the undertaking of significant international
events.99 The experiences gained by the branch make their expertise undeniable. The
expertise that has uniquely been developed during both in time of peace and crisis is also
viewed as a necessary key element to the success of the conduct of foreign policy.100 This
massive professional bureaucracy has been claimed to derive from its ability to access to
vast information and resources. Senator Stennis once commented in his lecture
concerning the President competence in the war affairs that he found it “very difficult to
believe that it is really wise or proper for us to convert the Senate of the United States
into a war room and try to direct battles, prescribe tactics, control strategies, draw
boundaries, dictated fixed withdrawal dates, and otherwise usurp the responsibilities and
prerogatives of the President and our military leaders”.101 Along this line, Justice

Tariff Act of 1930. Koh, supra note 60, at 1194. Despite the fact that Congress has power to collect taxes
and duties and to regulate foreign commerce, the President still holds the key function, which is power to
negotiate tariffs as Congress itself does not possess such authority. Under the “New Deal” doctrine,
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Sutherland stated in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. believing in the President’s
foreign policy discretion. In his opinion, “[t]he President…manages our concern with
foreign nations and must necessarily be most competent to determine when, how, and
upon what subjects negotiation may be urged…”102
For Thailand, at the turn of the twentieth century, the growing of the global
market economy and free trade led the executive branch to continue to manifest its
expertise through various types of international commitments ranged from regional to
multilateral levels.103 These international initiatives had primarily been undertaken by the
executive leading agencies such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of
Commerce. “As the breadth of our treaty obligations has broadened, their depth has
increased as well”.104 Recent developments in the world trading system also brought
technical issues and unanticipated problems, for instance, rules of origin (ROO), nontariff barrier to trade (NTB), Sanitary and Phytosanitary measure (SPS) that are far from
common to domestic problems. These are new sets of rules which now comprise more
than one-third of a nation’s economic activity.105 Thus, the executive’s superior capacity,
knowledge and skills because of its issue orientation, accessibility to resources and time
are determinative factors that make it a better branch to generate effective responses to
external challenges.106 The legislature, on the other hand, cannot be expected to develop
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the same level of expertise since the domestic duties at hand do not typically leave them
sufficient time to do so.107 The emergence of new international issues has arguably put
the executive branch into the leadership position, and will continue to do so through the
demand of the nation’s competency, speed and diplomacy.
But of course democracy cannot consistently demand levels of expertise that is
out of reach of citizen participation or legislature supervision. As I stressed in Section IV,
A concerning the legislative function in the area of foreign affairs, the legislative role will
become more important as domestic issues are increasingly touched upon. The difficulty
remains when the line between internal and external affairs becomes more blurry, since
“globalization has made even disparate parts of the world more tightly knit”.108 Almost
every international contact, if involving some sort of obligations, can arguably have
domestic impacts, except at different levels. But at what level is sufficient to require the
executive to seek a second opinion must be determined. Thus, the issue concerning the
standard of public participation and legislative involvement in the treaty-making process
will be dealt in the next chapter to address the boundaries. My assertion regarding the
quality of the executive branch in terms of its expertise neither seeks to embrace the idea
of granting absolute power to the branch nor opposes public involvements in the matter
of foreign affairs. My argument rather focuses on the rationale of why the executive
should be trusted and should serve as the leading organ in the promotion of our national
interest. For one thing, this department is equipped to cope with global challenges. And
for another, with sufficient deference from other branches, this political branch will be
allowed to respond to social needs more effectively when demanded. Citizens’ and
Why the President Almost Always Wins in Foreign Affairs, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 47, at 161.
107
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legislature expertise are still required, but not at every level, and definitely not in the
manner that should obstruct government performance or decrease the level of
administration efficiency to the point where it can no longer serve its own function and
democracy.
iv. Effectiveness and Efficiency
Although the significance of administration “efficiency” seems to be overlooked
in the justification of the centralized executive in the realm of foreign affairs, especially
when driven by the concern of governmental accountability, the issue of efficiency is
going to be my central argument in the proposition of the executive centralized authority
in the exercise of foreign affairs power since this is the factor that can, in fact, improve
the democratic condition of the governing system.
As mentioned, the executive branch has the institutional advantage which allows
the body to effectively respond to all kinds of international issues. In fact, foreign policy
should not entirely be a matter of the executive simply because it is convenient for the
branch. But foreign affairs must be the matter of the executive because it is effective and
efficient to be addressed through this organ.109 In his concurring opinion in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice Douglas acknowledged efficiency as a distinctive
quality possessed by the executive branch. He stated that “[a]ll executive power – from
the reign of ancient king to the rule of modern dictators – has the outward appearance of
efficiency. Legislative power, by contrast, is slower to exercise…the ponderous
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machinery of committees, hearings, and debates are…cumbersome, time-consuming, and
apparently inefficient”.110
How executive efficiency is compared to that of the legislature is quite clear.
However, such quality can be easily underrated, especially when countered by other
values such as accountability and transparency in the conduct of foreign affairs. But the
concern of efficiency should not be taken lightly as the lack of it could cause a stall in the
country’s administration, especially when handling by an inefficient body such as the
Senate which was once described as “the graveyard of treaties”.111 Taking an instance of
the Genocide Convention which took the U.S. forty years to ratify, instead of acting upon
a treaty, the Senate simply stockpiled it.112 In fact, most senators agreed that their role in
the treaty-making process should be limited.113 Every international agreements should not
be required to submit for advice and consent since “it would be literally impossible to
give all of them thoughtful consideration”.114 And because many would be a routine
nature of which the large number would result in Senate’s lack of attention to details.115
Such involvement certainly would neither make the government more accountable nor
make the system any more efficient. Even in the case of executive agreements which
required the executive branch to submit reports periodically to Congress, it was doubtful
whether the agreements were seriously scrutinized at all making the mechanism simply a
hollow threat which basically served no purposes.116
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The administration quality such as efficiency is not a light matter, and should be
considered along the line with maintaining the accountability and openness of a
government. As introduced in Chapter I (internal challenge), this element will matter in
the long run since its shortage can affect the capacity of the government to be responsive
to the people’s needs. Efficiency remains one of the leading characters that the executive
possesses in conducting foreign relations, and is required to have in administering
domestic affairs. Besides improving the democratic condition, efficiency is the quality
that brings about external gains economically, politically and diplomatically. In the age of
globalization, protecting domestic interests is as important as ensuring the potential
benefits that the country could secure from the cultivation of external relations.
v. Credibility and International Embarrassment
The issue of “efficiency” is not only a matter of domestic concerns. This quality
of the executive is a key factor that helps establishing the credibility of a nation and
diplomatic courtesy, and is what makes the executive predominant in the field of foreign
policy.117 The nature of the executive is therefore crucial to the maintenance of
international relations. The process of the foreign relations conduct must be driven by
both domestic and international considerations. In the conduct of a country’s foreign
diplomacy, jeopardizing its international relations should be avoided. This is because the
country’s good international relations are also what the country’s economy and political
stability depends upon.118 That being said, by no means, suggests that foreign policy

The uncertainty of the “advice and consent” condition in the treaty-making process in terms of its
timeline has complicated the negotiation stages. A sharp bifurcation of a treaty making process between the
presidential stage and the Senate stage frustrated Presidents, annoyed foreign governments, and troubled
U.S. foreign relations. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 50.
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should only generate positive interactions. Countries oftentimes employ economic
sanctions, trade retaliations and even the use of military force to gain their positions.
However, foreign policy should be conducted in the manner that would allow the country
to achieve its objectives at most. And if the goal of the country is to promote its economic
prosperity and stability through pursuing international agreements, then we should agree
that upsetting a partner to the agreement is to be avoided. This process clearly requires a
competent body to ensure that the country’s foreign affairs are being handled effectively
and professionally to avoid the issue of credibility and international embarrassment. In a
diffuse global economy, the country must constantly manage relations with foreign
governments. This responsibility demands special qualities that the legislature finds it
hard to meet due to its internal structure. Most importantly, developments in the global
communication and interconnection have increasingly made countries lean toward
bilateral and multilateral agreements as a way of delivering its foreign policy message
and asserting its position in the world stage. Any disorganization, delay or incoherence in
a position is a reflection of the country’s incompetency, and can definitely affect its
credibility and reputation.
Credibility remains one of the major issues in the multilateral trade forum that the
executive must constantly manage to maintain under excessive participation of the
legislature. For instance, the Kennedy Round of the General Agreements on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) negotiation gave the U.S. an uneasy position and humiliation through the
attempted control of Congress on the non-tariff concessions.119 The string attached
(subsequent approvals) effectively diverted the U.S. negotiation positions from what its
trading partners understood it would honor. This reaction of course produced “an
of the region. Sungjoon Cho, Breaking the Barrier between regionalism and multilateralism, 42 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 419, 436 (2001). See, The ASEAN Declaration, Aug. 8, 1967, 6 ILM 1233 (1967), available at
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international fall out”. The U.S. trading partners then “grew increasingly reluctant to
negotiate nontariff barrier agreements with U.S. officials, whom in their eyes, lacked
negotiating credibility because of their accountability to an unpredictable Congress.” 120
The control mechanism created by the 1984 Act which permitted a veto from a single
Committee of Congress in a negotiated agreement also sabotaged most agreements
politically by denying a potential trading partner the assurance of the other party’s
prompt positive response (guaranteed legislative approval).121 The mechanism was seen
as a negotiation killer that rendered other nations hesitate to enter into further deals.
Sharing the same fate, the required procedure (public participation and legislature
approval) under Section 190 of the Thai Constitution was triggered, and almost killed the
nearly complete Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement (JTEPA) that took up
to three years of negotiations.122 The claim of the constitutional process violation, had it
been successfully challenged, would have required the agreement to be renegotiated,
which would in turn undermine the Thai government’s credibility while inevitably
shaking its international relations with Japan.
Justice Sutherland emphasized that the central role of the executive branch in the
conduct of foreign affairs is necessary to avoid any serious international
embarrassment.123 The common “embarrassment” scenario have been described by the
fact that the executive might begin an international initiative “only to have Congress
change its mind after that policy had been undertaken”.124 The participation of the
legislature might be viewed as needed to legitimize the process, but its extensive role, in
120
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many cases, has been proven to be rather disruptive than constructive to the system. 125 As
commonly known, the Senate role is to advice the President as to the kind of treaty
should look like to be acceptable. Oftentimes there are conditions attached such as
reservations, amendments, understandings that would require further renegotiation. The
result was “a sharp bifurcation of the treaty process between the presidential stage and the
Senate stage, which frustrated governments, annoyed foreign governments and troubled
United States foreign relations”.126 The U.S. treaty process has also been criticized by
foreign governments as making it impossible to do diplomatic business, and that it gave
no chance of any predictability on the treaty approval.127 The uncertainty of the country’s
position may appear to the eye of the world community as “irresolute, divided, [and]
undependable”128.
Thus, ensuring a positive interaction between the political branches is deemed
crucial to the efficiency of the internal administration and the country’s external relations
(credibility, reliability and reputation abroad). The relationship should be in a
collaborative and respectable manner while keeping in mind that the central role of the
executive branch is sometimes required in the preservation of foreign relations. An
attempt to secure internal accountability by placing heavy controls over the executive
may come at the expense of the country’s accountability abroad.
It is therefore important that the executive maintain the quality of its
administration. And to do so, it must possess a certain level of autonomy to ensure
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flexibility, specialization as well as the consistency of the policy in the administration.129
Surely one could argue why a country should give priority to external courtesy, and pay
less attention to its own. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the legislature from acting
disruptive or from making changes of its considerations back and forth. And indeed,
sometimes the country’s foreign relations must be sacrificed for the sake of (as a critic
may call) a good policy.130 But one should keep in mind that we do not live in isolation.
We are part of the global system. Our internal well-being is contingent upon our external
relations. After the Cold War period, economic diplomacy has increasingly gained its
prominent role by drawing countries together to channel their energy toward building
global peace and economic prosperity.131 Foreign policy, especially trade, is claimed as a
strategic approach that has connected “policies on domestic economic growth to
international relations with foreign nations”.132 Diplomacy is not thus simply being
considerate to foreign governments, but also to our people who benefit from these
political and economic ties. International embarrassment and credibility therefore are not
simply matters of the country’s image, but its economic opportunities, social connection
and political gains in the world stage. To avoid these losses, flexibility in the
administration is needed for the executive branch to assure the partners of its competence,
and to increase its ability to employ trade negotiation in conjunction to other foreign
policy mechanisms.
In any case, the autonomy of the executive in the conduct of foreign affairs does
not suggest that the legislative role should be completely excluded as argued in the
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previous section, especially when substantial domestic impacts are involved. My
argument for the central role of the executive branch in the realm of foreign relations
only requires that the role of the legislature be reasonable and consultative rather than
prohibitive, while respecting the executive’s policy determination when needed. The
relationship between the branches should be in a mutual respect to promote the efficiency
of the administration, which is the approach that would foster the overall interests of the
country.
V. Judicial Review in Foreign Affairs
Balancing the interaction among the branches is the key to the maintenance of the
administration effectiveness and to the success of foreign policy implementation.
Limitation of a judicial role under certain circumstances is also one of the factors that
would promote the central role of the executive branch in the undertaking of foreign
policy. With this respect, this section will address the relationship between the executive
and the judiciary branch to examine how the restraint of judicial review can enhance this
quality of administration while reducing the potential shift in the balance of powers.
A. Judicial Roles and Limits in Foreign Affairs
The concepts of judicial abstention and deference, although distinguishable, share
the implication of limitation in judicial review.133 Whereas judicial abstention refers to a
circumstance in which a court can exercise its discretion and equitable powers pursuant
to the Constitution and statutes, but declines to decide a legal action over which it has
jurisdiction, judicial deference, on the other hand, refers to a willingness of a court to
reach the merit of a case, but only defers certain political issues to the competent
branches in respect of their authorities. Furthermore, judicial abstention often involves
the issue of allocation of powers where a laundry list of factors is to be considered, while
133
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these factors are not mentioned in the context of judicial deference.134 Despite the fact
that these concepts are two different animals, there is yet “the explicit interaction between
abstention and deference when courts adjudicate on constitutional foreign affairs
controversies”.135 The two concepts at least suggest that the court should be limitedly

involved in certain areas such as those concerning policy considerations such as national
security, economics or national expenditure.136 And, it was rather the degree of the
court’s involvement that should differentiate the two concepts; one in which deference is
absolute (abstention), and another in which deference is partial (deference). This section,
however, is not meant to focus on the analyses of the judicial deference and abstention
applications per se, but only to look at the justifications for limited judicial roles in the
realm of foreign affairs through an understanding of the relationship between the two
concepts.
Under the U.S. jurisdiction, the concepts of judicial abstention and deference have
been developed, and are commonly applied in the realm of foreign affairs.137 Despite the
fact that Article III, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution vests the judicial power in Article
III courts to decide all cases arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties,138 the courts
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have sometimes removed themselves to a backseat and have not played a major part in
the governance of the matter of foreign affairs.139 This is the area that oftentimes involves
a minimal role of the judiciary.140 These concepts thus implicates the courtesy of the
Court to accord the government a certain policy space for believing that the governmental
act may be in pursuant to the national security concerns or national interest in relation to
other nations.141
B. The Absence of Judicial Restraint and its Problems in the Thai Context
Judicial restraint, particularly “judicial abstention” may be an unfamiliar concept
under the Thai Constitution as the Constitutional Court has been able to exercise its
power to decide on the question of the distribution of powers among governmental
organs pursuant to the power granted under the Constitution (its general jurisdiction).142
Through the general provision, the Court was able to determine whether the international
document (presumably a treaty) undertaken by the executive branch can bypass the
legislature approval as appeared in its Ruling No. 11/2542 (1999).143 The Thai

authority;--to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;--to all cases of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction;--to controversies to which the United States shall be a party;--to controversies
between two or more states…”). But see RAMSEY, supra note 80, at 324 (explaining how the issue of
standing in foreign affairs can limit a judicial challenge under this jurisdictional grant Article).
139
The courts have responded to the cases that involved U.S. foreign policy in various ways. Under some
situations, courts have accorded complete deference to the position expressed by the executive. In others,
courts give that position great weight from persuasive to relevant evidence. And there are circumstances
that court have abstained from deciding such issues at all. Jonathan Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign
Relations, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 98 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1990). In
Goldwater v. Carter, the Court declined its role in determining whether the action of one branch exceeds its
authority to commit. DAVID GRAY ADLER & LARRY N. GEORGE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 38 (David Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds.,1996). During the war period,
the political question doctrine has routinely been invoked by the U.S. Courts in response to the challenges
to the constitutionality of the war (the Vietnam, Korean, Grenada and Panama wars) which were initiated
without congressional authorization. Nevertheless, the political question doctrine traditionally generates
more activity in the lower courts, where it has recently been applied to a wider range of foreign affairs
disputes, such as: controversies over the allocation of foreign affairs powers. Nzelibe, supra note 134, at
948.
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HENKIN, supra note 1, at 69.
141
Id. at 70-71.
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See CONST. (1997), Ch. 10 §266 (Thail.) (repealed 2006). CONST. (1991), Ch. 10 §207 (Thail.) (repealed
1997).
143
Summary of the Constitutional Court, May 25, 1999, Ruling No. 11/2542 (Thail.),
http://www.constitutionalcourt.or.th/download/Summary_desic/42/Summary_desic_eng/e11_2542.pdf
(requested the Constitutional Court to rule on whether or not a letter of intent to seek technical and
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Constitution of 2007, however, is known as the first Constitution that specifically grants
the Constitutional Court the power to resolve disputes concerning the types of treaty that
must be subject to the special process under Section 190.144 In addition, Section 214
grants the Constitutional Court general jurisdiction to resolve “the case where occurs a
conflict as to the powers and duties between at least two organs being the National
Assembly, the Council of Ministers or constitutional organs that are not Courts…”145
Most importantly, what these provisions confer upon the Court is the power to address
the conflicting claims of competence between the political departments. The difficulty
arises when this grant of power involves the determination by the Court as to how the
foreign affairs powers should be allocated, even in the departure of the original intent of
the Constitution which grants the executive a broad range of foreign affairs power. The
shift in the balance of powers can occur when the authorities of the executive in the
foreign affairs conduct can be limited or expanded according to the Court’s interpretation
of the treaty in question.
The ability of the government to undertake its full autonomy in the pursuit of any
international agreement depends heavily upon the determination by the Court on the type
of the document involved. A sharp contrast in the Court decisions with regards to the
executive’s obligation to submit an international agreement to the legislature for prior
approval is demonstrated in the two cases; one concerning the letter of the recognition of
Preah Vihear Temple enlisted by Cambodia as a World Heritage Site (hereafter “Preah
Vihear Temple”) and the other concerning the letter of intent to seek technical and
financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund (hereafter “IMF”).
financial assistance sent by the government to the International Monetary Fund was a treaty that had to be
approved by the National Assembly under section 224 paragraph two of the Constitution of the Kingdom of
Thailand, B.E. 2540 (1997)).
144
“In the case where there arises a problematic issue under paragraph two, the power to make the
determination thereon shall be vested in the Constitutional Court…” CONST. (2007), Ch. 9 §190, ¶ 6
(Thail.).
145
Id., Ch. 10 § 214.
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In the IMF, the Constitutional Court held that the letter of intent was simply “an
explanation of the policies and operations of the government” required as part of the
application process in order to exercise its rights to withdraw sums from the IMF. 146 It
also bore no character as a “treaty” for its being only a unilateral act of the Thai
government since the IMF did not treat such letter of intent as a binding obligation
between the two parties. Although there was an obligation to obtain Parliamentary
approval on the modification of its solvency law within a specific timeframe, the failure
to meet such dateline constituted no breach of contract, according to the Court.147 The
underlying decision of this case suggested that unless the document is not treated as a
“treaty” by the Court in the first place, there is no need to look into other elements. This
narrow interpretation certainly accords the government a large space in the exercise of its
foreign affairs powers.
On the contrary, the Court in Preah Viherah Temple ruled that the joint
communiqué signed between the Thai and the Cambodian governments in the recognition
of Preah Viherah Temple enlistment as a World Heritage Site by Cambodia was a type of
treaty, which rendered it unconstitutional for failure to go through the process required
under Section 190.148 Despite the fact that the declaration would not “affect each
country's rights on surveying and demarcating the common border”149and only serve as a
friendly support of the enlistment to strengthen the diplomatic relations between the two
countries, 150 the Court nevertheless held that the document was intended for legally
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Supra note 143.
Id.
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Saan Rattatumnoon [The Constitutional Court], Jul. 8, 2008, Ruling No. 6-7/2551 (Thail), available at
http://61.19.241.65/DATA/PDF/2551/A/108/1.PDF.
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Thailand, Cambodia Signed Document on Preah Viherah Temple, MCOT News, June 18, 2008,
http://enews.mcot.net/view.php?id=4812 (quoting the former Thai Foreign Minister Noppadon Pattama at a
press conference).
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In summary, the Joint Communiqué contains six provisions as follows; 1. Thailand is in full support of
the government of Cambodia in its enlisting Preah Viherah Temple as a World Heritage Site in accordance
with the map arranged by Cambodia. 2. Cambodia acknowledged that the enlistment will not include the
buffer zone located in the northern and eastern side of the temple. 3. The enclosed map under the first
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binding effects since it contained the obligations of the Thai side, specifically the forth
provision which specified the joint planning management to preserve the character and
cultural aspects of the Temple and the surrounding areas. The Court went further to treat
reservations under the fifth provision as evidence of a binding agreement where both
parties mutually agreed that nothing in the joint communiqué shall affect each country’s
rights on its border claims (as opposed to evidence of a simple understanding that
intended no whatsoever legal effects concerning borders’ delimitation and settlement).151
The inconsistency in the Court’s rationale can, in fact, makes it hard for the
executive to predict whether it has an independent authority to undertake and conclude a
certain international agreement. At one time, the executive acted as a primary guardian.
And at another time, its role was inadvertently switched to an assistant to a treaty making
process. The problem here is the Court’s rationales in differentiating Thailand’s
obligations under both international documents. Although both cases contain certain
obligations that Thailand must undertake, the Court basically treated the supposedly
collaboration of the two nations in the protection of the ancient Temple to maintain its
culturally distinctive aspects as a “breachable” obligation while, in the IMF, rejecting that
there could be any breach of Thailand’s obligation to amend its solvency law within the
specific timeframe stated in the letter of intent.152 And due to this mistaken recognition of

paragraph shall be the original map including the “Schema Directeur pour la Zonage de Preah Vihear” and
other core zones. 4. While awaiting for the decision of the joint committee in the demarcation of the
common border, the two countries will collaborate to preserve the value and the unique character of the
temple in accordance with the international standard. Such joint management plan shall be submitted along
with the Temple enlistment which is designated for the consideration on February 1, 2010. 5. The
enlistment shall not affect each country's rights on surveying and demarcating the common border. 6.
Thailand and Cambodia are deeply thankful to the Director-General of UNESCO, Mr. Koichiro Matsuura,
for his kind facilitation in the enlistment process. Supra note 148, para. 1.4.
151
Id. para. 1.5(3).
152
The Constitutional Court decision concerning the Joint Declaration between Thailand and Cambodia
does not practically reverse the effectiveness of the Signatory of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Topothai,
supra note 29. However, the fact that the Court in Preah Viherah Temple demanded that the communiqué
undertaken by the Thai government be withdrawn yet could not prevent Cambodia from enlisting the
temple since the Cambodian government was going to proceed regardless strongly showed that there was
really no contractual obligation on the Thai side or any breach that would have resulted in any sort of
reparation to be furnished by Thailand to Cambodia.
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the legal obligation, the joint communiqué was considered an international “treaty”153
making the Court look into other elements of the treaty such as the territorial or
jurisdictional impacts potentially made by the treaty to determine the executive’s
authority in the treaty-making process.
It is, in fact, understood that once an international undertaking is considered as a
“treaty”, other elements that would require a treaty to be subject to a complicated
constitutional process can easily fall into it.154 Such a broad treaty characterization of the
Court certainly will affect the executive discretionary power in the conduct of foreign
relations. A treaty that is meant to support diplomatic relations is no exception to the
scrutiny of the legislature. Not only did the decision of the Court to demand that the Thai
government withdraw the communiqué imply the diminished authority of the executive
in the conduct of diplomacy, it also jeopardized Thailand-Cambodia foreign relations by
putting the Thai government in an awkward position with Cambodia.
Although, under the Thai Constitution, the obligation of judicial restraint is out of
the question, it yet seems that its consideration could be a way out of this frustration. The
power to resolve the issues regarding the competence and constitutional functions of
political branches now rests with the Constitutional Court. Aside from its general
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 214, the power of the Constitutional Court to require
treaties to be subject to Parliamentary approvals and a public hearing is also an
implication for the ability of the judiciary to manage the distribution of powers among the
political organs. And the foreign affairs power is no exception. The expressed language
in the Constitution led some critics to invoke the traditional analysis of the separation of

The Constitutional Court employed an analytical method on the meaning of “treaty” pursuant to the
Vienna Convention. Supra note 148, para. 1.5.
154
Remarked by Professor Jaturon, the vagueness of Section 190 will create all kinds of claims since “it
does not matter whether the changes under Section 190 are for the worse or for the better and also when
many changes can affect the economic or social lives of the people”. And thus, there is no doubt that many
treaties will likely be subject to parliamentary approvals and public hearings. Therawat, supra note 2, at 2.
153
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powers doctrine to justify the current position of the Constitutional Court, through strict
adherence to the constitutional text, in the determination of foreign affairs authorities.155
Nonetheless, the language of Section 190, paragraph 6 only confers the power rather than
requiring the Court to resolve disputes that may arise thereof 156 which could also suggest
its ability to either entirely abstain from rendering a decision or defer the issue to the
competent body where it sees fits.
Thus, although it must be acknowledged that one of the crucial functions of the
Court is to police these constitutional boundaries by ensuring that the constitutional
process is observed, we must not forget that such a process also runs the risk of entrusting
the branch that may lack the resources, expertise and understandings to decide on the
question that is purely political in nature while concerning the stability of our foreign
relations.157 The question of what would be the appropriate role for the Court in the realm
of foreign affairs must be addressed. And the extent of the Court to scrutinize
governmental actions to assure their conformity with the Constitution will be examined in
the following sections.
C. Justifications for Judicial Limits
As we have seen, the concepts of judicial deference and abstention are not
unusual practices in the U.S. when the courts’ decisions might involve the determination
of certain foreign policy or affect the allocation of powers of the political organs. But the
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Fritz Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L. JOURNAL
517, 520 (1966) (“An avoidance on such prudential grounds would, of course, also conflict with the basic
assumptions of the classical theory, that the exercise of judicial review should be the necessary
consequence of the Court's postulated duty to decide all cases properly within its jurisdiction, and to decide
constitutional questions whenever the outcome of the case should depend upon such a question”). Topothai,
supra note 29, at 15 (suggesting that the adoption of Section 190 which grants the judiciary the power to
render a decision concerning the type of treaty that must secure legislative approval was in accordance with
the principle of the checks and balances).
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Supra note 43.
157
Recalling Justice William Rehnquist’s opinion in Goldwater v. Carter, he stated that when “basic
question presented…is political”, it would be “nonjusticiable because it involves the authority of the
President in the conduct of our country’s foreign relations…” RAMSEY, supra note 80, at 321 (quoting
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979)).
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next important questions to be addressed are the justifications for their applications, and
their significances to the executive function through the argument for institutional
competency.
Effectiveness and efficiency of the administration remained the key elements that
encouraged the court to view its function as a proponent for governmental policy that
has already been established.158 These are pragmatic concerns about the effective
execution of U.S. foreign policy that demand that a salient role of the executive branch
be accorded. Both democratic elements (effectiveness and efficiency) are the primary
concerns that led courts to defer its judgment for the respect of the executive’s
positions.159 The consideration of the effective administration in the conduct of foreign
affairs can, in fact, be traced back to the framers intent. Through the replacement of the
Article of Confederation with the Constitution, the framers had intended to empower the
executive through the assignment of various foreign affairs responsibilities for the more
effective implementation of foreign policy.160
The belief of the courts in the presidential plenary powers in the area of foreign
affairs that, in effect, made the courts defer its decision to the President by giving him “a
broad discretionary authority to identify and define national interests and national
security”161 may be explained by its lack of competence, expertise, resources and
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David Gray Adler, Court, Constitution and Foreign Affairs, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT
Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds.,1996).
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Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
supra note 139, at 99. Lavinbuk, supra note 59, at 864-865 (addressing the revisionist position believing in
a limited role of the judiciary in the realm of foreign affairs) (“Whatever judges may believe U.S. foreign
affairs obligations to be, ‘[t]he propriety of... interposition by the court may be well questioned,’
particularly because ‘the judiciary is not that department of the government to which the assertion of its
interests against foreign powers is confided.”).
160
Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
supra note 139, at 100.
161
Adler, Court, Constitution and Foreign Affairs, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 158, at 44-45 (emphasis added). RAMSEY, supra note 80, at 321-322 (2007)
(quoting Justice Jackson in Chicago &Southern Air Lines Inc. v. Wterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103,
111(1948)) (“[B]ut even if courts could require full disclosure, the very nature of executive decision as to
foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confined by our Constitution to the
political departments of the government, executive and Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and
OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 44 (David
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guidelines for resolution of foreign affairs matters, the fear of embarrassment that may
attend the judicial review against a presidential act as well as the view that the president
possesses superior diplomatic skills, information and better understanding of national
interest. Furthermore, the constant evolution in international norms may make it difficult
for the courts to properly define the scope of foreign affairs powers. These are, for
instance, the emergence of new kinds of international commitments or international
norms that may be of a non-legal character, but simply a share understanding among
international community.162 These factors can, in fact, diminish the capacity of the courts
to resolve disputes concerning foreign relations.163
As argued in Section III (B), there are reasons that render judicial reviews in
every government act or decision inappropriate in the context of foreign affairs.164 And
there are circumstances that demand the applications of judicial abstention and deference,
especially when the court decides on the constitutional question concerning foreign
affairs that could go far beyond a mere determination of the rights and duties of the
litigants in the case.

involve large elements of prophecy…and have long been held to belong in the domain of political power
not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry”). Lavinbuk, supra note 59, at, 865.
162
Nzelibe, supra note 134, at 981.
163
Other factors suggested by Charney were questions concerning international law, independent judiciary
(reflection of the biases of their culture and foreign policy), expertise in the law of the executive, access to
the facts, international law is alien, important and uncertain effects, sole voice and flexibility. Charney,
Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION supra note
139, at 101-106.
164
RAMSEY, supra note 80, at 321(“Judicial involvement in foreign affairs controversies nonetheless carries
a hint of inappropriateness, driven by an intuition that it is inexpedient and indeed dangerous for courts to
undermine or second guess foreign policy decisions of the President and Congress”). Baker v. Carr set
forth alternative tests for the application of judicial abstention which is partially reflected in this analysis
“when it is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department, a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility
of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches
of government, or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made, or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question”.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 218 (1962).
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i. Judicial Abstention
Judicial abstention has traditionally been applied to the situation in which the
“Constitution has committed the determination of the issue to another agency of
government than the courts”.165 This is a classical concern of the separation of powers
principle that where there is “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of an
issue to a coordinate political department”,166 the court will entirely decline to rule on
that particular issue. This concept has also been expanded to preclude the court’s
determination of authorities among the political branches.167 A political question became
the primary factor that rendered the case unreviewable by the court. Under this
circumstance, the court, compelled by the question of competence and the allocation of
powers among political branches, would abstain from rendering a decision without
making further inquiry into the decision of a political branch.
The concept of judicial abstention should be considered in the Thai treaty context
when involving the determination of the executive treaty-making authority. Despite the
power granted by the Constitution, this does not mean that the concept is inapplicable as
previously argued. Many of the factors that the court considered for judicial abstention in
the case Baker v. Carr are framed in terms of institutional competence to conserve the
judicial credibility and to promote the decision-making of the competent authority.168
Although critics of the judicial restraints may have pointed out the courts competence in
judging the matters of foreign affairs can derive from their abilities to analyze highly
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Nzelibe, supra note 134, at 949 (citing Herbert Weschler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1, 9 (1959)).
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Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217.
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The President was claimed acting unconstitutionally by depriving the Senate constitutional role in the
treaty termination with Taiwan. The question of whether the Constitution allowed the President to
terminate a treaty in connection with recognition in the absence of the Senate was then presented to the
court. Although the court recognized that the question will only require the interpretation of the
constitutional provision which is within the judicial function and competence, the court was not willing to
decide whether one branch of the government has impinged upon the power of another. Goldwater v.
Carter, 444 U.S. at 999.
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Nzelibe, supra note 134, at 949. See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 218.
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vague and complex domestic legal issues,169 the problems presented in the Thai context
which involved an aggressive role of the judiciary in foreign affairs may have less to do
with the court’s “undiscoverable standard”,170 but more to do with the impact of its
decision upon the stability of the country’s foreign relations. It concerns the nation’s
established foreign policy and the conduct of international relations. The Preah Vihear
Temple involves an important decision of the Constitutional Court to withdraw the
executive’s foreign affairs authority, which has destabilized Thailand-Cambodia foreign
relations. The Court’s decision by rendering a judgment against the validity of the Joint
Communiqué has disregarded the government’s policy determination, and undermined
the principle of mutual respects among the institutional branches while delimiting the
foreign affairs powers that were originally vested in the executive.
ii. Judicial Deference
The concept of judicial deference could suggest a lesser degree of abstention in
the sense that the court will at least reach the merits of the dispute, but deferring certain
issues to the discretion of the concerned authorities.171 The concept again calls for
institutional competencies or raises the question whether the court is more competent to
use its own judgment than is another institution.172 Sharing judicial abstention’s
justifications, courts typically are seen as more competent to evaluate the merits of facts
169

Nzelibe, supra note 134, at 983. See also HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION:
SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIRS 221-22 (1990).
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The term “judicially discoverable and manageable standards” was one of the factors set forth in Baker v.
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their understanding of the applicable norms governing such evidence is incomplete.
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Judicial deference derives from the famous case, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) concerning the court’s deferral decision to an administrative agency on
the statute’s interpretation. Although judicial deference is understood to be outside of foreign affairs
context, “at least one commentator has argued that much of the judicial role in foreign affairs can be
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134, at 1000.
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Gunn, supra note 136, at 484. There are other circumstances that courts would defer their decisions that
this paper will not address since they are not the center of this chapter’s analysis. These are such as
jurisdictional disputes within the federal system (the reluctance of federal courts to challenge the
constitutionality of a federal law) or jurisdictional disputes in the international system. Id. at 485.
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where “popular interests and political power ignore human and constitutional rights”,173
than making a judgment concerning political and economic decisions. It is thus
sometimes less of the capability concern than appropriateness.
The judicial deference approach can play an important role in a situation where
the court must address a substantive violation of an individual’s constitutional rights, but
its review must be limited in terms of the extent those rights must be accorded due to the
concern of government’s limited resources and important policy decision. This is
especially important in the upholding of the people’s participatory rights that affirmative
governmental action is required. This kind of right imposes duties on the government to
resources for the right to be fully respected.174 Thus, the determination of the right to
public participation (substantive requirements) can have a policy implication as to how a
branch of government should manage its budget and resources. And it is questionable
whether the judiciary should be able to judge, especially in the absence of a specific
regulation or statute concerning the manner of a public hearing. And even if there is one,
should the interpretation be deferred to the concerned bodies will require further analysis
that is beyond the length of this dissertation. But in any case, matters involving political
judgments, especially those concerning an assessment of the validity of claims on
national resources may fall outside the judicial function, and can be ones of the factors
that justify judicial deference.
For Thailand, the case of Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement
(JTEPA) raised a very important issue concerning the ability of the court to define a
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CECILE FABRE, SOCIAL RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 40, 42 (2000). Ran Hirschi, Negative Rights vs.
Positive Entitlements: A Comparative Study of Judicial Interpretations of Rights in an Emerging NeoLiberal Economic Order, 22.4 HUM. RTS. Q. 1060, 1084 (2000) (“…all matters involving political
judgments on the allocation of economic resources, the management of a valuable public asset…in which
complex economic and social considerations and trade-offs were involved…the Courts should be less
inclined to intervene…).
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public hearing standard in the treaty context.175 The validity of an international agreement
does not only depend on following a proper process, but also observing the substantive
requirements of a public hearing imposed by the judiciary. These factors can drive up the
costs of judicial intervention on the administration of foreign policy.176 The burden that
the government must bear to defend the means of participation it accorded to the public
will be considerably high. And it is not necessary that the substantial requirements of the
public consultation procedure will guarantee its effectiveness, if the public administration
itself lacks such a quality. For these reasons, it will be necessary for the Thai courts to
avoid prescribing absolute rules of conduct for a political branch under certain
circumstances for the executive to maintain sufficient autonomy in the foreign policy
decision.
Despite the fact that the Thai Constitution assigns the court a function to decide
on cases regarding foreign affairs matters, there are yet factors to be considered in terms
of the diminished degree of judicial involvement, especially when its decision concerns
the determination of the political departments’ authorities, the judgment of policy
considerations (having political or budget consequences), and in the absence of individual
justice interest (fundamental rights). These factors are what I feel compelling and
consistent to the principle of our constitutionality, which our judicial system should take
into consideration in the area that concerns our international relations.177 The concerned
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The primary challenge was the unconstitutionality of the agreement that did not afford the public
sufficient means and time to participate in the making of the agreement. Saan Pokklong [The
Administrative Court], Mar. 30, 2007, Ruling No. 178/2550 (Thail.), available at
http://www.admincourt.go.th/50/s50-0178-o01.pdf.
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One of the compelling justifications for a limited judicial review suggested by Chamey is the fear that
the court decisions might have important and indeterminate effects. The argument calls into the question of
the court’s effectiveness when applying the rule of laws that also involve foreign policy determinations and
other factual considerations. Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION supra note 139, at 104.
177
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executive’s sphere, especially in the realm of foreign affairs where the Constitution vested plenary power to
the executive. For the U.S., the Supreme Court’s docket in fact showed the manner of the judiciary
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factors will help enhancing the effectiveness of the executive administration by
discouraging unnecessary judicial interference while reducing the potential shift in the
balance of powers among the institutional branches. This functional consideration, while
according the executive a certain level of autonomy to undertake its foreign policy
decisions, will allow each branch to effectively perform a function in the area of its
competence and in a manner that would foster our national interests.
D. Balancing Approach: Justifications for Judicial Involvement
The mere involvement of foreign policy or the allocation of powers cannot simply
exclude the judiciary role from a legal dispute concerning foreign affairs since any slight
connection to those considerations would justify the absence of the court’s role entirely in
this realm.178 In the case of Thailand, there will be a question of where this line can be
drawn since the making of treaty could all involve or at least affect foreign policy
determinations in some ways. If this was the case, then the court would be completely
excluded from the entire process. And there would be no room for the court to act as a
guardian of constitutional rights in foreign affairs.
Thus, although it may be true that foreign policy determination in general is
within the executive’s discretionary power, but the policy that substantially affects
fundamental individual justice can trigger a better, justifiable role of the court. And it is,
in fact, an important question to be addressed by the court rather than any other political
organs which must serve as a guardian of the people’s constitutional rights.179
Furthermore, stability, as one of its institutional qualities, may very well prove to be

involvement in foreign affairs, although prevalent in the early days, is limited when affecting the function
of the necessary political branches. Lavinbuk, supra note 59, at 895.
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“But it is erroneous to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies
beyond judicial cognizance” Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. at 999 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211
(1962)).
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RAMSEY, supra note 80, at 107 (casting doubts on the executive power amounting to altering
individuals’ legal rights and duties in the domestic legal system).
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important in a context where individual rights are at stake.180 Thus, readjusting the scope
of the treaty categories to that concerned with individual fundamental rights is highly
relevant here since the change can make the court a more appropriate body to address the
issues of individual fundamental interests rather than to evaluate governmental acts
concerning the conduct of our foreign relations.181 There are strong implications of
individual rights within the system of the separation of powers under which individuals
harmed by government acts must be protected. Even in the area of foreign affairs where
judicial deference has normally played its role in the U.S. jurisdiction, “the Court has, at
least in one line of cases, enforced the standards of the Bill of Rights without any
deference to the international responsibilities of the government”.182 Nevertheless, even
when the courts actually do reach the merits of such a case, it does not mean that it
cannot accord the political branches a significant amount of policy discretion. Thus,
foreign policy that may implicate fundamental individual rights may not justify judicial
abstention, but may validate judicial deference which has a certain degree of judicial
involvement for a guarantee of the people’s important constitutional rights while
allowing certain policy decision to be deferred to, and addressed by the political
branches.183 It is thus the function of the court to weigh individual rights claims against
other national interest, including the effectiveness of foreign administration to determine
the level of deference it should accord to the political branches. Through this approach,
the courts would then promote the political branches' (including itself) institutional
180
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In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the government has argued that the courts should abstain from hearing these
cases because they involve sensitive matters of national security and foreign policy. The courts that have
considered this argument have rejected it, but have nonetheless concluded that considerable deference to
the political branches' judgment was appropriate. Nzelibe, supra note 134, at 1006.
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competence over foreign affairs issues. “In such a framework, judicial abstention and
deference do not entail mutually exclusive categories, but rather reflect a continuum of
judicial involvement in foreign affairs”.184
The consideration of the factors mentioned may require that our treaty-making
practice under the Constitution be re-evaluated. Thus, a form of limited judicial review in
foreign affairs can be (i) the readjustment of the judicial intervention manner that should
take place early in the treaty process, and in collaboration with the other two branches to
determine if the treaty must undergo the special treaty process (to be elaborated in
Chapter V, Section II, D (i)-(ii)) as well as (ii) the limitation on the judiciary’s ability to
impose a public hearing standard (to be elaborated in Chapter V, Section II, D (iii)).
These proposals relate to the concepts of judicial abstention and deference in the sense
that (i) the prior-determination mechanism will provide a stronger basis for judicial
abstention in the constitutional challenge of a procedural violation once the executive’s
treaty authority has formally been established, and (ii) that political branches’
discretionary approach concerning the public hearing standard will require the application
of judicial deference in order to maintain an effective function of the public
administration. These notions of limited judicial review are necessary to broaden the
executive’s power in the area of its competency.
Preah Viherah Temple has become a bitter lesson for Thailand-Cambodia foreign
relations which can hardly be patched due to the decision of the Constitutional Court to
invalidate a friendly act of the Thai government toward Cambodia. What type of interests
is being protected here by the judicial process is unclear.185 However, it is quite clear
what we are losing in this battle. The ideas of limited judicial review in foreign relations
184

Id. at 1009.
The decision of the Constitutional Court could not prevent the Cambodia government from proceeding
with the enlistment of the Temple (even in the absence of the Joint Communiqué). The revocation of the
Thai government act requested by the Court only sent Cambodia a hostile message that Thailand is no
longer in support of the enlistment.
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certainly has nothing to do with the concerns of judiciary insecurity and confidence (as
some critics claimed),186 but rather has much to do with ensuring a proper method of
securing our national interests and protecting citizens’ welfares in our system, even if it
may sometimes require that the central role of the executive in the making of foreign
policy decisions be preserved.187
VI. Conclusion
The principle of separation of powers, although aims at preserving the
accountability and transparency of a governing system, also reminds us of what it means
for each institutional branch to be “separate”. Institutional competencies may not be part
of the bargain (objective) of this principle, but are arguably byproducts that can help each
department perform its function effectively. The effectiveness of the executive
administration is far from what people understand as mere “convenience”. It, in fact, has
significant contributions to the assurance of our national interest that can be attained
through the maintenance of external relations. In terms of domestic challenge, this
effectiveness quality is also required for an administration to be responsive to the
people’s needs and concerns. It is, therefore, important that the executive be accorded
sufficient autonomy in the exercise of its foreign powers as constitutionally intended. The
possession of the adequate autonomy does not mean a grant of the executive’s absolute
power that should receive no scrutiny, but rather calls for an appropriate level of

Although, to some critics, the argument concerning the lack of judiciary’s competency may be overrated
while making judges feel faithless in the judicial process in guarding our national interest, it should be
acknowledged that having the judiciary decide on every issue concerning foreign relations can be
politically damaging since the courts sometimes find it difficult to maintain its impartial judgment against
foreign governments. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 69-91 (for criticism of political question doctrine).
187
The ability of the executive to decide its own competence in the realm of foreign affairs is also crucial to
the maintenance of an effective administration. The proposal of an “oversight committee” which should be
composed of the executive, legislative and judicial officials to determine the types of treaty that are subject
to the constitutional process prior to undertaking any treaty negotiation will be incorporated into the treatymaking model presented in chapter V. The idea is also influenced by the concept of judicial deference in
the sense that the determination of the foreign affairs conduct is executive-based.
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legislative and judicial interventions, which is still required to secure the legitimacy of
our political process pursuant to the principle of separation of powers.
Foreign affairs are considered sensitive areas of politics that may demand for
coordination and mutual respect among the institutional branches in the upholding of our
national interest and the maintenance of institutional competencies. This rationale affirms
the significance of executive autonomy and limited involvements of the legislature and
judiciary through the justifications of strong domestic impacts and individual rights
implications. Specifically, the Thai Constitution, unlike the U.S. Constitution, does not
vest the entire treaty-making powers in the legislature. Its required approval merely
concerns specific types of treaties, and what is left is within the plenary powers of the
executive. The treaty-making power is generally preserved, although not exclusively, for
the executive for various legitimate reasons such as a tradition, institutional advantages
and the concerns of foreign relations. Thus, the excessive roles of other branches in the
treaty process can create shifts in their functions while undermining the competence of
the branch that has the primary responsibility.
The notions of judicial limits in foreign affairs may be unfamiliar in the Thai legal
context, especially when the power to police constitutional boundaries is clearly granted
to the branch under the Constitution. But the consideration of the concepts can be
practical, given the conditions and dynamics of today’s international politics188 in which
flexibility and policy space must be sufficiently accorded to the executive in order to
address the exigencies of the country in the international realm. The manner of judicial
intervention is therefore important to maintain this balance. The current approach may
entail the Court to cross into the area of foreign policy decision which falls outside the
judicial function and contributes to the shift in the balance of powers. This dislocation of
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powers can threaten the foundation of constitutionalism and the integrity of our
Constitution. Judicial limits should thus also be understood as a support system for the
separation of powers principle in the sense that “[w]here the Constitution assigns a
particular function wholly and indivisibly to another department, the federal judiciary
does not intervene”.189
The intervention of the Constitutional Court in the Pra Vihear Temple case which
involved the Court’s review in the government’s foreign policy decision is an example of
a devastating result that shattered diplomatic relations between Thailand and Cambodia
when it rendered the decision that the friendly posture of Thailand is unconstitutional,
and that such a position must be withdrawn. The embarrassment, the severance of
diplomatic relations, hatred among the people of the two nations and the loss of many
more economic opportunities, in my view, are sufficiently justifiable for the
consideration of judicial limits (both in terms of the level and manner of intervention). In
the support of this argument, the rationale in Dames & Moore v. Reagan reflected the
court’s willingness to go along with the government policy instead of judging it for the
reason that “[i]f the Court had rule against the Iranian pact. Chaos and confusion would
have resulted and a carefully crafted diplomatic package would have been unraveled”.190
By conclusion, the way in which the current Thai Constitution was drafted may be
complicated for the application of judicial limits in foreign affairs since the Constitution
clearly designates the role of the Constitutional Court to resolve issues concerning the
extent of the executive and legislative roles in the treaty-making process. Under such a
construction, the judiciary’s obligation to police the constitutional boundaries may be
hard to be relieved, but can be re-adjusted. My argument comes nothing close to
suggesting a complete abandonment of this judicial role in the foreign affairs area or
189
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encouraging the usurpation of power by the executive because such an approach will only
undermine the system of checks and balances as well as the function of the court, as the
guardian of the people’s constitutional rights.191 My proposal only asks to re-create a
balanced role for each branch in order to meet the internal and external challenges
described in Chapter I. How the role of each institutional branch should be readjusted and
coordinated in the realm of foreign affairs, particularly in the treaty-making process to
maintain balance in the executive’s autonomy will be further discussed in the following
chapter (Chapter V).
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Chapter V: Democracy and the Treaty Practice Reform through a Comparative
Perspective (The Public and State Roles)
I. Introduction
The derivation of a treaty-making model requires this chapter to answer three
primary questions; (i) what the proper scope of public participation should be in terms of
the type of participation involved, and the kind of treaty to be subject to the
constitutional process under Section 190 (which has also partially been analyzed in
Chapter III), (ii) what the proper role of the legislature should be in the treaty process in
terms of the type of legislative check, and the kind of treaty to be subject to its scrutiny,
and (iii) what the proper roles of the courts are in terms of the level of deferential review
they should accord to other branches (which has also been considered in Chapter IV).
These questions will be addressed through examining treaty-making practices among the
various civil and common law countries. The surveyed countries include France,
Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), India, Switzerland, New Zealand and South Africa.
The analysis will be made in the following order. Section I provides the meaning
of a “treaty” according to each country’s terms and definitions, followed by the study of
how the surveyed countries approach these three primary questions. Although the search
for the meaning of a treaty is not the primary focus of this analysis, it is deemed crucial to
the determination of the executive’s treaty power in certain jurisdictions as the definition
can affect the ability of the executive to conclude a treaty. Under Section II, this survey
study will be incorporated into the analysis concerning the three particular areas of
proposed reforms through readjusting the roles of the public, legislature and judiciary in
the treaty-making process. Each question will be consisted of two sub parts, namely (i)
assessing the surveyed countries’ treaty practices, and (ii) asserting the standard (adopting
the approach) through my analysis. Section III will provide a complete derivative model
by taking into consideration the assessments of the surveyed countries’ treaty-making
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experiences, cultural arguments in Chapter III (the adoption of liberalism), and structural
arguments in Chapter IV (the maintenance of institutional competence) to achieve fuller
democracy in the treaty-making process. Therefore, the primary objective of the analysis
is to argue neither for the facilitation of the executive administration nor its
monopolization of foreign affairs power, but rather to generate a practical approach in
order to secure effectiveness and responsiveness in the machinery of our public
administration in the realm of foreign affairs.
II. Comparative Perspective
It is unquestionable that participatory rights of citizens can serve as a “mechanism
for enhancing the democratic tenor of public decision-making”.1 The method of
participation can come either though representation (legislature) or direct means
(referendum). In a large society where direct participation by citizens is deemed less
practical, the role of legislature may increase to better serve this democratic goal. The
judiciary, at the same time, has the power to enforce to ensure that this right is being
observed. These mechanisms are meant to improve the quality of political decisions by
guarding against the corruptive practices of a government and by securing intellectual and
constructive inputs of participants. Opportunities to directly or indirectly participate in
policy decision-making process are, therefore, crucial to the abilities of individual or
groups to defend and improve their interests.
Despite all the wonderful aspects, this self-governing principle can sometimes
collide with citizens’ own interest in having a responsive and effective government,
especially in the area of external affairs where national interests are also contingent upon
the country’s well-established foreign relations. The strenuous checks from the public and
institutional branches upon the executive (as described in Chapter I), although in theory
1

Martha Jackman, The Cabinet and the Constitution: Participatory Rights and Charter interests: Manicom
v. County of Oxford, 35 MCGILL L.J. 943, 944 (1989-1990) (Criticizing the unconstitutional outcome of the
case).
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can strengthen the people’s interests, do not always guarantee such a result when the
checks can have substantial impacts upon domestic as well as external relations
administrations. Aside from the need to secure the accountability and transparency of the
government, an effective function of the executive in handling treaties with foreign
governments must also be taken into consideration. Thus, the first question to be
addressed in this section as to what should be the scope of the public participation in the
treaty context will be drawn from the surveyed countries’ experiences combined with the
analysis provided in Chapter III.
Many jurisdictions generally have broad categories of treaties that are subject to
close supervision. However, their scrutinizing mechanisms in the treaty process are based
on final rather than prior legislative approvals and mandatory public consultations in
addition to this legislative check. The complicated process established in Section 190
certainly requires us to narrow down the scope of the treaty categories and to determine a
proper participation mechanism in order to ensure that those in need of special attention
properly receive one. The comparative perspectives will help us understand how the value
of public participation is carried out in practice in the context of a treaty-making process.
And this understanding will also help us shape its scope and define its limits to enable the
effective function of this participatory mechanism.
A. The Constitution of a “Treaty”
The Thai Constitution does not provide a legal definition of a “treaty”. 2 Section
190 primarily provides a treaty-making procedure for special classifications of treaties,
and it is rather the judiciary function to determine whether the treaty in question is within

2

It must also be noted that, under the Thai treaty-making practice, unlike the U.S. system, the term
“international agreements” and “treaties” are interchangeable.
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the meaning of those specified in Section 190.3 Thus, the power to interpret and define
treaties is entirely vested in the Constitutional Court.
According to the Thai jurisprudence, a treaty means any type of international
agreement in written concluded between states or international organizations intended for
legal effects among the parties in accordance with international law.4 The court, in fact,
treated mutual obligations borne by the parties (if breached would entitle the other to
certain judicial remedy) as a core element of a treaty. In the case of the International
Monetary Fund (hereinafter “IMF”) under which the Thai government tried to seek a
financial assistance from the IMF through the submission of the letter of intent, the court
rejected the plaintiff’s argument stating that the document, if anything, constituted no
more than “an explanation of policies and the operation of the government” bearing
simply “the characteristics of being a unilateral act by the Thai government in request of
the exercise of its rights in its capacity as a member State to utilize the general resources
of the IMF”.5 The court distinguished treaties from unilateral acts, which in its view lacks
the binding legal effects of both sides. The letter of intent, according to the court’s
analysis, is a non-binding instrument in which no sanctions would have been imposed had
the Thai government failed to deliver its promises stipulated in the letter of intent. It can
be understood that any binding agreement certainly accompanies significant legal
implications which can potentially have adverse impacts upon the people, and thus
requires greater scrutiny before it can take effects. Contractual obligations created by a

CONST. (2007), Ch. 9, §190 ¶ 3 (Thail.).
Saan Rattatumnoon [The Constitutional Court], Jul. 8, 2008, Ruling No. 6-7/2551 (Thail), available at
http://61.19.241.65/DATA/PDF/2551/A/108/1.PDF. See also the Summary of the Constitutional Court,
Ruling No. 33/2543 (Thail.) (ruling on the constitutionality of the Bio-diversity Convention).
5
Summary of the Constitutional Court’s decision, May 25, 1999, Ruling No. 11/2542 (Thail.), available at
http://www.constitutionalcourt.or.th/download/Summary_desic/42/Summary_desic_eng/e11_2542.pdf
(requested the Constitutional Court to rule on whether or not a letter of intent to seek technical and financial
assistance sent by the government to the International Monetary Fund was a treaty that had to be approved
by the National Assembly under section 224 paragraph two of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand,
B.E. 2540 (1997).
3
4
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written agreement between the parties, therefore, have become the primary factor that the
court considered in the construction of a treaty.
In addition, the courts have increasingly relied on the elements of the treaty
definition provided under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969)
(hereinafter “VCLT”). Despite being a non party to the VCLT, its customary status has
long been recognized by the Thai judiciary.6 The courts, in fact, have adopted and
incorporated into their interpretation the treaty definition provided by Article 2(1) of the
VCLT which defined a treaty as “an international agreement concluded between States in
a written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular
designation”.7 It should be noted that the intent for the legal binding effects of the parties
is missing from the VCLT definition. And, thus the contractual obligations created
between the parties is an additional element that is being recognized by the Thai
judiciary. In conclusion, there are four primary elements that the Thai courts have
elaborated in the constitution of a treaty. These are (i) legal consequences of the
obligations (ii) in a written form (iii) concluded between states or international
organizations and (iv) under the governance of international law.
The majority of states have virtually adopted these similar elements pursuant to
the VCLT treaty definitions.8 Canada, for instance, recognized treaties as a source of the
international legal obligations binding upon the state, and treated the VCLT as a basis of
the Constitution.9 Switzerland, in the same manner, recognizes any form of agreements
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Id. See also ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 14 (2d ed. 1985) (suggesting that the
criteria set in the VCLT have become customary international law).
7
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(1) (a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 331; 8 I.L.M.
679 (1969); 63 A.J.I.L. 875.
8
Australia, Canada, China, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, for instance, have domestic
definitions that are compatible with the VCLT definition. Duncan B. Hollis, A Comparative Approach, in
NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 10 (Duncan B. Hollis et al., eds. 2005).
9
Maurice Copithorne, National Treaty Law and Practice: Canada, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND
PRACTICE 91-92 (Duncan B. Hollis et al., eds. 2005).
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intended by the parties for binding legal effects to be governed by international law as a
treaty.10 The creation or change of legal obligations pursuant to public international law is
primarily required in order for a treaty to form under the Netherland constitutional
approach. This position has, in effect, generally excluded policy or cooperative
agreements from constituting a treaty to be submitted for parliamentary approval.11
In summary, although Thailand provides no distinction between “treaties” and
“international agreements”, its definitional approach is still considered conventional by
incorporating the international law definition (VCLT). The title of the instrument is also
proven to be less important than the intent of the parties when considering whether the
instrument in question has legal binding effects. The constitution of a treaty is therefore
relevant since it is one of the factors that can determine or even delimit the scope of the
executive authority in the treaty process. The next section provides the discussion of
another treaty component that must be taken into consideration in the allocation of the
treaty-making power.
B. Special Categories of Treaties
Despite the prerogative of the executive in the treaty-making realm, one cannot
deny that the executive cannot exercise such an authority without limitation. In many
states, the system of checks and balances enables state legislature (or in rare cases, public
consultation) to approve certain types of treaties prior to its implementation or its entry
into force. These categories ranged from as broad as those with political and economic
implications (i.e. territory cessation, having significant financial obligation) to the ones
that may have personal impacts (i.e. affecting individual rights).12 The surveyed countries
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Luzius Wildhaber, Adrin Scheidegger & Marc D. Schinzel, National Treaty Law and Practice:
Switzerland, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 627, 642 (Duncan B. Hollis et al., eds. 2005).
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J.G. Brouwer, National Treaty Law and Practice: the Netherlands in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND
PRACTICE 483, 485 (Duncan B. Hollis et al., eds. 2005).
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Hollis, A Comparative Approach, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 8, at 35. See
also Pierre Michel Eisemann & Catherine Kessedjian, National Treaty Law and Practice: France, in
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in this section, namely France, Germany, India, the UK, Switzerland and South Africa all
place an emphasis on the treaties that have substantial implications on individual rights.
The issue can get more complicated when the constitutional process, such as that
of Thailand entails checks from the public and the legislature prior to the initiation of an
important treaty negotiation,13 which is to be distinguishable from the practices of many
jurisdictions. Thus, securing the effectiveness of this process may require us to narrow
down the treaty type since, given these additional requirements, a broad common treaty
category as reflected in many jurisdictions will certainly cast all kinds of treaties into this
demanding process, which will prolong the process of treaty negotiation while potentially
leaving the important ones unattended.14 To redefine the treaty scope, the surveyed
countries have at least suggested that those that potentially threaten individuals’ rights to
life, liberty and security - the utmost interests guaranteed under the Thai Constitution should primarily be warranted in the treaty context. This is also a liberal approach that I
argued for in Chapter III.
Arguably, public participation can become more significant as the government
conduct increasingly affects individual fundamental rights to life, liberty and security. In
the U.S. treaty-making context, sole executive agreements without proper checks is seen
as a threat to the principle of democracy and constitutionalism, “especially when an
agreement entails lawmaking and affects individual rights”.15 The impacts on an
individual fundamental justice, which bears the basic characteristic of human rights, can
provide a strong basis for the participatory right of an individual in a policy decision. As
argued by Jonathan Charney, there are strong implications of individual rights within the

NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED
KINGDOM 1, 6 (Leigh Monroe et al., eds.1995).
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CONST. (2007), Ch. 9, §190, (Thail.) (amended 2011).
14
In the Switzerland model, LUZIUS WILDHABER, TREATY-MAKING POWER AND CONSTITUTION: AN
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE STUDY (1971) (emphasis added).
15
LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 65 (1990).

174

system of the separation of powers under which individuals harmed by government acts
must be protected.16 Even in the area of foreign affairs where judicial review has
limitedly played its role in the U.S. jurisdiction,17 “the Court has, at least in one line of
cases, enforced the standards of the Bill of Rights without any deference to the
international responsibilities of the government” 18 where important individual rights are
at stake. These are the cases that individuals’ political participation is undeniable, and
should be given priority.
i. Assessing Treaty-Making Practices
France (Civil law)
Under the French Constitution of 1958, Article 53, Section VI specifically
provides that special types of treaties require parliamentary approval before these treaties
can take effect (prior to ratification or approval by the executive).19 Such a process (the
intervention of the Parliament) can also be replaced by direct consultation of the citizens
in accordance with Article 11.20 According to Article 53, peace treaties, trade agreements,
treaties or agreements relating to international organization, those committing the
finances of the State, those modifying provisions which are the preserve of statute law,
those relating to the status of persons, and those involving the ceding, exchanging or
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Charney pointed out the crucial function of the court in upholding the constitutional rights. And matters
such as foreign affairs when implicating individual rights and fundamental justice should be subject to
closer scrutiny. Jonathan Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION 98, 102 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1990) (“The Constitution establishes an independent
judiciary primarily to protect aggrieved individuals harmed by the violations of the law… Their function is
essential to the maintenance of the separation of powers among the branches and the protection of
individual rights.”).
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HENKIN, supra note 15, at 69. DAVID GRAY ADLER & LARRY N. GEORGE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 38 (David Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds.,1996).
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Fritz Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L. JOURNAL
517, 584 (1966).
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1958 CONST. art. 53 (Fr.).
20
Id. art. 11 (“The President of the Republic may, on a recommendation from the Government when
Parliament is in session, or on a joint motion of the two Houses… submit to a referendum… which provides
for authorization to ratify a treaty…). Pierre Michel Eisemann & Raphaёle Rivier, National Treaty Law and
Practice: France, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 253 (Duncan B. Hollis et al., eds. 2005).
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acquiring of territory, may be ratified or approved only by an Act of Parliament.21 The
operation of this clause prevents these treaties from taking effect until such ratification or
approval has been secured. In addition, the consent of the population affected by the
ceding, exchanging or acquiring of territory must be obtained.
Despite the broad scope of the legislative approval required by the Constitution,
special attention has been paid to the case in which individual rights have been deprived.
Although the cession and acquisition of territory, in many jurisdictions, is a common type
of treaty that simply requires legislative approval after the treaty has been concluded, the
direct impact upon an individual’s livelihood and his community resulted from the
transaction are the type of interest that the Constitution protects. Therefore, additional
process for the concerned individuals must be accorded. Thus, the issue requires us to
look beyond territory ceding and acquisition, and to take into consideration citizens’
fundamental interests that are substantially at stake in any type of treaty negotiation. This
protective approach has also been adopted more or less in the treaty practice of Germany.
Germany (Civil law)
Germany, following the lines of the parliamentary system, also has particular
types of treaties that require the participation of Parliament in their conclusions.
According to the German Constitution (The Basic Law), these are the treaties affecting
the existing legislations or requiring a new law, affecting the existence of the state and its
territorial integrity, independence, status and sovereignty.22 Although the Federal

1958 CONST. 53 (Fr.). Eisemann & Rivier, National Treaty Law and Practice: France in NATIONAL
TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 259.
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GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 59(2) (F.R.G.) (“Treaties that regulate the political relations of
the Federation or relate to subjects of federal legislation shall require the consent or participation, in the
form of a federal law, of the bodies responsible in such a case for the enactment of federal law. In the case
of executive agreements the provisions concerning the federal administration shall apply mutatis
mutandis”). Parliament’s consent to a treaty is given in a form of an accessory law enacted by both
chambers of Parliament. The procedure of approval is varied depending on the type of treaty. The
conclusion and modification of treaties on the European Union, for instance, may require only an enactment
of an ordinary federal law. For others that require the law of approval, additional process may be needed.
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Constitution provides no mandate for the federal government concerning direct
participation of the people in treaty-making process, public consultations may be required
where the interested groups so requested that their special interests be taken into
consideration in the conclusion of the agreement.23 However, for the facilitation of the
administration, this process rather takes place through representative civic bodies such as
chambers of commerce, associations and other public interest groups.
India (Common law)
For India, the treaty-making power is exercised and regulated by the executive.24
The Indian Constitution, in contrary to France and Germany, does not require
parliamentary approval (Union Parliament) before agreements are concluded or enter into
force.
Despite this plenary power, the concern of individual rights is affirmed and
expressed in conjunction with the exercise of the executive’s treaty-making power. Thus,
implementing legislations are necessary to give effect to certain categories of treaties
relating to cession of Indian territory, affecting the existing laws or restricting or
infringing upon individual rights.25 Treaties such as the Geneva Conventions for the

For further discussion, see Hans D. Treviranus & Hubert Beemelmans, National Treaty Law and Practice:
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INDIA CONST. art. 52 § 5. K. Thakore, National Treaty Law and Practice: India, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW
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conference, association or other body”). Article 253 is to be read in conjunction with “the Union List” (the
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covers “treaties and agreements with foreign countries and implementing of treaties, agreements and
conventions with foreign countries”. Thakore, National Treaty Law and Practice: India, in NATIONAL
TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED KINGDOM 79,
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Protection of War Victims 1949, the Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other
Acts Committed on Board Aircraft 1963, the International Convention on the Suppression
and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 1973, the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against Safety of Civil Aviation 1971 are subject to this requirement due
to their natures that have significant implications for fundamental individual rights. 26
In addition, treaties or agreements that are matters of public importance may be
considered in Parliament on a motion moved by the concerned minister. This process can
take place after the treaty has been signed or ratified.27 The Indian Constitution, although
does not generally require parliamentary approval for treaties prior to their conclusions,
still ensures that treaties affecting individual rights must be brought to the Parliament
attention who acts as a screening body before they can take effect in the domestic realm.
Switzerland (Civil law)
Despite the unique treaty referendum process (to be further discussed in the
section on the public hearing standard), the emphasis on individual rights in the Swiss
treaty context may not be as strong in the sense that they were not explicitly expressed
under the treaty categories required for further action of the Parliament. Individual rights
were rather assumed as matters of major importance that generally fall within the ambit of
the Federal Assembly’s (Parliament) authorization prior to their entry into force.28
Aside from enacting legislation and rendering budget decisions in connection with
international agreements, the primary role of the Federal Assembly in influencing foreign
26

Thakore, National Treaty Law and Practice: India, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: FRANCE,
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Id. at 97.
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The Federal Assembly is the Swiss Parliament which consists of two Chambers: the National Council and
the Council of States. The two Councils are on an equal level. See,
http://www.parlament.ch/e/wissen/parlamentswissen/Pages/parl.aspx. Switzerland adopted the negative list
approach for the Federal Assembly foreign relations power under which all treaties are subject to
parliamentary approval, except those of a technical, administrative or executive nature, and of minor
importance. Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft [BV], Constitution fédérale de la
Confédération Suisse [Cst] [Constitution] April 18, 1999, SR 101, RO 101, art. 166, ¶ 2 (Switz.) (“[the
Federal Assembly] shall approve international treaties, except where by statute or international treaty the
Federal Council alone is competent.”).
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policy is also to approve these international agreements of which the Federal Council’s
power (the executive) alone is not sufficiently competent. The agreements that the
executive alone can conclude are (i) agreements the Federal Assembly had authorized in
advance whether explicitly or implicitly, (ii) purely administrative or routine agreements
of minor importance (i.e. no individual rights affected), and (iii) urgent agreements that
must require a provisional entry into force, yet to be subject to subsequent parliamentary
approval - mostly treaties of commerce.29
The international agreements of minor importance or “petty agreements” are
described as those of a purely administrative or technical in nature, and do not primarily
aimed at individuals.30 The observation of individual rights in the Swiss treaty-making
process is thus emphasized through the implication of treaties of major significance of
which the executive cannot solely execute without the necessary parliamentary approval.
United Kingdom (Common Law)
The United Kingdom (UK) embarked on a dualist system under which no treaty
can give effects without receiving the cooperation of Parliament, notably in the form of
legislation enactment.31 Under the UK system, a treaty that has impact upon private rights
cannot escape the external check since it is explicitly expressed as the category that
requires Parliamentary approval. The consideration of individual rights in the treaty
process is therefore within the Parliament’s supervision. And thus, treaties that affected
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the Federal Council had power to act alone were revised by the International Law Division of the Federal
External Affairs Department and the Federal Office of Justice in 1987. 51 VPB No. 58, 369-85, at 381
(1987), See also Federal Statute Concerning External Trade Measure, June 25, 1982 SR 946.201
(empowering the Federal Council to conclude international agreements concerning external commerce,
services and payment transactions).
30
Wildhaber, et al., National Treaty Law and Practice: Switzerland, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND
PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 650.
31
Ian Sinclair & Susan J. Dickson, National Treaty Law and Practice: United Kingdom, in NATIONAL
TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED KINGDOM 223,
229 (Leigh Monroe et al., eds.1995).

179

individual rights cannot take effect until a formal legislative action has completed.
Treaties requiring legislative action are those; (i) modifying or adding to the existing law
or statute, (ii) endowing additional power to the Crown, not previously existed, (iii)
affecting private rights, (iv) creating a direct or contingent financial obligation upon the
UK, and (v) providing for an increase in the powers of the European Parliament.32 The
safeguard of individual rights is reinforced by an additional consultation process with the
legislature prior to ratification as well as the enactment of legislation. Such mechanism,
also known as “the Ponsonby Rule”, provides the Parliament an opportunity to consider
and evaluate the desirability of the treaty content.33 Thus, a formal legislative action may
only bring the treaty into force, but it is the particular consultative process that pays due
consideration to the concerned citizens.
South Africa (Common law)
It can be said that South Africa has similar approach to the Swiss treaty practice in
terms of limited open list for treaties that can be solely performed by the executive
branch. The positive list entails all treaties to be subject to parliamentary approval, except
those listed under section 231(3) of the South African Constitution.34 These international
agreements that are not subject to parliamentary approval are those of a technical,
administrative or executive nature or agreements that do not require ratification or
accession.35 The role of legislature in the treaty-making process, nevertheless, does not
come up until after the decision to conclude an agreement has been reached.
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Despite the absence of the expressed language in the treaty approval requirement
concerning individual rights, it is to be assumed that the term “technical, administrative or
executive” agreements enabling the executive to execute the agreement alone practically
excludes any agreements with major political, economic and social significances as well
as those affecting individual rights.36 Therefore, under the South African approach, the
concern of individual rights’ impact was simply addressed in the treaty category that has
significant social implication, without further specification.
ii. Asserting a Law-Making Standard
The conventional treaty-making process, which normally has neither mandate for
public consultation nor legislative approval prior to a treaty negotiation, may provide an
explanation why many jurisdictions are able to cast broad categories of treaties to be
subject to the final legislative approval. For Thailand, which has a more demanding treaty
process, following this conventional practice may not be practical, if not unfeasible.
However, it is noteworthy that the treaty practices of these surveyed countries recognize
individual rights as a matter of high importance that deserve special attention and close
supervision. Narrower treaty categories are deemed necessary under the current treaty
approach. And by shifting the focus of Section 190 treaty provision to the issue that
concerns individual rights, we may achieve more than a practical function of the
mechanisms established in this Section, but also the assurance of a responsive
governmental administration.
As I explained the significance of adopting the liberal approach in Chapter III, my
additional justification for borrowing an element of a legislative process to provide a
minimum ground for Section 190 treaty category was also due to the fact that the demand
documents to the President properly and in accordance with the constitutional process. Manual on
Executive Acts of the President of the Republic of South Africa, Office of the President, Ch. 5 § 5.5, at 24
(March 1999).
36
Botha, National Treaty Law and Practice: South Africa, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE,
supra note 35, at 588.
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on the level of accountability in the making of a treaty that Section 190 has set may be
close to that of the law making procedure.37 Thus, any activity or commitment the
executive branch made externally that may personally subject individuals to must be first
addressed and properly heard. Treaty consultation with the public under Section 190
certainly is a unique process that heightens public scrutiny on the executive’s exercise of
its foreign power. Although an argument had been made concerning the opposite nature
(difference) of the treaty and that of domestic legislation that the latter was rather
“introverted”, 38 what should not be distinguished between the treaty-making and the lawmaking processes is the impact of individual fundamental justice that must be addressed
regardless of the context in which it was involved.
In the context of Canadian governmental regulations, the areas in which a
maximum level of individual and public participation has been arguably required are
those concerned with the right to life, liberty and security of individuals.39 According to
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom, the notion of fundamental justice
particularly refers to the most basic human rights to life, liberty and security of the person
dealt within section 7.40 Manicom v. County of Oxford provides an example of which
fundamental justice of individuals or groups is being affected by the cabinet decisionmaking process in the location of the waste disposal site.41 The constitutional challenge in
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this case was thus based on the denial of participatory rights for the most affected local
individuals. The fundamental principle and the goal of democracy were thus being
undermined by excluding participatory rights of citizens in the case which the life, liberty
and security interests of the people were clearly at stake. And why this is important and
more effective to engage people, especially in such a situation has already been
elaborated through my lengthy arguments in Chapter III. The approach will provide us
with a more specific standard that would help balance the government workloads while
better responding to the internal (citizens’ demands and social harmony) and external
challenges (the country’s credibility, diplomacy and national interest).
This approach narrows down the principle of public participation to the area
where persons’ welfare, health and safety have been directly deprived. It is also specific
enough to ascertain a standard that will allow the holding of a public forum to attend to
individuals’ injuries without causing undue delay of necessary government actions. This
conclusion does not, however, suggest that public participation should be excluded at a
higher level such as foreign affairs, the area in which the threats toward citizens’ life,
liberty and security is less imminent. Rather, it should serve as guidance when
determining the participatory rights of citizens in any international commitment. The
countries such as France, India and the UK have specifically spelled out individual rights
as one of the treaty categories that cannot take effect unless implemented through an
internal process, whereas Germany has a special channel to address the issues for those
who believed their interests were adversely affected. Fundamental individual rights
should at least be a minimum mandatory standard for public participation to create trust
and to provide the people with a sense of security within the governing system, and to

process that gave rise to the issue of constitutionality brought the plaintiffs to file a complaint with the
Ontario High Court. Id. at 946 (emphasis added).
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avoid overstretching the participatory right to the extent that it would hamper the quality
of the public administration which also means the interest of the people.
The assertion of a law-making standard by requiring a public hearing in a case of
individual fundamental rights’ infringement goes along the line with the adoption of the
liberal approach here. The goal is not only to legitimize government policy decision in
foreign affairs, but also to increase the effectiveness of the public participation
mechanism itself by making sure that individual energies will be positively unleashed into
the system in which responsive and effective administration can be warranted. The
potential direct impact that the treaty’s obligations may have upon individuals’
fundamental rights should trigger the same mechanism as the law-making process since
the law-making power (which amounts to altering individuals’ rights and duties, even if
done to further foreign policy objectives) is certainly beyond the executive constitutional
boundary.42 Individuals’ right to life, liberty and interest should stand as one of the core
elements in the requirement of the direct public participation in the treaty realm.
This liberal approach, thus, is not only restricted to treaties that are commercial in
nature (as those introduced in Section 190), but will cover any type of international
agreement that threatens the well-being of individuals and their local communities. Public
participation is particularly important to this new treaty category (concerning fundamental
individual rights) which must be created in addition to other important treaties. The
approach will be further summarized in Section III (the Derivation of a Treaty Model).
I believe this specific requirement will bring out the best of the people’s intellects,
understandings and empathy toward the community they live in rendering public
participation serve its fuller function. And to make public participation in the treatymaking process works, we must ask if our constitutional mechanism operates in a way
MICHAEL RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 106-107 (2007). See, Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 635 (1952).
42
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that would allow our political ideology – democracy- to flourish. As a matter of a
democratic principle, citizens’ participatory rights should not be denied even in the area
that is far-fetched from individual’s fundamental interests, but can be weighed against the
government’s interest in having an effective administration which is also in the best
interest of the people.
C. Seeking Appropriate Legislative Role
The roles of public participation in the legislative process suggested the minimum
standard that individuals’ participatory rights must be warranted. The role of direct public
participation in the treaty-making context, which may not be as widely recognized, can
also be strengthened by the participation of legislature.43 By increasing the accountability
and openness of the executive in the early process, this approach may help cut back the
extensive judiciary role in the treaty process that had sometimes caused policy disruption
and frustration to the executive.
Many of the civil law countries such as France, Germany, India and Switzerland
share the common treaty practice in terms of the executive responsibilities in negotiating,
signing, ratifying and terminating a treaty. The only substantive distinction among them is
the extent to which the executive may commit the nation internationally without
parliamentary approval.44 Treaty-making practice may range from a highly secured mode
requiring extensive legislature roles to a minimally involved form. Switzerland’s treatymaking procedure, for instance, requires widespread consultation of political parties and
interested groups prior to the initiation of new legislation of international treaties. India’s
For instance, under New Zealand’s common practice, the executive remains the supreme authority of the
treaty-making process. With this respect, “the Executive does not require the Parliamentary approval to
negotiate, conclude or ratify treaties. The current political structure and institutional arrangement thus allow
Parliament to take a role only when the Executive provides its opportunity to do so. The Parliament
practically has limited role in the making of treaties, which is to implementing them by incorporating
treaties into New Zealand’s domestic law. Mark W. Gobbi, Enhancing public participation in the treatymaking process: an assessment of New Zealand's constitutional response, 6 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 83, 88
(1998).
44
Leigh Monroe, Introduction to NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE : FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA,
SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED KINGDOM at ix, x (Leigh Monroe et al., eds.1995).
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parliament, on the contrary, almost plays no role in approving agreements, despite the
power granted under its Constitution.45
Despite the variation of models concerning the extent of the countries’ legislative
roles in the treaty-making process, legislature participation, in a number of states, is based
on strong political, economic and social implications that a treaty may have.46 It is,
however, uncommon for the legislature to take part or consult with the executive during
the on-going treaty negotiation.47 Thus, the legislative role is somehow limited within the
constitutional framework to facilitate effective and feasible governmental functions.48 In
Germany, although legislature is allowed to attend a treaty negotiation at the invitation of
the Federal Government,49 this participatory role clearly serves no more than an
observatory one, and does not entitle the legislature as a co-decision maker in the treaty
negotiation. The particular negotiation process, therefore, is simply meant to keep the
legislature informed and to secure coordination between political branches while entailing
no parliamentary control the way the implementation process does.
Thus, generally speaking, the roles of the legislatures in the countries of my study,
namely France, Germany, India, Switzerland, the UK, Japan, South Africa and New
Zealand have been cut short to facilitate the treaty negotiation process while enabling
effective check mechanism before the international agreements can take effect
domestically. In spite of the unique treaty referendum process, Switzerland yet adopts a
45
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more flexible approach by requiring that legislative approval be secure only after the
conclusion of the negotiation has been reached.50
i. Assessing Legislative Roles
The following section divided the participation of the countries’ legislatures into
three different stages; namely prior to a treaty negotiation, during the negotiation and
prior to its entry into force. The presence of the legislatures’ actions in different stages
can help us rationalize their roles and significance in each stage, and enable us to generate
an applicable approach.
(a) Prior to Treaty Negotiation
In most countries, the requirement of legislative action at the initiation of a treaty
negotiation is uncommon or even absent. For the countries such as France, Germany, UK,
South Africa or New Zealand, the executives are vested with full powers to initiate and
negotiate without having the official involvement of the legislature at the beginning. 51
These models demonstrate the predominant executive’s role in the early stage of a treatymaking process by entailing the executive to determine its own responsibility concerning
the initiative of a treaty negotiation. Especially in Germany where treaty-making power
as part of the foreign relations power is in the sole hand of the executive,52 the ability of
the cabinet to make up their own decisions concerning a treaty framework at the
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beginning of the treaty process is deemed crucial to its capacity to determine foreign
policy guidelines. By the same token, under the UK system, the exercise of treaty-making
power is the responsibility of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs.53 This includes foreign policy formulation and treaty-making procedure. The
Foreign and Commonwealth office operates as a central coordination with other
governmental departments that has primary responsibility to initiate certain treaties
negotiation.54
India, on the other hand, suggests that the freedom of the executive in the exercise
of its treaty-making power is conditional upon an absence of any legislation concerning
the entry of the negotiation. This is because Parliament has exclusive power to legislate
on foreign affairs.55 Nevertheless the treaty procedure is to be regulated by the
executive.56 And, in practice, it is uncommon for parliamentary approval to be required
prior to a negotiation, a treaty conclusion or even its entry into force.57
For Switzerland, the Federal Constitution assigned no strict boundary between the
Federal Assembly and the Federal Council in the realm of external affairs. By virtue of
Article 166, the Federal Assembly must participate in the shaping of foreign policy and
must supervise foreign relations.58 Although this loose constitutional framework renders
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the legislature’s and executive’s powers and responsibilities overlap (while failing to
specify at what stage the Federal Assembly must approve treaties), there is no definite
answer to the extent of the legislature’s participation, and one of the five possibilities,
theoretically, is the authorization in advance of negotiations since treaty-making is not an
exclusive authority of one or another branch.59 Nevertheless, the Federal Council is the
sole organ that represents the state, negotiates, signs and ratifies a treaty. The Federal
Statute on the Federal Assembly may have been amended to increase the parliamentary
participation in the treaty process at an early stage.60 But the legislative involvement is
after the negotiation has been initiated and only to keep Parliament informed of any
important developments in the negotiation process rather than to authorize the treaty
content.
All in all, from these countries’ experiences, treaty-making powers whether solely
vested in the executive or shared between the political branches have left the executives
with a considerable amount of discretion at the initiation of the treaty process to provide
flexibility in the shaping and guidance of foreign policy, which mainly are the primary
responsibilities of the branch.
(b) During the Negotiation Stage
In these surveyed countries, it is quite uncommon for legislature to take part in the
negotiation process, let alone the informal approval of the negotiated items. This is
especially true in the countries that keep the treaty-making power quite centralized,
typically in the hand of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.61 In France, legislature does not
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receive official notification of proposed international agreements since negotiating the
agreements is not within its authority.62 The ability of the legislature to participate in the
on-going negotiation is limited through the submission of written or oral questions to the
government concerning the particular agreement,63 whereas, in India, substantial
legislature actions can take place even after treaty signing or ratifying through a motion
moved by the concerned ministry in Parliament.64 In the South African model,
parliamentary committees, strictly speaking, are not authorized to negotiate or renegotiate
the terms of treaties, except inserting a reservation which marginalizes the legislature’s
role during the negotiation process.65 In the same manner, Parliamentary approval for
treaty negotiation is not required in the treaty practice of New Zealand. Under the current
political structure and institutional arrangement, Parliament may partake only when the
executive provides such an opportunity to do so.66 All in all, limitations on the
executive’s exercise of its treaty power are rather imposed toward the conclusion of the
negotiation by restricting the executive ability to consent to that particular treaty. The
screening mechanisms may involve national legislative approval and public consent.
Nevertheless this common practice does not necessarily suggest that the
involvement of the legislature during the treaty negotiation is insignificant because for
some countries such as Germany and Switzerland keeping the legislature informed
throughout the negotiation process may work to the advantage of the principle of
separation of powers. In Germany, parliament members may attend important treaty
negotiations at the invitation of the Federal government to improve its supervising
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function under the Constitution while this procedure can lessen the tension between the
branches.67 This type of legislature’s participation is also undertaken in the Swiss model.
Whereas the Federal Council (the executive branch) still posses the power to negotiate
treaties under its Federal Constitution, 68 the Committees on Foreign Policy of both
chambers are allowed to send their own observers to attend international negotiations.69
The Federal Council also has a duty to inform the president of each chamber of the
Federal Assembly regularly and thoroughly concerning the development of the on-going
negotiation. Recommendations from the legislature may take place through this
consultative process, but do not necessarily bind upon the Federal Council’s final
decision. 70 The Federal Council still retains its independent negotiation authority.
Despite the possible advantage of the approach in terms of increasing the
transparency and accountability of the executive branch, the approach may work against
the nature of treaty negotiation which requires a certain extent of confidentiality to
preserve the country’s interest. Debates and discussions concerning the country’s position
and concessions can compromise the country’s interests while putting the country at a
disadvantage.71 Preservation of information during the negotiation stage may sound
dubious, but it is also wise to keep in mind that even if this information was fully
disclosed and openly discussed with the legislature, the process may not allow the
legislature to directly control the executive’s decision since the legislature’s role is still
limited to a consultative one. Despite a certain possible influence the legislature may have
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at 130.

upon the executive’s decision, this benefit must still be weighed against the fact that the
country’s position may have already been compromised by the process.
(c) Prior to the Treaty’s Entry into Force
Every model of the surveyed countries establishes the mechanism to secure
legislative approval after the treaty has been concluded, which is deemed the most crucial
stage prior to its ability to take effect internally. The meaning of legislative actions in this
section will include the power to form treaties both by its consent and the power to
implement them (legislation enactment). Variations among these countries, however,
concern the types of treaties that must be subject to the process of this final legislative
action.
The majority of states have shown that not every type of treaties requires the
legislature’s involvement in the final stage.72 And those that fall outside the requirement
are also known as executive agreements of which the executive branch can solely rely on
its authority to execute them. Executive agreements, for instance, have been categorized
by treaties not requiring legislative implementation in India, treaties falling outside of
categories that require legislative approval in France and Germany or treaties within the
executive’s sole authority for Switzerland and the UK.73 On the other hand, the common
types of treaties that require legislature’s involvement, as I observed, are those affecting
the existing laws and those that are of major significance, and more than simply
administrative, technical or routine agreements. The variation, once more, depends upon
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There are, however, a few states that require legislative action to give effect to every treaty or
international agreements. Columbia, for instance, required that all treaties entered into by the President
must be submitted to Congress prior to ratification/enforcement. This powerful posture of Congress entitles
it to approve or disapprove of treaties as well as postpone the enforceability of a treaty by questioning the
treaty text. German Cavelier, National Treaty Law and Practice: Colombia, in, NATIONAL TREATY LAW
AND PRACTICE : AUSTRIA, CHILE, COLOMBIA, JAPAN, THE NETHERLANDS, UNITED STATES 69 (Leigh
Monroe et al., eds.1999).
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See Table 2, Hollis, A Comparative Approach, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 8,
at 24.
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how each nation goes about the definition of “major significance” which can be as narrow
as those having an impact upon individual rights.
In a simple analysis, two distinctive approaches concerning the requirement of the
joint actions between the two political branches are applied among the countries. In one
case, the ability of the executive to execute treaties independently is applied by a negative
list approach meaning the plenary treaty executing power lie within the executive body,
except those expressly listed that requires a joint action from both branches. This
approach is undertaken by France, Germany, India and the UK which provides a broad
range of the executive’s treaty-making power. And another case is in which the
opportunity for the executive’s sole power to give effect to the treaties is given only when
it is in accordance with the circumstances listed under the Constitution (positive list
approach). These are the Swiss, the South African and the New Zealand models.
Unlike Switzerland, although, for South Africa, the role of the legislature in the
treaty-making process does not come up until after the decision to conclude an agreement
has been reached, 74 both countries vest considerable amount of treaty approval authority
in the legislature by enumerating the executive treaty-making powers. The ability of the
executive to implement the treaty’s obligations is, therefore, limited through the
enumerated list provided under both countries’ Constitutions and legislation. According
to Article 231(3) of the South African Constitution, only “[a] n international agreement of
a technical, administrative or executive nature or an agreement that does not require either
ratification or accession, entered into by the national executive…” does not require an
approval of the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces to bind the
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In South Africa, the legislature may not approve a treaty until after the conclusion of an agreement has
been reached, and the Section 231(2) obligations have been confirmed by the Departments of Justice and
Foreign Affairs. Section 231(2), (3) requires approval by resolution in both the National Assembly and the
National Council Province for the conclusion of international agreements. Botha, National Treaty Law and
Practice: South Africa, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 35, at 586.
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republic.75 Along this line, the Swiss Constitution grants the Federal Assembly a plenary
power in treaty approval by stating that the Federal Assembly “shall approve international
treaties, except where by statute or international treaty the Federal Council alone is
competent”.76 Despite the absence of the specification concerning the types of treaties
that the Federal Council can solely execute in the Swiss Federal Constitution, this task is
rather carried out by a federal statute as stipulated in Section 166(2) of its Constitution.
Accordingly, Article 7(a) of the Federal Statute on the Organization of the Government
and the Administration provided a list of treaty categories of “minor importance” to be
concluded by the Federal Council.77 Others are the agreements that the Federal Assembly
had authorized in advance or urgent agreements requiring provisional entry into force (yet
to be subject to subsequent approval).78 These provisions provide limited circumstances
in which the executive may exercise its independent treaty power. The same principle is
also applied to the country, with no formal written constitution, like New Zealand whose
exceptions to the general requirement of legislation to make a treaty part of domestic law
are those that do not affect domestic laws or the rights and duties of individuals.79
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S.AFR. CONST. §231(3) 1996.
Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft [BV], Constitution fédérale de la
Confédération Suisse [Cst] [Constitution] April 18, 1999, SR 101, RO 101, art. 166, ¶ 2 (Switz.).
77
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Clearly, the powers of the executive to negotiate, sign and ratify treaties are not
necessarily amount to the implementation of the treaty obligations in every case. The
scope of this executive power, however, has been broadened in the countries that adopt
the opposite approach.
Under the negative list approach, a clear majority of states grants the executive a
prerogative power to conduct and conclude treaty negotiations. These countries, France,
Germany, India and the UK, allow the executive to solely execute treaties, except those
enumerated in their Constitutions, statutes or reflected in the common law tradition.
Article 53 of the French Constitution of 1958, for instance, itemized treaty categories,
namely peace treaties, trade agreements, treaties or agreements relating to international
organization, committing the finances of the State, modifying provisions which are the
preserve of statute and law, relating to the status of persons, and involving the ceding,
exchanging or acquiring of territory that may be ratified or implemented by a joint action
between the executive and the Parliament.80 Germany has both constitutional provisions
and a statute that require participatory function of its Parliament in the final stage.81 In the
same manner, Article 245 and 246 of the Indian Constitution provides specific
circumstances in which the legislature’s role is deemed necessary in the treaty execution
by conferring the exclusive power to the Union parliament to make any law affecting the
territory, and implementing treaty and agreement with other nations.82 In the UK, in the
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GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 59(2) (F.R.G.) (“Treaties which…relate to matters of federal
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absence a written constitution, the common law tradition has provided a few exceptions to
the executive’s prerogative treaty-making power.83
From the treaty practices of these surveyed countries, it can be concluded that not
every model requires legislature’s participation in the initial and intermediate stages of
the negotiation. This does not mean that the principle of separation of powers is
weakened, but rather strengthened through the respect of each branch’s political function
and a proper check mechanism. Every state does have a mechanism to secure certain
legislative action in the final stage of the negotiation, which has come to support my
understanding of how the legislature’s involvement in the last phase is the most critical
process. A number of states even showed the practices of having the legislature active
after the treaty’s entry into force, which is to ensure that the legislature is consistently
informed of the treaty’s effects.84
The approach of procuring the legislative check in the final stage as consistently
found in the majority of states helps keeping the legislative involvement in the treaty
process in balance, while reducing the disruption of the negotiation process. The
distinction made among the treaties to be subject to the legislative action was also a
procedure to facilitate the effectiveness of the administration.85 Legislative authorization
at the very end as part of an implementation process may also serve as a pre-condition to

83
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ensure that a treaty is in a clean state before it can take effect. This mechanism can induce
the executive to generate a constructive approach in order to secure the legislature’s
approvals as demonstrated in the New Zealand’s treaty reform proposal.
ii. Seeking Balance in the Legislature Role: New Zealand Treaty Reform
Experience
Under the New Zealand treaty-making model, although treaties that are deemed
important and require a change in domestic law are subject to legislative control before
they can take effect, efforts have still been made to counterweigh the executive’s treaty
power. Public participation was seen as another means to induce greater accountability in
the treaty-making process, in addition to the legislative safeguard.86 Nevertheless, the
emphasis on the ability of the legislature to supervise the executive’s treaty power prior to
the treaty’s entry into force is still prevalent as it does not only serve as the ultimate
safety net, but also a mechanism conducive to generating a forum of public discussion in
a treaty realm. Citizens’ participatory rights are, therefore, rather encouraged and
expected to naturally be created from the process in which a government attempts to
secure parliamentary approvals of the treaty by using the previous public support. This
approach, in fact, implies the crucial function of the legislature in the approval of a treaty
in the absence of any explicit requirements of public participation in the treaty-making
process. And according to this model, the legitimacy of the making of a treaty lies in the
final stage of the legislative role by creating a condition for the government to seek
greater consultations from the people.
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New Zealand has a mechanism to ensure the openness of its treaty-making process. Many of its treaty
negotiation forums are open to public, particularly multilateral treaties. Only some that do not affect rights
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through invitations as observers and through media commentary on the progress of a negotiation. Gobbi,
supra note 43, at 85. Hasting, supra note 79, at 672-673 (arguing for the increased role of the legislature in
the final stage of the treaty-making process, which should also apply to treaties within the executive’s
prerogative).
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Under the New Zealand treaty practice, the legislative function assumes a greater
role in legitimizing the treaty making conduct. New Zealand’s attempt to make changes to
enhance greater participation in the treaty negotiation process went to address the
relationship between the parliament and the executive rather than that between the
government and the civil society.87 Even treaties that are deemed insignificant and do not
require a modification of law were recommended to receive certain legislative action
whether in a form of tabling or notification after its ratification.88 The additional
requirement of parliamentary approval is presumed to generate sufficient incentives for
the executive to ensure public involvement. Whereas a formal requirement of a public
hearing conduct is absent, the public participation will be indirectly improved through the
pressure that parliament can impose upon the executive. The readjustment of the
executive-parliament relationship, which requires the executive to seek greater
consultations with the legislature, was assumed to accord the public better opportunity to
participate in the treaty-making process. The executive is also expected to extend its
consultative practice with the public at the early stage because this public support could
help secure parliamentary endorsement. Thus, the legislature can itself be the guarantor of
the government’s obligation to include public participation. According to the proposed
changes of a treaty-making process, the executive will be held directly accountable to the
parliament, and indirectly to the people. 89
The point being made here is not that the Thais should adhere to this standard by
adopting this traditional practice, and eliminating the explicit requirement of public
The opportunity for greater parliament’s role in the current treaty-making process can be increased if the
Executive were to execute a treaty containing a provision that the treaty shall only take effect upon
Parliament’s approval; or the Governments decides to seek Parliament’s approval prior to ratifying a
treaty. Gobbi, supra note 43, at 85 (emphasis added).
88
Hasting, supra note 79, at 672, A. MCNAIR , supra note 33, at 98. Kenneth Keith, New Zealand Treaty
Practice: The Executive and the Legislature, 1 N.Z.U.L.R. 272, 293-294 (1964).
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The readjustment of the balance of powers between the Parliament and the Executive reflected in the
following manners; the ability of the House of Representatives to debate the Government’s annual budget
(implications for a control over a foreign policy), offering all elected representatives an opportunity to form
a negotiating position and the parliamentary approval of treaties. Gobbi, supra note 43, at 101.
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participation in the treaty-making process. My intention is rather to point out that securing
parliamentary approvals on both stages (prior to negotiation and prior to be bound) may
be unnecessary and prolong the negotiation process since the current Constitution already
secures direct civic participation within the procedure.90 Legislature may ensure direct
accountability to the people given that it is the representative body of the people. But
when the people can act to ensure that account themselves, it is even better while making
the role of the legislature diminished. The crucial point to keep in mind is how to make
the executive’s tasks as well as those of the legislature manageable to maintain wellbalanced functions of the political branches.91 Thus, for Thailand in which a negative list
approach (independent executive treaty authority, except those listed under the
Constitution – explained in Chapter IV) has already been established, requiring a final
legislative approval can be deemed sufficient to secure transparency and accountability in
the treaty process. This later legislative control would mean securing a simple majority
vote of the National Assembly on the enumerated treaties any time after the conclusion of
the negotiation, but prior to the treaty’s entry into force (whether through ratification or
legislation implementation). A time limit within which both Houses must make a decision
must be imposed (i.e. 15 sitting days). This final legislative control mechanism will of
course be applied to both special category (individual rights) that I proposed in Section B,
and the traditional kinds (affecting territory and sovereign rights, and domestic laws of
the country). The application of this approach can even be extended to those that generate
material commitments in trade, investment or budgets of the country as seen under the
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Legislature can have vital functional roles as a foreign policy co decision-maker for it is the focal point
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current treaty provision. The proposal of the model is therefore to take the quality of the
administration into consideration which is also to act in the interest of the country, and in
accordance with the principles of democracy and good governance.
D. Seeking Proper Judicial Role in the Treaty Process
Generally speaking, the role of the judiciary in the treaty process tends to be
limited and is usually involved after the treaty has come into force. This is especially true
when Article 7 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (of which many states
have adopted as a customary practice) provides the primary authority of the executive i.e.
the Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers of Foreign Affairs to conclude
treaties.92 The language of this international instrument purports to states’ distribution of
their treaty making powers at the national level.93 As discussed in the earlier section, this
tension is, however, relieved through states’ remarkable uniformity in vesting their treatymaking power in the executive. Nevertheless, the scope of the executive’s treaty-making
power is varied from country to country depending on the conditions applied to limit the
executive’s ability to consent to the treaty. Beside implementation measures which
require the participation of legislature, judicial intervention in the legality of the treaty
can be another common restriction upon the executive’s exercise of its foreign affairs
powers.
The common role of the judiciary in a treaty process oftentimes involves judicial
scrutiny on the constitutionality of the international agreement. In other words, judges
must observe and enforces procedural limitations prescribed by the Constitution.94 The
approach and the scope of the review are, however, varied among the countries. One
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primary distinction is the ability of the court to decide on the question of the
constitutionality of the international agreement. Countries with limited judicial mandates
are such as the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland.95 The Constitutions of these
countries, in fact, ruled out the possibility of the Courts’ inquiry into the constitutionality
of treaties or international agreements whether they were properly concluded without
legislative approval. On the other hand, this opportunity has been accorded to the French
and the Indian judiciary branches to determine the constitutionality of the executive’s act
in the conclusion of a treaty.
i. Assessing the Scope of Judicial Review: Judging the Constitutionality of a
Treaty
Both France and India provide a judicial procedure to ensure that treaties and
international agreements are made in conformity with the Constitution. For France, the
“Conseil Constitutionnel” 96 has a similar function as a constitutional court. It may
exercise its power to ensure the conformity of the treaty and international agreement, and
the statute authorizing the ratification or approval of such agreements to the
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The scope of review of the Dutch, the Belgian and the Swiss Courts are limited to observing whether an
agreement is properly published, and only extends to the publication of the agreement. Id. at 350-352.
According to the Dutch Constitution, the Courts are incompetent to judge the constitutionality of the
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into law by the President of the Republic. http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil
constitutionnel/english/homepage.14.html.
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Constitution.97 According to Article 54 of the French Constitution, the Conseil
Constitutionnel has the power to declare that “an international commitment contains a
clause contrary to the Constitution” rendering any authorization to ratify or approve such
commitment ineffective. This hybrid judicial body, thus, has the primary function to
observe that Article 53 treaties’ process is properly followed. Its authority is also
extended to approving the statute that authorizes the international agreement pursuant to
Article 61.98 In addition, “Conseil d’Etat” (the Supreme Administrative Court) whose
primary duty is to observe the misuse of administrative power, the conduct of the
bureaucracy or the executive action also has jurisdiction over the question of the treaty’s
constitutionality through the examination based on the lack of proper procedure in the
treaty ratification for treaties within the meaning of Article 53.99 India, in the same
manner, assigned the role of the Supreme Court to decide on the type of treaty that needs
an implementing legislation before giving its effects.100 Thus, the question of the validity
of the treaty that was concluded without the legislative authorization can be raised in
court.
It must be noted that, in the French context, the power of the Conseil
Constitionnnel to rule against the treaty in question is limited to the period prior to the
enactment of the statute or the ratification of the treaty pursuant to Article 61 which
1958 CONST. 54 (Fr.) (“if the Constitutional Council…has declared that an international commitment
contains a clause contrary to the Constitution, authorization to ratify or approve the international
commitment in question may be given only after amendment of the Constitution”) . For the Conseil’s
decision on the interpretation of Article 53 concerning the agreements modifying provisions within the
ambit of legislative power, see F.C.P. 1970 I, 2354, R.D,P. 1971, at 1972, R.G.D.I.P. 1971, at 239. Pierre
Michel Eisemann & Catherine Kessedjian, National Treaty Law and Practice: France, in NATIONAL
TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED KINGDOM ,
supra note 12, at 9.
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established this rule.101 Thus, after the treaty ratification, the question of the
constitutionality of the particular treaty application is rather referred to and decided by the
French courts such as the Counceill d’Etat.
Their being restrictive in the judiciary role likely comes from the court’s
consideration of the nation’s delicate treaty relations.102 It has been said that since “there
is no basis in French law for challenging the constitutionality of the agreement after its
approval or ratification”, the French courts have hesitated to take an action that could
annul the treaty or question the validity of the treaty.103 In its view, the subject of
international relations is outside the scope of its review. The same is also true for the
Indian Courts which often times either deferred its decision to the executive authority or
validated the executive acts as within its treaty-making competence under the
Constitution.104 In Germany and the U.S, where the question of the executive competence
in the treaty-making process is allowed to be raised in court, the Courts have maneuvered

1958 CONST. 61 (Fr.) (“Organic laws, prior to their promulgation, and the regulations of the Chambers
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to interpret the conflict in such a way that it was out of existence for a similar
consideration.105
Clearly challenges can present in both cases either the court attempts to nullify the
treaty for its lack of constitutionality or validates it to affirm the executive’s competence.
There will always be negative consequences. There are of course several reasons why
judicial review on the constitutionality of international agreements should be restrained.
For the most part, as previously discussed in Chapter IV (the separation of powers), such
a review is a delicate task and may create diplomatic controversies and embarrassment on
the international plane. 106 And the courts must take into consideration the repercussion of
the strenuous review.107 But judicial abstention will also mean a potential circumvention
of citizens’ participatory right to a treaty-making process (whether directly or through the
representative body). The decision will inevitably affect the judicial capacity to enforce
constitutional obligations.
The drawback to this approach clearly has something to do with the timeline of
the judicial intervention, which can either cause the disruption in the state’s foreign policy
upsetting foreign relations and yielding potential liabilities, or result in the disregard of
the affected citizens’ participatory rights in the treaty process. The attempt of the court to
police the political branch’s constitutional obligation in the treaty realm by invalidating
105
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their act can be destructive as the fully enforced treaty already involved the consumption
of time, resources and energy. The post determination approach is also less effective in
the sense that the court’s judgment against the legality of the treaty unfortunately cannot
restore the individual rights that had already been overlooked. And surely, there is not
much to gain when the issue of political departments’ competence in the treaty-making
realm is raised after the facts only to repudiate the treaty since the country cannot escape
its obligations.108 Thus, these negative consequences may not be easily rectified by
judicial redress, but could have been prevented by providing all the branches an
opportunity to co-determine this question to ensure that the treaty-making process is
properly followed prior to the treaty’s entry into force. Such power is best exercised in the
early stage.
The issue of each political branch’s competence (role and authority) in the treatymaking process should, therefore, be prior determined to reduce these internal and
external tensions. To what extent the executive treaty-making power is subject to
constitutional limitations is a very important question that must be addressed in the early
phase. As mentioned, when such a question failed to be responded early in the process,
there will certainly be a dilemma attached, either the treaty invalidation ruled by the
Court can make the state liable internationally and harm external relations or the treaty
validation attempt by the Court (to save the country’s reputation and resources) could
mean a loss of the people’s certain important constitutional rights that could have been
observed earlier.109 Through this conventional approach, the objective of judicial policing
power may not be achieved at best as it does not guarantee a constant enforcement of
The Vienna Convention made clear that a material breach of a treaty includes “a repudiation of a treaty”
by the party which does not prevent the other party from seeking a remedy when the treaty has been
concluded. See The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 7, art. 61(3)(a), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf.
109
In Ex parte Georger et Teivassigamany, the French Supreme Administrative Court was asked to void the
treaty of territory cessation. The French government was, however, still liable under the obligation as well
as lost its reputation and credibility internationally. WILDHABER, supra note 14, at 373.
108
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citizens’ participatory right in the treaty-making process. At the same time, the ability of
the executive to partially decide its own competence in the realm of foreign affairs is also
crucial to the maintenance of an effective administration. From the evaluation, it may
seem that the most effective approach is to establish the procedure that guarantees the
constitutional compliance prior to the enforceability of the treaty. The creation of a legal
body which should be composed of the executive, legislative and judicial officials to
determine the treaty to be subject to the constitutional process prior to the undertaking of
any treaty negotiation may be necessary for the maintenance of our democracy and
international relations.
ii. Asserting a Preemptive Approach
In response to these challenges, some states have adopted a mechanism to verify
the constitutionality of the international agreement in advance either prior to the
negotiation or the agreement’s entry into force to avoid future complications such as
international liability resulting from a breach of the treaty due to its unconstitutionality.
The countries that have established this approach are such as Canada, Germany, the UK,
Japan and South Africa110 ranged from a simple internal consultation to a (less popular)
broader one which involves the legislature in the determination of a treaty process.
The multi-branch prior-consultation to ensure the executive competence in the
treaty-making process is uncommon in most surveyed countries. For Canada, the process
takes place through the procurement of legislation. The decision to seek legislative
approval on important treaties may be deferred to the legislature in a later process through
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Although, in the case of Germany, the Constitution does not explicitly state that whether international
agreements are subject to judicial review concerning their constitutionality, the German Federal
Constitutional Court have ruled on this question. WILDHABER,, supra note 14, at 354. However, Germany,
at the same time, has provided a necessary mechanism to ensure the constitutionality of the agreement
before hand, which I feel will set another excellent example in the formulation of the treaty model.

206

the coordination among the Standing Committees on their concerned issues.111 To avoid
future complication concerning its treaty-making authority, the government will ratify a
treaty only after any necessary enabling act has been passed.112 And this process itself
serves as a prior legislative consultation to ascertain the treaty’s constitutionality.
On the other hand, the basic model, which allows the executive body to priordetermine its competence in the treaty realm, is more popular in several states. This
approach is reflected in the UK, Japan, South Africa and Germany. Although an approval
for certain important treaties must be sought from the legislature, the legislature is not
necessarily consulted on the question of the type of treaty that requires its authorization.
According to the UK practice, the Legal Advisers to the government acting in cooperation
with the Legal Advisors to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Law Offices of
the Crown and Parliamentary Counsel make the determination on the question of whether
legislation (legislative approval) is required to ensure the validity of a particular treaty.113
Similarly, in Japan, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau has a duty to decide before hand
whether the international agreement in question falls within the category of executive
agreement, and therefore requires no Diet (legislature) approval.114 This process is
customarily undertaken prior to the signature. The power of treaty interpretation also falls
within the executive branch, namely the Treaties Bureau under the Ministry of Foreign
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E.g., Third Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (SCFAIT),
March 3, 2008. http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/dpr-rmr/2007-2008/inst/ext/st-ts09-eng.asp.
112
Copithorne, National Treaty Law and Practice: Canada, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE,
supra note 9, at 96.
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Sinclair & Dickson, National Treaty Law and Practice: United Kingdom, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW
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Takao Kawakami, National Treaty Law and Practice: Japan, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE
415, 419 (Duncan B. Hollis et al., eds. 2005).
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Affairs.115 Thus, any dispute or ambiguity concerning the classification of an international
agreement, it is the Treaties Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in consultation
with the Cabinet Legislation Bureau that has a final word.116
The responsibility to address the ambiguity as to how international agreements
should be classified also belongs to the South African executive bureau. Since there is no
clear distinction made between the types of agreements that require only the executive
and those required both the executive and the Parliament approvals, the Manual on
Executive Acts of the President of the Republic of South Africa has played a major role in
guiding the distinction allowing the executive to partially determine its own competence,
especially when the exception provision (Section 231(3)) has never been defined or
determined by the courts.117 In addition, the determination of whether a treaty falls under
Section 231(3) vests in the minister who is responsible for the particular treaty.
Nevertheless, such decision must be taken in conjunction with the law advisors of the
Departments of Justice and Foreign Affairs.118 This is a required procedure prior to the
submission of a treaty to the Cabinet and the Parliament to ensure the constitutional
compliance of the treaty.
In Germany, this process is required under §72(4) of the Common Rules of
Internal Procedure of the Federal Ministries (Gemeinsame Geschäftsordnung der
Bundesministerien - GGO) by demanding that the Federal Ministries of Interior and
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According to Article 13 of the Cabinet order for the Organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
Treaties Bureau shall take charge of (1) matters relating to conclusion of treaties and other international
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116
Id. at 108.
117
Botha, National Treaty Law and Practice: South Africa, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE,
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Justice be consulted during the preliminary drafting of international agreements to verify
the constitutionality of the agreement and its national implementing directive.119 In
addition to the text verification, the competent department together with the Federal
Foreign Office, the Federal Ministry of Justice and the Federal Ministry of the interior,
collectively decide whether a given treaty should be submitted to Parliament in
accordance with the rule of the Constitution (the Basic Law).120 This method again
enables the executive to independently determine its own authority prior to giving the
state consent to be bound.
A prior co-determination among the institutional branches in the treaty process is
clearly an unusual practice. Among these countries, the judiciary’s role, let alone the
legislature’s involvement, in helping ascertain the constitutional process of a treaty in the
early stage is absent. Thus, the proposal of a multi-branch treaty determination can be
conventional and innovative; conventional in the sense that the executive still takes up its
role in determining its treaty power, and innovative in a way that the process will
encompass the roles of other departments to establish the executive’s competence.
This multi-branch prior determination approach can take care of two important
issues, (i) procedural violation – improper constitutional procedure of a treaty and (ii)
substantive violation – infringement of an individual’s constitutional rights, especially
participatory right, by ensuring that important treaties follow a proper process, and that
treaties that threaten individual fundamental rights are properly heard through a public
forum.
These issues of procedural and substantive violations also correlate to the level of
court involvement, namely abstaining, deferential and vigorous in the treaty process.
119

§72(4) of the Regulations and Orders Relating to Treaties reprinted in Treviranus & Beemelmans,
National Treaty Law and Practice: Federal Republic of Germany, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND
PRACTICE, supra note 49, at 335, available at
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Id. at 326.
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Under this proposal, while judicial abstention can arguably be of less concern due to the
assurance of procedural compliance, the degrees of judicial deference and engagement are
still highly relevant when it comes to determining the sufficiency of a public hearing or
addressing individual rights infringement in the treaty context (substantive violations). In
some countries such as Germany, despite having the procedure of prior determination in
place, the issue concerning the constitutionality of the treaty is still allowed to be raised in
courts.121 Nevertheless, the Court has elected to exercise judicial self-restrained
(abstention) when it comes to political matters such as the competence of the executive in
the making of treaties that had previously been determined.122 Judicial abstention is thus
legitimate here when a proper treaty process has been followed through the assurance of
the executive treaty authority. However, it may be misleading to conclude that by
establishing this prior-determining mechanism for treaties will automatically foreclose the
possibility of a judicial challenge on the constitutionality of the treaty at a substantive
level in the aftermath. The substantive constitutionality of the treaty must still constantly
and strictly be observed by the judiciary in order to enforce the principle of
constitutionalism. This substantive compliance which concerns a guarantee of an
individual’s constitutional rights requires us to examine the extent to which the judiciary
should defer or engage in rendering its decision. For instance, treaties that violate
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In the absence of any explicit requirement of judicial control over international agreements under the
German Constitution, treaty application and interpretation nevertheless lie within the jurisdiction of the
Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) who decides on the questions of constitutional law
and its conformity. WILDHABER, supra note 14, at 366.
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Id. (“The Federal Constitutional Court has been confronted with claims alleging constitutionality of
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Treaty Law and Practice: Federal Republic of Germany, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra
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fundamental constitutional rights will demand a rigorous participation of the judiciary to
ensure that these important rights are closely observed. But the standard of a public
hearing, although involving an individual participatory right, should deserve a certain
degree of deference. This particular type of deference is to be discussed in the next
section.
Despite the possibility of a constitutional challenge on the substantive basis, we
cannot deny that what this mechanism helps is enhancing the odds of the treaty survival
by securing procedural compliance. This discussed mechanism can at least foreclose the
chance of a treaty being overturned by the court on a procedural, if not on a substantive
ground.123 Thus, for Thailand where a specific procedure is established for important
treaties, the creation of an oversight committee who will make prior determination on the
application of the constitutional process to a particular treaty is a necessary step to avoid
irreversible damages both domestically and internationally. This approach does not only
allow the executive to partially determine its competence in the area it originally has a
prerogative, but will also enhance the effectiveness of the court’s role in the treatymaking process by reducing the impact of its decision on the country’s international
relations (through ensuring procedural compliance), and by guaranteeing that the people’s
rights are properly observed and respected early in the process (through ensuring
substantive compliance).
iii. Assessing the Public Hearing Standard
Since the incorporation of a public hearing pursuant to Section 190 of the Thai
Constitution, the scope of judicial review has undoubtedly been extended in the treatymaking process.124 This is another important area of the judicial function that concerns a
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Saan Pokklong [The Administrative Court], Mar. 30, 2007, Ruling No. 178/2550 (Thail.), available at
http://www.admincourt.go.th/50/s50-0178-o01.pdf (Affirming the decision of the Administrative Court of
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substantive guarantee of the Constitution (upholding an individual’s participatory right).
Despite the justifiable role of the courts in addressing this substantive violation, there are
times that judicial deference must be applied as a matter of public policy to maintain
administration effectiveness. The level of judicial control over a public hearing standard
(the substantive requirement of the participatory process) will therefore be addressed in
this section.
The Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement (JTEPA) became the first
case since the enforcement of the 2007 Constitution that concerned the unconstitutionality
of the treaty on the public hearing basis (inadequacy). Although the case was dismissed
by the Supreme Administrative Court for its lack of jurisdiction (on the constitutional
issue) which deprives the Court’s ability to determine whether the three day public
hearing held by the assigned research center provided people with adequate opportunity
to participate,125 the moral of the story is that a public hearing standard can constitute as
an element of the treaty constitutionality, and that the substantive requirement of this
public consultation is within the judiciary discretion. Such a power, if exercised without
limit, can jeopardize government functions that must try to constantly manage what the
judiciary demands.
The limit of judicial review concerning the standard of public participation is
especially crucial for Thailand in which the public consultation requirement must take

First Instance ruling that it had no jurisdiction judging the constitutionality of the treaty pursuant to Article
9 of the Act on Establishment of Administrative Court and Administrative Court Procedure B.E. 2542
(1999) . The Administrative Court, therefore, did not get to determine whether the public hearing claimed
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be meaningfully held meets the “standard” of public participation).
125
Despite the defendant (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)’s contention that it had assigned the Chulalongkorn
University research centre to conduct public hearings 3 days following the cabinet decisions, the plaintiffs
claimed that people were not given adequate opportunities to participate because the hearing was not widely
announced and took place for a short period of time. Such conduct shows bad motives of the government
when it tried to exclude people from meaningful participation and discussions which, in effect, prevent
people from effectively checking the government’s exercise of power. Id.
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place as early as prior to the entry of a negotiation.126 The need for judicial deference in a
public hearing standard becomes less relevant in most surveyed countries in which the
hearing process is not required. In certain states such as France, the process rather takes
place on an optional basis which is substantially within the discretion of the executive.127
Thus, under this executive discretionary approach, the judicial review scope or its control
over public hearing activities is naturally limited through the decision of the government
whether and how to undertake it. This method of limited judicial involvement becomes a
necessary tool in many treaty provisions that can carve out the burdens on the executive
which paralyze the function of the administration.128
In this section, I will primarily focus on the issue of a public hearing standard
which requires a consideration of the judicial deference concept.129 Because the
requirement of public consultation in a treaty process is an uncommon practice in many
surveyed countries, examples given here only demonstrate how the countries approach
this requirement, and may not provide us any specific practice. Switzerland turned out to
be one of a few countries that have incorporated this tradition into its Federal Constitution
in a form of a treaty referendum. The suggested treaty-making model will take into

CONST. (2007), Ch. 9 §190 ¶ 3 (Thail.) (“Prior to undertaking a treaty negotiation of any treaty
specified under paragraph two; The Council of Ministers shall provide information and cause to be
conducted public hearings, and shall give the National Assembly explanations on such treaty.”)
(emphasis added).
127
See, 1958 CONST. art. 11, 53 (Fr.) (“Where the referendum is favorable to the adoption of the project,
the President of the Republic promulgates [the] same within the time period specified in the previous
Article). Article 53 also requires that “no ceding, exchanging or acquiring of territory shall be valid without
the consent of the population concerned”. WILDHABER, supra note 14, at 94 (suggesting that the President
of France is empowered to hold a referendum on treaties which have repercussion on the functioning of
public institutions).
128
A major problem that worried the Swiss officials was the fact that “the treaty referendum handicaps
Switzerland in its international dealings”. A state, instead of being able to act freely and responsively on the
international plane, must be subject to this restriction and must take into consideration wide-range of
interests. France, for instance, vigorously protested and refused to enter into an arbitration with Switzerland
as a result of the Swiss referendum rejection to the 1923 Convention that abolished Free Zones.
WILDHABER, supra note 14, at 102
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Since I justified the need for a public participation in both Chapter III and the Section II, B of Chapter V,
its requirement is thus out of the question.
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considerations these variations and may also require us to borrow the public consultation
standard from a law-making process.
(a) Assessing the Models: Comparative Perspectives
At one end, Germany and India, for instance, provides no room for direct public
participation in the treaty-making process.130 The public is either consulted through
representative bodies such as chambers of commerce, trade unions and other
organizations that represent public interests or the Parliament which may inquire into the
government’s position, intention and over all policy in a form of parliamentary debate.
Along this line, in the absence of statutory or constitutional requirements
concerning public consultation in the treaty-making process, many surveyed countries
such as the UK, Japan and South Africa have one thing in common; the freedom of the
executive to seek the consultation when it feels appropriate.131 The responsible
department may elect to consult with professional or interest groups either before or
during the negotiation process. This decisions as to which group should be consulted and
how it should be consulted are entirely within the executive’s sole discretion. Since there
is no constitutional or statutory requirement for a wide-range public participation, its
format is usually on an ad hoc basis, including general participation by way of an
invitation to comment on the treaty, rather than pursuant to any compulsory procedure.132
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On another end, public participation has been embedded in the constitutional
history of very few jurisdictions such as Switzerland. Public consultation mandate dates
back to the Federal Constitution of 1921, in which Article 89(4) required treaties
concluded for an indefinite period or for a duration more than fifteen years, must be
submitted to the people for adoption or rejection if 30,000 active citizens so demanded.133
The duration of the treaty, thus became the sole criterion for requesting the referendum,
whereas the treaty content is irrelevant.134 And thus, the weakness of this approach is the
possible exclusion of important treaties such as those affecting fundamental rights of the
citizens when their binding period fails to meet the criterion.135 The concern led to treaty
referendum reforms.136 The new regime, thus, provided only the mandatory optional
referendum when 50,000 citizens or 8 cantons so requests for treaties which contains
important provisions establishing rules of law or requiring the enactment of federal
statutes for their implementation.137
Despite the requirement, public consultation remains significantly a matter of the
executive for the fact that the public hearing is regulated by the Federal Council’s
Ordinance, also known as “Consultation Procedure” (Vernehmlassungsverfahren) of
August 2005 which specifies a hearing format, procedure and scope to be applied to all
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consultations held by the Federal Council.138 In practice, not only may the Federal Council
arrange public consultations after the signature (but prior to legislative approval) in a
written format, but also through a means of oral communications and conference
discussion.139 Through the application of the consultation ordinance, the judiciary has
almost no role in the decision outcome concerning the adequacy of the public
consultation.140 Judicial limit in this context thus takes place through the consideration of
rules and policy laid down by the executive and legislature without imposing the
judiciary’s own standard.
(b) Asserting a Public Hearing Standard: Revisiting the Legislative Process
In the treaty-making context, in the absence of the public consultation requirement
in the majority of states, searching for and assessing the public hearing standard can be
difficult. Most treaty practices either provide no room for direct public participation or
make the process optional. The executive discretionary approach in the consultation
process means the branch’s own determination in terms of the manner, the period of the
hearing, and the participants. In either case, judicial review in this realm (ability to
impose its own hearing standard) is foreclosed.
The executive discretionary approach offers an idea of judicial deference when it
comes to determining the substantive requirement of the participation process for
Thailand that has adopted a unique method of securing additional legitimacy in the
making of important treaties. And due to the distinctive feature (the requirement of prior
public consultation for certain treaties), the judicial role in deciding on the
138
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appropriateness of this procedure must be addressed to establish a balanced relationship
among the three institutional branches in the treaty context. This following South African
approach, although speaking from a law-making perspective, also offers a scope and limit
of public participation mechanism through the notion of judicial deterrence on the public
hearing standard. Such an approach by allowing a policy decision (the manner of public
consultation) to be determined by the executive and the legislature in the form of rules,
regulations or laws rather than judicial decisions can facilitate public administration,
which is crucial to the assurance of a meaningful public involvement.
Although public consultation is generally required in the domestic legislative
process, in particular where fundamental individual rights are involved,141 there is yet a
limit on the exercise of this political right. The decision in Doctors for Life Int’l v. the
Speaker of the Nat’l Assembly & others (Doctors for Life), which affirmed the need for
the involvement of citizens in the law-making process, addressed one of the crucial issues
concerning the scope of the constitutional obligation of a state's legislative organ to facilitate
public participation (substantive matter) and the issue of timing (procedural matter). 142

The South African Court has played a crucial role in enforcing, expanding and
delimiting individuals’ participatory rights in the law-making context. Under the South
African Constitution, the scope of the Parliament’s constitutional duties to provide public
participation has been set by various sections to support democratic values in the
guarantee of individuals’ “social justice and fundamental human rights”.143 This
obligation has been broadened by the application of Section 19 (political rights clause)
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and Section 16 (freedom of expression) of the South African Constitution by the Court.144
The Court’s interpretation on a parliamentary obligation in facilitating public involvement
in the conduct of public affairs also took into account Articles 19 and 25 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) concerning the freedom of
expression and the political rights of the people.145
Despite the Court’s broad interpretation concerning the Parliament’s constitutional
obligation to facilitate public participation, the Court did address the scope of the
mandatory public consultation by deferring the manner in which the Parliament may
fulfill such an obligation.146 The Court by suggesting the possible (not determinative)
methods of public involvement that the Parliament may include, decided that the standard
of the public hearing arrangement is to be left within the discretion of the Parliament.147
The limitation on the Parliament’s obligation to facilitate public participation was driven
by public policy concerns (practicality and efficiency of government administration).
According to the Court’s ruling, requiring the judiciary to address a specific standard of
public involvement may cause “the business of the Parliament” to be “stalled” and the
“parliamentary process would be paralyzed if Parliament were to spend its time defending
its legislative process in the courts”.148 And, therefore, it is not the duty of the judiciary to
judge how well the government spends their resources and provides the consultative
means. This is a matter of policy rather than a legal question.
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Drawing from this experience, the substantive requirement of public participation
should primarily be the discretion of the branch that possesses the capacity and resources
to facilitate a public forum. This does not mean that the conduct of a public hearing can
be made arbitrarily by the branch. Rules and regulations concerning public consultation
must be made to set a legitimate standard, and to allow the concerned branch to manage
its own resources, time and energy. The case of Doctor for Life represents the middle
ground approach by opening up the opportunity for the judicial enforcement of the
constitutional rights while allowing the legislature to determine how to address them.149
Such limits provide a practical approach which can help secure proper balance in the
enforcement of the participatory right without overstretching to the point that it interferes
with the responsiveness of the administration, and becomes an obstacle to the democratic
goals.
In conclusion, aside from the need to narrow down the scope of the public
consultation in the treaty process for the maintenance of the effective administration, the
judiciary may have to play a limited role in deciding on the question of the sufficiency of
the consultation by deferring its decision to the political branches. It can be understood
how several surveyed countries have come to allow their executive branches to determine
the manner of a public hearing or even let the branches undertake the initiative where
they sees appropriate to preserve the quality and integrity of the administration. Thus, the
primary arguments for the limitation of judicial review in this realm are ones of policy
concern; firstly, how the government should manage its resources is not the question for
the judiciary,150 and secondly how much information should be discussed is the country’s
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Czapanskiy & Manjoo, supra note 142, at 25.
Although freedom of speech (under civil and political rights) is traditionally regarded as a negative right
in nature, for these rights to be fully respected, “one must entrench rights to resources that help the exercise
of those rights…” Thus, this type of negative rights which arguably does not enjoy unlimited exercises
because it could have both budgetary and certain political consequences. CECILE FABRE, SOCIAL RIGHTS
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UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 40, 42 (2000).

219

privilege that is outside the judiciary’s discretion.151 The ability of the executive to
control the subject of discussion is crucial to the preservation of the country’s position.
The length and the contents are a matter of policy decision. And it is not the duty of the
Court to create its own rule to define the adequacy of the required public consultation,
especially when such a right has budgetary and political implications. On the other hand,
this approach does not suggest that the government should be at liberty to hold anything
less than a meaningful consultation. My suggestion is only to remind us that the
determination of the public hearing standard is the function of the political branches (the
executive and legislature) and should come from their coordination in the form of
legislation, and certainly not from the judiciary’s words.
III. Breaking the Barriers: Derivation of a Treaty Model
It is undeniable that the increased involvements of the public, legislature and
judiciary enhance transparency, openness and accountability in government decisionmaking which are also the democratic goals that Section 190 intends to promote in the
realm of foreign affairs. However, it is clear that securing these objectives without
balancing against other democratic values (administration effectiveness and
responsiveness) is not sufficient to fulfill the definition of democracy and good
governance. The quality of public administration is crucial to the function of democratic
mechanisms and the achievement of other political, economic and social goals. The
existing mechanism of Section 190 which provides a method of direct public
consultation, parliamentary approvals and judiciary intervention in the treaty-making
process has put the executive in a straitjacket leaving it with little room to make the
decision in terms of the country’s foreign policy. The progressive approach inevitably

Debates and discussions oftentimes concern the country’s position, compromises and concessions, and
can put the country’s interests at stake. Having all the information fully disclosed in public makes the
country bear the risk of the exploitation by its partner. The executive should not be compelled to tender
more than “dark hints and appeals to the confidence of the voters”. Wildhaber, supra note 14, at 103-104.
151
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causes damages to domestic and international relations (i.e. the unresponsive public
administration, public unrest, and the frustration of foreign nations). Section 190
mechanisms therefore do not only involve the regulation of external, but most importantly
internal affairs. What Section 190 may lack is certainly not these ambitious goals, but
rather the proper means to fulfill them.
What I am proposing in this section is a reform of the three areas under Section
190, namely (i) the types of treaties to follow this special treaty process, (ii) the procedure
of the treaty-making and (iii) the manner of the judicial involvement. These are the three
primary areas that have obstructed an effective function of the government, and need to
be re-assessed. The existing categories of treaty, especially those concerned with the
extensive impacts on national economic or social security or generate material
commitments in trade, investment or budgets of the country, are vague and incredibly
broad to be subject to public participation, and for the executive to undertake without
having a possible backlash. Furthermore, having the Constitutional Court determine on
the constitutionality of the treaties (which is likely to be after the treaty has been
undertaken) and assert its own public hearing standard would present both major
impediments to the treaty-making process and expose the country to international
liability. And finally, the treaty-making process itself should not require two stages of
legislative checks.152 The parliamentary approval should only be required before the
country is bound by the treaty, which serves as a more effective check on the executive
treaty power when detailed substances are available for a review as opposed to a vague
framework that might never take shape when tabling it early in the beginning.
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The U.S. treaty-making process is not as democratic as it might be. But to propose constitutional
amendment that requires the roles of both Houses in the making of treaties would certainly make the
process more cumbersome. And “[d]o the claims of democracy demand that greater inefficiency?” HENKIN,
supra note 15, at 61.
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These issues are not addressed solely to impose limits on citizens’ participatory
rights in the treaty-making process. They are rather addressed to guarantee the effective
implementation of public participation, and to ensure that Section 190 serves the ultimate
democratic goals. And how these goals will be best served will be briefly explained
through my treaty-making model.
As mentioned, the types of treaties that are subject to Section 190 process is the
first area of my concern. Many surveyed countries have included the category of
individual rights in their treaty practices. The explicit requirements of the Constitutions
such as those of France, India or the UK set good examples of paying close attention to
the very fundamental issue that a constitution must primarily guarantee. From the
Canadian regulatory model, public participation is operated upon the principle of
individual fundamental justice - life, liberty and security interests. This fundamental
principle should be incorporated into Section 190 treaties by being an additional category
to be specifically subject to public consultation.153 Thus, in terms of the public
participation scope, the primary approach here is to shift the focus from a broad and
ambitious language to the very fundamental issue of constitutionalism. This new category
will come to replace the vague ones (having extensive impacts on national economic or
social security). This new addition will also be the sole category that requires public
consultation, while participations for other three classifications are optional, and within
the executive’s discretion.
The liberal approach will guide us on the questions of the public participation
mechanism as to who should be the primary participants and when they should
participate. With this respect, a public participation mechanism must be narrowed down
in its scope by primarily focusing on the treaty that may substantially have an adverse
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In the U.S. treaty-making context, principle of democracy and constitutionalism suggested a limited role
for sole executive agreements, without proper checks, especially when an agreement entails lawmaking and
affects individual rights. Id. at 65.
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impact upon a person’s life, liberty and security. Those who perceived themselves to be
potentially affected may file a request for participation along with their reasons. The
extent of the impact on each person is to be considered when judging against others or a
government’s own goal in the delivery of the final decisions. Secondly, the institution to
guarantee such a forum must be available both at local and national levels. And finally,
the means through which participants will address their concerns are public hearings to be
subject to appeals within a specific timeframe to allow government to move forward. The
appellate process will at least serve as a safeguard for the administration’s responsiveness
to individuals’ issues by making the government aware of the people’s opportunity to
respond. The incorporation of liberalism in the area of treaty making which calls for
individual rights to life, liberty and security as the third category of “important treaties”
will create a key element of self-government that is public trust - a believe in change the
people could make in the system they can call their own.
The second area is the scope of judiciary function. The judicial role in enforcing
this constitutional right can be strengthened and made less intrusive through firstly the
creation of a committee that oversees the treaties that should go through Section 190
process prior to being undertaken by the government, secondly the avoidance of imposing
its own public hearing standard on the review, and thirdly the jurisdictional grant to the
Constitutional Court on the substantive violation of international treaties.
The primary purpose of an oversight committee is to eliminate the uncertainty of
the executive’s treaty authority when a fully enforced treaty can later be turned down by
the Constitutional Court due to a procedural violation. This method affirms the concept of
judicial abstention by discouraging the judiciary to step in once the executive competence
has been determined by the committee. This body will be consisted of representatives
from the executive, judiciary and legislature whose members possess legal skills and
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expertise. The involvement of the legislature in this process is necessary since this is the
body of the people that should have a say in determining the matter that may threaten
individuals’ fundamental interests. The early determination mechanism will also help
ensuring that the basic rights of the people will be properly upheld before they are lost in
the treaty process. At the same time, when the frustration of the government from seeking
third and fourth opinions is reduced, the government can focus on holding a meaningful
public hearing for the treaty that truly needs attention, allowing the participation
mechanism to better fulfill its function. Thus, the country’s as well as citizens’ interests
can be better served when the process of this particular constitutional requirement is
ascertained at the early stage.
This pre-determination method goes along the line with the legislative procedure
in which the Constitutional Court must determine the constitutionality of the statute and
organic law bills prior to their enactments. In the legislative context, the Court is obliged
to rule on the constitutionality of the bill (in consistent with the Constitution) that has
already been approved by the National Assembly, but prior to the presentment to the King
for his assent.154 In other words, the bill is assured of its constitutionality before its
enactment to bind upon the Thai people. In the same manner, a treaty draft should be
prior determined to follow an appropriate constitutional process before it can become a
treaty. The making of a treaty may require this similar approach to prevent the
infringement of the people’s rights and liberties when once lost in the treaty process can
be difficult to redress.
The operation of the committee does not completely wipe out the function of the
Constitutional Court. The judicial body still plays an important part in the process of a
CONST. (2007), Ch. 6 §141, (Thail.) (“Upon its approval by the National Assembly, an organic law bill
shall be, prior to its presentation to the King for signature, referred to the Constitutional Court for
determining its constitutionality…”). Amara Raksasataya & James R. Klein, THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
OF THAILAND: THE PROVISIONS AND THE WORKING OF THE COURT 7 (Amara Raksasataya & James R. Klein
eds., 2003).
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treaty determination concerning substantive violations of individual rights.155 While
judicial involvement in this particular area is undeniable, the degree of its participation
(deference) can be varied depending on the type of rights being violated, the level of
infringement and the kind of important government policy decisions being involved (e.g.
national security, allocation of resources). These are the factors that the court must take
into consideration when determining the degree of its deference. Thus, for instance, its
deferential role will be demanded when the sufficiency of a public hearing is called into
question. The limitation of judicial review on the determination on a public hearing
standard is through acknowledging the policy decision made between the legislative and
executive branches (a rule or regulation). This recommendation, while emphasizing the
facilitation of government administration in the treaty process, will ensure a proper and
effective judiciary’s role.
The last area of my proposal is re-adjusting the treaty-making process by reducing
two-step parliamentary approval to the “prior to be bound” stage. This is the approach
that all the surveyed countries have undertaken to ensure that the executive branch has
sufficient autonomy and discretion in conducting a negotiation. This approach goes back
to the analysis on institutional competence argued in Chapter IV in which the primary
authority of the executive in the treaty-making conduct must be preserved in order to
secure national interests. Many surveyed countries have shown that legislature’s
involvement is either absent or disallowed until the treaty has been concluded to preserve
the executive’s function and secrecy of the country’s position. Under limited
circumstances such as that of Germany, the legislature is allowed to partake in an ongoing treaty negotiation. Nonetheless, its role is restricted by having no authority to
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The Constitution establishes an independent judiciary primarily to protect aggrieved individuals harmed
by the violations of the law. And the role of the judiciary in policing constitutional boundaries should
continue to serve this objective. Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 102.
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approve or disapprove the content. The New Zealand treaty reform suggested that the
parliamentary role in the final stage can induce more effective public participation
through the executive’s incentive to gain better support in getting the treaty approved.
This method can become crucial when public consultation for the other three categories,
as I suggested, are made optional. One could argue that the requirement of the
parliamentary approval does not only serve that purpose (encouraging public
participation), but also provides additional protective mechanisms against any nontransparent treaty-making conduct. But my question is how well this mechanism will
serve such a goal since there are still chances of future textual alterations and the
government’s incentives to provide all the wonderful information to get the legislature to
endorse the framework. Thus, the crucial stage for a legislative check is rather in the final
stage (where government will have a high interest in behaving knowing that the treaty can
get turned down if the treaty fails to carry out the people’s interests) before “important
treaties” can take effect. The treaties to be subject to final legislative approval will be
summarized in Chapter VI.
This method of final legislative control means the approval of both Houses
(National Assembly) through a simple majority vote prior to the treaty’s entry into force
(ratification, accession, acceptance or approval). The draft treaty when tabling to the
parliament is subject to a time limit (i.e. 15 sitting days) which requires the draft to be
returned to the negotiating authority. A legislative approval guideline for the
consideration of approval may take the following factors (but not limited to) into account:







Reasons for Thailand to become a Party
Advantages or disadvantages of the treaty to be entered by Thailand
Any out of ordinary obligations that Thailand must undertake
The costs of compliance and breach
Economic, social, cultural, environmental impacts
Or flexibility of the treaty obligations
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While the legislative approval guideline will help the executive predict the
outcome of this control mechanism process (how a treaty gets approved), the elimination
of this additional stage can improve the quality of the administration as well as the
legislative function.156 Thus, the effectual operation of a constitutional method such as
Section 190 depends significantly on re-designing its mechanism to secure the political
environment that facilitates the process toward fulfilling its fuller objectives.
IV. Conclusion
Giovanni Satori suggested that “once a democratic system has been
established…the democratic ideal must be minimized”157 to ensure the survival of its
function. Mechanisms established under Section 190 may be the key elements to
improving democratic conditions in a remote area of politics like foreign affairs. But
within this process, it is still necessary that the roles of the public, legislature and
judiciary in keeping an eye on the executive’s treaty-making conduct are subject to
certain limits and properly determined to maintain other democratic goals, namely
effective and responsive governmental functions. The treaty practices of my surveyed
countries have demonstrated crucial elements that we should take into our consideration
in the readjustment of Section 190. These are individual rights concern for direct public
consultation, the executive treaty-making autonomy, and the limited legislative control
and judicial involvement in the treaty realm. There are good reasons why these
conventional practices have widely been adopted and maintained, which are not
necessarily in the promotion of the executive monopolization of a treaty power. My
proposals of narrowing down the treaty categories to be subject to public participation
(the mandatory type and other optional kinds), creating an oversight committee, limiting a
The inefficiency of legislature’s review of treaties was reflected in a notorious example when the
Genocide Convention was on the U.S. Senate shelf for thirty-seven years before finally ratified forty years
after. The U.S. Senate was once described as the “grave-yard of treaties”. HENKIN, supra note 15, at 50-51.
157
CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 10 (1970).
.
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judicial review of the public hearing conduct (but enabling its safeguard when the
individual interests at stake are high), and eliminating excessive parliamentary roles in the
treaty-making process aim at seeking better balance between ensuring the observation of
the executive’s constitutional obligations and securing the quality of the public
administrations. This is especially the current challenge faced under the implementation
of Section 190, which requires extensive accountability of the executive toward the
people and legislature, whereas the aggressive role of the judiciary has become a major
impediment to the discharge of the government’s duty in international affairs.158 Lessons
learned from other countries’ treaty-making experiences are not the sole justification for
proposing the new treaty model. There are cultural and political structural factors
discussed in Chapter III and Chapter IV that have come into play in the shaping of the
proposed model. Thus, its formulation takes into consideration the analyses on the notion
of public participation, the principle of separation of powers and the comparative study of
the treaty-making practices which I shall demonstrate how this proposed treaty model can
provide an effective response to internal and external challenges (discussed in Chapter I)
in the next chapter. There will certainly be counter-arguments to my approach to be
addressed in Chapter VI.
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The case of the Joint Communiqué between Thailand and Cambodia has set a perfect example that has
terribly shaken the relations between the two nations after the Thai government was ordered to withdraw its
acknowledgement. A New Way to Annoy Neighbor, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 12, 2009, available at
http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14857229. Judicial review can be
intrusive if enforcing people’s participatory rights involves imposing a standard of practice such as public
hearings. At the very least, “[c]ourt must be conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority and the
Constitution's design to leave certain matters to other branches of government” Czapanskiy & Manjoo,
supra note 142 , at 13 n.43 (citing Doctors for Life, 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) at 59-60 (S. Afr.).
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Chapter VI: Toward the Next Chapter
I. Introduction
There is no doubt that political structural change is one of the preconditions for
establishing democracy. However, whether this component can solely sustain the principles
of democracy and good governance in the long run remains an important question. Political
forms such as political parties, electoral process, a constitution, public participation and
checks mechanisms are all part of the democratic components. These are structural and legal
means of limiting and controlling governmental power to ensure its accountability to the
people. From the birth of the People Constitution (Constitution 1997) to the implementation
of the 2007 Constitution, Thailand never seemed to fall short of these formal elements. To
the Thais, the adoption of a democratic form is relatively an easy task. But what it may lack
seems to be the meaning of a democratic nation, the absence of the “demos’ power” and the
people’s right mindset (political will). Thailand may fall within the category referred by
Giovanni Satori as the “latecomers” that must catch up the trend at an excessively rapid pace.
And what these latecomers likely to experience are the sufferings from “overload, [an]
unmanageable situation arising from too many simultaneous crises or burdens”.1 Amid the
political and social chaos, Thailand thus has a major task to tame politics and to foster a real
democratic political culture within the people by setting up a political environment that will
increase greater trust among the people and toward the institutions through which they
exercise their sovereign powers. This is a path toward good governance which can only be
realized when both political and social dimensions of democracy are at play.

1

Giovanni Sartori, How Far Can Free Gov. Travel? in Democracy: A Reader 51(Larry Diamond and Marc F.
Plattner eds., 2009).
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The treaty provision (Section 190) of the 2007 Constitution is part of the progressive
plan. This approach requires an active, impartial, intellectual and selfless mind of citizens, an
extensive legislature’s role, and a strong judicial intervention in the treaty-making process.
Whatever democratic mechanisms that got incorporated into were expected to be
automatically and wisely applied by the people, and to be successfully followed through by
the government. Pressured conditions of the government, as a result of this reform, become
their responsibility to deal with in order to be accountable to the public. The bottom line of
this strategy is that the government’s problem is not really the people’s problem.
Unfortunately, the consequences of this idea brought about factors that affected the pace of
our democracy. Ineffective administration that led to unresponsive administration, public
participation that seemed more problematic and less promising, and inefficient treaty
negotiation that resulted in a loss of national interests at the borders’ fronts, altogether, make
up the interests of the “demos”. It is thus difficult to see how over-emphasizing transparency
and accountability can lead us far, but in fact slows us down from achieving fuller democracy.
As we are moving toward the country’s new political phase, it is quite clear that
public affairs are no longer the matters of government and representatives, but also of
citizens. These two sectors must work together. Section 190 may reflect the appreciation of
the dynamic of public participation and the meaning of limiting government mechanisms, but
fails to perceive the significance of a balanced interaction between the limiters and the
limited in fulfilling the objectives of democracy. The introduction of liberalism into the
participation of a treaty process and the readjustment of each institutional branch’s role in the
making of treaties are meant to restore this balance, and to address the political and social
dimensions of Thai democracy in the treaty context through recovering currently missing
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components, namely effective and responsive administration. The aspect of liberalism, which
has also been adopted in the treaty practices of many surveyed countries, to my belief, can
enhance the meaning of public participation by creating public trust in their government
which is vital to nurturing a positive political culture. At the same time, an understanding of
the system of checks and balances which takes into consideration the political branch’s
autonomy and independence other than transparency is deemed crucial to the practical
function of the executive, which is the source of securing national interests and the public
trust. There are thus good reasons why many surveyed countries have maintained the system
of the centralized executive foreign policy making (CEFP) without deferring too much power
to other bodies. My proposal, however, does not suggest that CEFP must be fully embraced,
but rather asks that this method be factored in when seeking accountability, transparency,
responsiveness and effectiveness in administrating foreign affairs. The readjustment of each
political branch’s treaty-making role to increase the executive competence in the treatymaking process may not be the ultimate answer in the future, but certainly is necessary for
now. The current treaty provision (Section 190) is an ambitious project, but not impossible to
achieve, given the maturity of certain social and political conditions, which will take some
time before it can be fully materialized. This is what I hope that the proposed treaty reform
will help prepare for such conditions. Professor David Williams in his book, Designing
Federalism in Burma, gave us a lesson that you need the right tool to fix the right problem.2
For Thailand, we might only have a good tool that has not yet fitted the problems.

2

DAVID C. WILLIAMS, DESIGNING FEDERALISM IN BURMA 130 (David C. Williams & Lian H. Sakhong, eds.,
2005) (“the right Constitution can help lead a country away from internal division and toward the rule of law”).
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II. Summary of the Problems: The Dilemma of Section 190
As introduced in Chapter I, mechanisms established under Section 190 to secure a
more open and accountable administration in the area of foreign affairs have presented both
internal and external challenges, which also undermine the principles of good governance
and democracy. These mechanisms include the extensive executive’s obligations in the treaty
process which involves a public hearing, legislative approvals (prior and after a treaty
negotiation) and the policing power of the judiciary after the enforcement of a treaty. Not
only does Section 190 expand the list of important treaties whose meanings have not yet been
determined, but also requires the executive to provide information and cause to be conducted
for public hearings, and to secure the approval of the National Assembly prior to undertaking
a treaty negotiation. The second approval prior to the country’s ratification to the treaty is
also necessary whereas the power to determine whether the executive is competent to act
alone on the treaty in question is solely vested within the Constitutional Court, which can be
challenged after the treaty has been in full force.
Although the recent Section 190 amendment aims at solving these problems by trying
to create greater certainty in the executive’s treaty-making authority, a legislation to be
enacted that lists important treaties within the meaning of Section 190 will only serve as a
temporary relief for the types of treaties that are currently foreseeable. And because the list
will never be comprehensive, despite the enumerated treaties, they are still subject to the
Constitutional Court’s decision whether a treaty in question fits the “important treaty”
characteristics. Public participation is still required vastly and mainly on national issues. As
long as foreign affairs are not tied to personal interests, the gap between remote politics and
individuals will be hard to bridge. Thus, without looking beyond a simple text alteration, and
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into a cultural change and balance of institutional arrangements within a treaty framework,
these democratic aspects will continue to hamper with the effectiveness of the administration
by undercutting meaningful public participation, restraining the executive’s autonomy in
foreign affairs, damaging the country’s foreign diplomacy, and subjecting the country to
potential international liabilities.
A. Hampering with the Administration’s Effectiveness and Responsiveness
The idea of democracy which is centered on a governing process has much to do with
the quality of governance itself by seeking a way in which the demos’ power can be
exercised effectively. Thus, democratic mechanisms should not only warrant accountability
and transparency, but also the effectiveness and responsiveness of the administration since
these are important elements that facilitate the exercise of the people’s sovereign power
through the bodies that can accurately represent their interests, and quickly respond to their
needs. Unfortunately, these elements have been weakened under the implementation of
Section 190.
The vague and broad language of the two additional types of treaties which have
recently been added (referring to those having economic and social impacts, or generating
material commitments in trade, investment or budget of the country) have presented
challenges to the executive.3 At the same time, the amendment of Section 190 does not
guarantee that the branch will not run into the same old problem by having to present all
kinds of treaty proposals to the public and parliament before it can proceed to commence a
3

H.R. REP. No. (omitted) , at 32 (2011) (Report of the Committee on the Draft Constitution of the Kingdom of
Thailand Amendment (No. 2) B.E. 2554 (Section 190)), available at
http://web.parliament.go.th/parcy/sapa_db/adhoc-upload/5-20110128105022_190.pdf (describing the concern
of the vagueness of Section 190 treaty categories which has presented a major difficulty in carrying out national
foreign policy). H.R. REP. No. 2, at 4-5 (2010) (Conf. Rep.), available at
http://web.parliament.go.th/parcy/sapa_db/adhoc-upload/5-20101222105129_2.pdf.
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negotiation. Accountability and openness of the system may be created, albeit at the expense
of government time, resources and efficiency. The check mechanisms introduced under
Section 190 which involved the role of the public, legislature and judiciary in the treatymaking process has substantially slowed down the negotiation process. Since the Court’s
decision in 2008, the Foreign Ministry and Ministers have refused to sign “mildly-worded
agreements” lest it will later be interpreted as a violation of Section 190.4 This outcome is not
just a concern of government works with foreign nations, but most importantly a matter of
domestic relations – a positive interaction between the people and their government which is
founded upon trust and good political attitude. While government responsiveness is
essentially lost in the current public participation mechanism within the treaty context, the
legislature and judiciary’s powerful roles in determining the survival of a treaty that caused
major disruption in foreign affairs administration provided even less guarantee for
government responsiveness5 when satisfying these constitutional obligations serve no more
than a shield for the executive. The scope of public participation, the level of legislature’s
involvement, and the timeline and manner of judicial intervention are all the factors that
contribute to the effectiveness of government function upon which responsive administration
depends.6
4

Bangkok Pundit, Yellow Shirt Turns on Abhisit, Asian Correspondent, Nov.24, 2010,
http://asiancorrespondent.com/42930/yellow-shirts-turn-on-abhisit/
5
The World Bank, in fact, emphasized the significance of administration effectiveness as a way of exercising
political authority in using and maximizing institutional resources to manage public affairs and respond to
social needs. Farouk Lawan, Chairman, Educ. Comm., Democracy & Good Governance, Lecture at the
University of Nigeria (Feb. 28, 2008), in DEMOCRACY AND THE ISSUE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE: CHALLENGES
AND PROSPECTS, 2008, at 6-7.
6
The reduction of the effectiveness of the Thai government administration is posing two phases of challenges;
the current situation in which the government’s resources, time and energy have been heavily invested into the
constitutional requirements of the treaty-making process in order to avoid any sort of political backlash, and the
future challenge in which the government will become further unresponsive by being tempted to fast-forward
their obligations only to satisfy the rules while ignoring the true meaning of the procedure. While government
resources will be drained down into the demanded treaty process due to the vague terms of the required treaties,
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B. Reducing the Executive Autonomy in the Exercise of Foreign Powers
The principle of separation of powers in which government should be composed of
independent branches with distinct constituencies is the heart of democracy.7 As argued in
Chapter IV, the core idea of the principle does not only focus on breaking down
governmental powers to prevent a tyrannical act of the governing authority, but also concerns
the functionality of the institutional branches to ensure the effectiveness of the checks and
balances mechanisms.8 The principle’s underlying purpose is also to assign powers and
responsibilities to each political branch in order to prevent interference and to guarantee
independence among the legislature, executive and judiciary.
For a long period of time, Thailand had maintained the tradition of “diplomatic
kingship” in which the Kings took the leads in the country’s conduct of foreign relations.9
Even after being under the system of constitutional monarchy, a series of Constitutions, in
fact, explicitly vested plenary foreign power in the executive with a few exceptions, and for
practical reasons which are functionality and expediency in foreign diplomacy.10 This

public comments and concerns from the hearing which are formed as part of people’s wills and intellects will
run the risk of failing to take part in the final decision.
7
The concept of separation of powers was by many famous political theorists between the seventeenth and
eighteenth century. These include Montesquieu, John Locke and William Blackstone. Although uniquely
developed by each theorist, the concept “remained a cornerstone in their constitutional thought”. MICHAEL
RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 59 (2007).
8
What became the forefront idea of separation of powers was the autonomy of each branch by assigning those
particular functions and powers to particular entities. And for effectiveness and transparency, powers should be
separated by who exercise them, and the types of activities they involved. Id.
9
See Chapter IV, Section III, A
10
Treaties that provides “for changes in the Thai territories or requiring the enactment of an Act for its
implementation must be approved by the National Assembly”. For numerous examples, see Chapter II, Section
III, B (ii). Kanitta Topothai, The Jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court on the Matter of Being the
International Agreement under the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 2550 Section 190 with
Regard to the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 26 (Dec. 12, 2008) (an academic document submitted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the program of senior executives on criminal justice administration, National
Academy of Criminal Justice)(on file with the Library of Courts of Justice),
http://elib.coj.go.th/managecourt/data/c12_4.pdf (“Because the King as the head of state who exercises his
executive power through the Council of Ministers has the prerogative to conclude a peace treaty, armistice or
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constitutional framework technically limited the scope of the parliament authority in the
treaty-making process, whereas the public role was never required. This practice, however,
has been reversed as the exceptions got expanded under the implementation of the 2007
Constitution.11
Despite the presumption of the executive’s inherent foreign affair power under this
new Constitution,12 its new treaty provision has effectively stripped away the executive’s
treaty-making power by re-distributing it to the public and other political organs. The
executive’s treaty authority has been counter-balanced through three channels, namely the
public, legislature, and judiciary. These first two channels basically require that the
undertaking of important treaties be disclosed and discussed directly with the public and
legislature. This process, including a formal approval of the legislature on the treaty
framework, is acting as an authorization before the executive can proceed to a treaty
negotiation. In the absence of these steps, the executive is deemed powerless to conclude an
important treaty, and the treaty itself is considered unconstitutional.
In the judiciary channel, the executive treaty power can be closely observed. The
broadness and vagueness of the exceptions (in the form of treaty categories) render the
executive’s treaty-making authority inflexible and uncertain.13 Because the treaty categories

other treaties with other countries or international organizations, the authority in the making of treaties pursuant
to Section 190 thus belongs to the executive branch…”).
11
The expanding exceptions refer to (i) the textual adjustment of the first treaty category to include those
affecting “extraterritorial areas over which Thailand has sovereign rights or jurisdiction in accordance therewith
or in accordance with international law”, and (ii) the addition of two treaty categories that have extensive
impacts on national economic or social security, or generates material commitments in trade, investment or
budget of the country. See Chapter I, Section III, B (iii).
12
Rujikej Chumkasorakit, Praden wikrao rang rathatumnoon hang ratcha anachak thai: bot bunyad kiewkub
sonthisanya nai rathatumnoon [Analysis on a referendum: Treaty Clause in the Constitution], 24 (Working
Paper, 2007). See also Jaturon Therawat, Roles of the Parliament in Treaty Making Process under the Thai
Constitution 2 (Nov. 21, 2008) (Working Paper, on file with the King Prajadhipok’s Institute).
13
A change that has been made to the first treaty category by replacing a treaty which provides for a change “ in
jurisdiction” with “extraterritorial areas over which Thailand has sovereign rights or has jurisdiction in
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(especially those with “extensive impacts on national economic or social security or
generates material commitments in trade, investment or budgets of the country”) fail to
provide a clear meaning, the interpretative power then belongs to the Constitutional Court
who can solely make a final decision concerning the executive’s authority.14 It has been
widely acknowledged that the source of the problem is the court decision in 2008 concerning
Thai-Cambodia Joint Communiqué which applied such a broad interpretation of Section 190.
Whether the branch is capable of acting alone in negotiating and concluding a particular
treaty can be subject to a challenge in court later. This constitutional obligation makes it
harder for the executive to predict and comprehend its competence in the making of treaties
since the power to interpret what these important treaties are is rested within the
Constitutional Court, which also means the power of this judiciary body to determine the
territory of the executive authority in foreign affairs.
Since the implementation of Section 190, the treaty-making power of the executive
has thus been affected and curtailed in several ways primarily to secure openness and
accountability in the area where the public had traditionally been excluded. The question that
we may have is why should we care or so what if the executive must take substantial efforts
to complete the task. This perception obviously does not take the relationship between
government practical function and a successful operation of democracy into account. The
ability of the executive to retain sufficient autonomy in this particular area is crucial to the
accordance therewith or in accordance with international law”, although meant to clarify the old definition, has
still been a subject of dispute since such terms provide broad definitions concerning the extent to which the
country can actually exercise its sovereign rights which can go beyond territorial seas such as exclusive
economic zone or continental shelf. These broad terms has made the executive branch feel uneasy to rely on its
own authority in negotiating a wide variety of treaties. While the executive prefers a narrow interpretation to
limit to “territorial jurisdiction”, the judiciary is more willing to apply a broad interpretation to cover possible
sovereign rights. Topothai, supra note 10, at 28.
14
Id.
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effectiveness in its administration in order to guarantee healthy domestic relations for one
reason, and a good foreign diplomacy for another.
C. Damaging Foreign Relations and Hampering Economic Gains
The issue of administration effectiveness is not only a domestic concern, but also a
matter of external relations. It can impact, establish and destabilize the country’s credibility
and international relations. This matter of securing an effective government requires the
executive branch to at least maintain sufficient discretionary power and to have certain
flexibility in the implementation of foreign policy.
In the case of Thailand, the independence of the executive branch which has been
undercut by the application of Section 190 has substantially affected the negotiation process
of several routine beneficial international agreements, which could have fallen within the
category of “important treaties”,15 and for the worst part, its treaty partners that may
eventually lose its faith in the country’s commitment under a weak leadership of the Thai
executive who seems to have less authority than the parliament and the court in the making
of a treaty. Hesitant gesture of the Foreign Ministry in pursuing international negotiation also
sends out a negative sign of Thailand’s foreign policy (e.g. its willingness to establish
international diplomacy). The maintenance of the country’s foreign relations oftentimes
relies on the conclusion of a friendly or cooperative treaty, which unfortunately is without
exception. Its process has also been disrupted and delayed under the implementation of
Section 190. The country thus faces a big time of losing its economic and political
opportunities that are contingent upon the enforceability of those treaties.
15

Charter Change Goes Before Parliament, BANGKOK POST, Nov. 22, 2010,
http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/207499/charter-change-goes-before-parliament (“The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs will benefit most from the attempt to amend Section 190 of the constitution as the present
situation is causing delays in negotiations with other countries”).
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There is no question that there is still the need to protect real important treaties
originally intended to secure by Section 190. However, the safeguard must not be at the
expense of other minor treaties which are tantamount to the people’s interests and the
country’s economic and political gains. The reaction of the Constitutional Court which
resulted in the withdrawal of Thailand-Cambodia Joint Communiqué has rolled the foreign
relations between Thailand and Cambodia downhill, despite the fact that it served no more
than a friendly diplomatic gesture according to the former Foreign Minister Pattama’s view.16
Since the decision in 2008, the government hardly desired to push forward the three
memorandums of understanding on border demarcation between Thailand and Cambodia
signed by their Joint Boundary Commission, which “are still awaiting parliamentary approval
despite being forwarded to the lawmakers three times since November 2008”.17 Although
these memorandums can help patch up the tie, and improve border trade relations between
the two countries, the action to undertake it is still up in the air. The disruption of the crossborder trade and tourism definitely harmed both countries' revenues which generate billions
of baht.18 The border trade was even known to benefit Thailand more than Cambodia.19
Thailand-Cambodia Joint Communiqué is not the only case that has a negative implication
on Thailand’s foreign relations. Its precedence has discouraged the executive from relying on
its own power to conduct the negotiations of other international treaties. The hesitation of the

16

Thailand, Cambodia Signed Document on Preah Viherah Temple, MCOT News, June 18, 2008,
http://enews.mcot.net/view.php?id=4812 (quoting the former Thai Foreign Minister Noppadon Pattama at a
press conference that “the declaration would not affect each country's rights on surveying and demarcating the
common border” ).
17
Supra note 15.
18
Kavi Chongkittavorn, Abhisit and Hun Sen, A Clash of Leadership, THE NATION, Nov. 12, 2009,
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2009/11/12/opinion/opinion_30116375.php
19
Id.
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Thai government in pursuing even a mild commitment cast doubt in the mind of its partners
who essentially questioned about Thailand’s hospitality and sincerity.
Sure enough, Section 190 amendment has been speculated to help ascertain the
boundary of the executive’s treaty-making authority by saving time on the making of routine
and technical agreements, which have been known to benefit the country’s economy and
foreign relations. However, it is unclear if other cooperative agreements, which may not have
been listed in the legislation, but share certain characteristics with those important treaties
will not be the subject of a challenge. The risk that the executive will run into in determining
its own competence in the treaty process may be reduced, but will not entirely be eradicated.
We cannot deny that creating a transparent treaty-making process may be necessary,
but it is not the sole democratic element that should drive the machinery of our public
administration. The fact that the country’s economic well-being still highly depends upon
external relations reminds us that we may not afford to have a claim of transparency take
over the country’s interest in the pursuit of foreign diplomacy. There are political and
economic interests to gain from the effective conduct of foreign relations that we must take
into account. Maintaining good foreign relations does not simply concern “theirs”, but the
economic and social well-beings of “ours” through exchange of trade, resources and
information. As a treaty process, Section 190 should not weaken its primary function which
provides the means to secure these particular interests. However, I did not suggest that the
transparency mechanism should be undercut. Far from this perception, the mechanism should
rather be operated in a fashion that minimizes its impact on other important components.
These economic and political interests to be borne out of having effective administration in
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the conduct of foreign relations must therefore be balanced against the transparency and
openness of the system since they also constitute as one of the democratic goals.
D. Bearing International Liability:
In the modern time, a country can no longer stand in isolation, especially when it has
continued to benefit economically and politically from the power of globalization. Thailand
has been part of the global force since it first made contact to the outside world in the
thirteenth hundred.20 As the world gets smaller, the interconnection among nation states may
make our self-governance “less than a self” in the sense that the country can no longer be
solely accountable to its citizens, but also to the outsiders under the role of international rules
and obligations. The country’s commitments that once made with other nations cannot
simply be repudiated without legal consequences regardless of how serious or legitimate
reasons are being made.
This understanding raises another important issue within the implementation of
Section 190 which allows the Constitutional Court to nullify a treaty that may have already
been in force. And what is left with the country are international breach, possible liability,
reparation, and a violation of citizens’ participatory rights that cannot be refurnished once
treaty compliance is sought by the other party.21 Serving as customary international law, the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the Vienna Convention) made clear that a
20

See Chapter I, Section III, B (i)
In addition, although the 2007 Constitution provides an escape clause for treaties which have been complete
prior to the date of its promulgation, this does not mean that there will not be further complication concerning
the future treaties or existing treaties whose terms are subject to automatic renewal at the end of their periods.
These treaties whose terms enable automatic renewal may encounter the conditions required by Section 190
which could result in the modification of the treaty instead of a continuation of the existing terms. This is
another potential breach that Thailand must face. CONST. (2007), Ch. 15 §305(5), (Thail.) (“any act, in
connection with the conclusion or the implementation of a treaty, which has been done prior to the date of the
promulgation of this Constitution shall be valid and the provisions of section 190 paragraph three shall not
apply but the provisions of section 190 paragraph three shall apply to acts which remain incomplete and require
further action”).
21
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material breach of a treaty includes “a repudiation of a treaty” by the party which does not
prevent the other party from seeking a remedy when the treaty has been concluded.22 An act
of refusal to honor the treaty that has been made therefore does not release the country’s
international obligations. The country still either has to comply with those commitments or
pay the price for breaching them. Article 61 and 62 of the Convention also refer to situations
of “impossibility of performance” and “fundamental change of circumstances” which cannot
provide grounds for treaty termination, except under limited circumstances.23 Both Articles,
however, explicitly disallow a breach of treaty as a ground for termination, which prevent a
party from making repudiation of a treaty as an excuse to escape its obligation without legal
consequences.
Thus, Section 190 may be able to give the court all the power to nullify an
international treaty. The country is nonetheless responsible for its compliance or otherwise
for its breach which can incur costs in the form of financial obligation or diplomatic relations.
The decision of Cambodia-Thailand Joint Communiqué is a clear example of the weakness
of section 190. The withdrawal of the pact ordered by the court did not affect anything, but
the diplomatic relations between the two countries. The strong application of a “check
system” in which the judiciary is prescribed with the power to invalidate the executive treaty
authority became sharp teeth that rather damage than protect its own skin. Judiciary
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The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 61(3)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 I.L.M. 679
(1969); 63 A.J.I.L. 875, http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf.
23
For instance, Article 61(1) provides that “[a] party may invoke the impossibility of performing a treaty as a
ground for terminating or withdrawing from it if the impossibility results from the permanent disappearance or
destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty.” Article 62(1)(a), (b) states that “[a]
fundamental change of circumstances which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground
for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless [they] constituted an essential basis of the consent of the
parties to be bound by the treaty and the effect of the change is…still to be performed under the treaty”. The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Id. art. 61(1), 62(1)(a), 62(1)(b).
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intervention may be the right approach to balance out the executive power, but the timeline is
clearly wrong to achieve the intended outcome.
E. Weakening the Principles of Democracy and Good Governance
The dilemma of Section 190 does not only pose numerous problems in practice, but
also in principle. These issues may be found to work against the principle of democracy and
good governance which share a common ground in terms of the quality of a governing
process. Although transparency and accountability are well-known elements of democracy
and good governance, these characteristics cannot be solely sustained, and must be
accompanied by other governing qualities. Thus, the improvement of any democratic
elements must seek balance to avoid jeopardizing other important components.
The issues of the government’s ineffective response to the political participation and
social needs of the public, and the delayed administration in international affairs as a result of
the Section 190 implementation are all relevant to the quality of our governing system in
which I believe are not part of the democratic goals. First of all, the public participation
mechanism and legislative prior approval process, which are intended to induce both
transparency and responsiveness of the public administration in the area of foreign affairs,
provide no guarantee that the decision outcome will well reflect public opinions when it is
doubtful whether a busy and ineffective government will carefully listen to the people and
keep up with its promises. Secondly, the fact that the direction of the country’s foreign
diplomacy (the decision to undertake a negotiation and conclude a treaty) can be thwarted by
the judiciary body can put the country’s economic and political gains on hold. These gains
are also deemed the interest of the people. Thus, both internal (toward the people) and
international (toward international community) accountability are equally important as they
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seek social, economic and political dependence upon each other. And to hamper this process,
Section 190 which conveys a means of treaty negotiation, is to undercut its own objective. In
addition, the issue of international liability due to this external accountability, which is
sometimes inescapable without legal consequences, also has negative impacts on internal
affairs both in terms of benefit and the public participatory rights losses. While the country
will be sought either for compliance or compensation, the decision of the court to invalidate a
treaty will not restore the people’s participatory rights that had already been disregarded in
the treaty process. And it seems that judicial intervention at this stage does not serve much
purpose, but only causes internal and external damages.
It is true that democracy is an “exercise of power” that belongs to the people, and not
to a particular branch.24 The power therefore may either be directly exercised by the people
or through their representatives that must be held accountable to the people, the original
owners. But in the assurance of this process, is it necessary to substantially intervene with the
authority of the executive in such a way that might eventually undermine effective
democracy, the system in which the people’s wishes and interests being effectively
represented and accorded a guarantee of popular control over final policy decision.25 This
would be a democratic irony. Seeking to secure the accountability and openness of the
system should not weaken the effectiveness and responsiveness of the public administration.
Thus, the primary objective of the proposal to a treaty process reform is to address this

GIOVANNI SARTORI, DEMOCRATIC THEORY 3 (1962). Democracy is generally understood as “a political
system in which the citizens themselves have an equal effective input into the making of binding collective
decisions. [W]hereas a non-democratic system gives power to the hands of certain individuals to make binding
decisions without any accountability to citizens.” MICHAEL SAWARD, THE TERMS OF DEMOCRACY 15 (1998).
25
ROSS HARRISON, DEMOCRACY 8 (1995) (defining effective democracy as the process in which people’s
wishes are being effectively represented by way of getting what they want or responsive administration
regardless of whether it is direct or indirect participation).
24
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dilemma by showing the possible co-existence of these important democratic elements
through cultural and structural changes to be concluded in the following section.
III. Adopting a New Approach: Proposal of a Treaty-Making Process Reform
A. A Model Summary: Areas of Reforms
In Chapter V, I have developed the derivation of a treaty-making model through the
comparative analysis of the treaty practices in various countries by factoring in the liberal
and structural approaches addressed in Chapter III and IV respectively in response to the
three primary areas of concerns under the current treaty-making provision (Section 190)
which are the re-adjustment of (i) the treaty categories for public participation and legislative
approval, (ii) the level of the public and legislative involvements, and (iii) the manner and
scope of the judiciary intervention in the treaty process.
While narrowing down the treaty category to be subject to a mechanism of public
participation is a means to attain cultural change through the use of better public involvement
in order to foster the people’s positive attitude in politics, adjusting the categories of
important treaties required for final legislature’s approval is to ensure transparency and
accountability of the treaties that may not receive public hearings, through indirect public
involvement. The single participatory approach (the requirement for the sole category) is
meant to induce more active political participation of the people while increasing effective
government function by narrowing down its obligations to focus on truly fundamental issues.
The re-adjustment of the treaty categories for a final legislative approval process is crucial to
the effectiveness and transparency of the public administration. Although demanding broader
categories to include the traditional kinds (affecting territory and sovereign rights, and
domestic laws of the country) and the special kinds (affecting individual rights, and
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generating material commitments in trade, investment or budgets of the country), this
adaptation has eliminated the most vague category, and replaced it with a more definitive one.
The proposal of treaty category adjustment still maintains the traditional negative list
approach in which the plenary treaty power is vested within the executive, except those listed
under Section 190 of the Constitution. And those are important treaties that must receive
proper authorization from the body that represents the interests of the people.
The structural changes by re-specifying the timelines and scopes of the legislative and
judicial involvements in the treaty process are required to improve administration efficiency
without giving up transparency and accountability as governing qualities in the treaty
negotiation process. While legislative function can best safeguard the people’s interest in the
final stage of the treaty process, moving up the judiciary body to determine the executive
competence in the making of a treaty at an early stage can help timely secure the people’s
participatory rights and preserve the country’s stakes (potential international liability and
embarrassment). An appropriate role of judicial intervention is suggested through
empowering the Constitutional Court (jurisdiction grant) to address questions concerning the
individual’s rights violation of a treaty, and the determination of its deferential power. These
are the underlying arguments which led to the reformulation of a treaty process.
i. Readjusting Treaty Classifications
The liberal approach and the treaty practices of my surveyed countries had shown the
significance of incorporating individual’s fundamental interests into the treaty process by
adopting it as one of the treaty categories. Thus, pursuant to this understanding, Section 190
should appear as follows;
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A treaty which:
(1) Provides for change in the Thai territories or
extraterritorial areas over which Thailand has
sovereign rights or jurisdiction in accordance
therewith or in accordance with international law
(2) Requires the enactment of an Act for the
implementation thereof, or
(3) Has substantial adverse impacts upon
individuals’ life, liberty and security interests
or the livelihoods of local communities
(4) Generate material commitments in trade,
investment or budgets of the country
The proposed new category which focuses on the people’s fundamental interests also
narrows down legal interpretation by replacing the vague category of having extensive
impacts on national economic or social security, and by ensuring that only treaties that
actually have adverse impacts upon individuals (in the exclusion of potentiality) will receive
a proper hearing in accordance with the constitutional requirements. Treaties that concern
individuals’ fundamental rights will be the sole category which demands a public hearing
process, primarily due to the cultural argument I made in Chapter III. This proposal of course
does not bar other important treaties which may also carry individuals’ fundamental rights
implication from guaranteeing a public forum (e.g. treaties affecting the country’s territories
oftentimes bring along the issue of personal livelihood). In any case, all four classifications
are considered “important treaties” that require approval from both Houses prior to their
entries into forces.
ii. Adapting Treaty Process (Legislature and Public Involvements)
The second area of reform is to re-affirm the principle of separation of powers which
aims at preserving both checks and independence of each institutional branch. The
elimination of the legislative approval in the early stage may also mean increasing the role of
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the public (which are optional for the three treaty categories) whose views and concerns will
hold the executive most accountable at the final legislative approval upon the conclusion of a
treaty. The treaty content that does not reflect people’s interests and concerns will run the
risk of falling through at this last screening stage, which is more critical than an early
approval of a treaty framework which is still subject to changes, and renders the executive’s
position inflexible. The language should appear as follows;
Prior to taking steps to concluding any treaty specified
under paragraph two,
(1) The Council of Ministers shall provide information and
cause to be conducted public hearings for the treaty that
bears the characteristic of the third category
(2) A public consultation may be conducted in the case
where the Council of Ministers is of the opinion that a
treaty may affect national or public interests specified
in the first, second and forth categories
(3) Prior to expressing its consent to be bound, the
Council of Minister shall, thereby, submit to the
National Assembly a final treaty text for approval,
and make its details publicly accessible…
Under this proposal, public consultation is divided into two levels, namely (i)
mandatory for treaties affecting fundamental individual rights, and (ii) optional for the rest of
important treaties (the first, second and forth categories). Because the mandatory public
consultation has been cut down to one important category, the government will be expected
to address the issue promptly and effectively. At the same time, the optional approach (as
opposed to complete absence) can provide additional incentive for the government to seek
public consultation for other important treaties in order to secure their final legislative
approvals without being interfered by the substantial demands of the constitutional process.
The re-wording of the treaty process is also in accordance with the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) which allows different means for a country to be
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bound, and not necessarily limited to consent expressed by ratification, acceptance or
approval.26 This is also the problem of the Section 190’s current text which only takes into
account the consent to be bound by a treaty by ratification. Its failure to include other means
of consent makes the requirement of parliamentary approval and public accessibility “after
the treaty has been signed” meaningless, and yield potential liability had the parliament
disapproved it. Because many international treaties take effects upon signing, the disapproval
of the legislature afterward will not excuse the country from compliance. And at worst, this
final screening process will not serve as any safety valve for the people’s interest. Thus, the
suggested wording by not specifying a particular means to declare an intention to be bound
will also force the executive branch to secure legislative approval prior to its undertaking any
legal action whether signing or ratifying a treaty.
iii. Creating an Oversight Committee
In considering the doctrine of separation of powers to ensure that the interaction
among the institutional branches works toward the effectiveness of the checks system,27 the
creation of an oversight committee is to replace an ineffectual function of the judicial body
whose intervention, after the treaty takes effects, does not serve as effective check upon the
executive, and only incurs legal burdens to the country. Although the judicial role in the
treaty-making process is limited in many surveyed countries, its role and opinion are still
necessary to form a final decision in regarding to the types of “important treaties”. However,
this decision must take place at an early stage. With this respect, the following clause
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Means of expressing consent include consent to be bound by signature, by an exchange of instruments
constituting a treaty, by ratification, and by accession. See The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art.
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, supra note 21.
27
See Chapter IV, Section II.
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requiring the executive, the legislature and the Constitutional Court to co-determine the
nature of the treaty in question prior to an undertaking of a treaty negotiation must be added.
A treaty proposal shall be submitted to an oversight
committee to prior determine the nature thereof that
may fall within the parameter of any treaty specified
under paragraph two. In the case of dispute concerning
legal interpretation, the power to make the final
determination thereon shall be vested in the
Constitutional Court.
This clause, although giving the power to the oversight committee to decide on the
question of “important treaties”, also addresses a potential conflict among the branches
concerning the legal meaning of the treaty proposal (in which an executive may have a high
interest in asserting its own interpretation) by giving the constitutional court the power of
final determination.
iv. Empowering the Constitutional Court in the Treaty Context
As argued in Chapter V, Section II. D (ii), the operation of the oversight committee
which helps addressing the issue of procedural violation in the treaty-making process does
not necessarily eliminate the role of the constitutional court or render a constitutional
challenge on a substantive ground impossible. The court must still adjudicate on a claim
where individual rights guaranteed under the Constitution are involved, regardless of the
context in which such a violation took place. Thus, even in the area of foreign affairs where
limited judicial involvement is suggested, the court should address the question whether a
treaty infringes upon an individual’s constitutional rights. Nevertheless, the degree of
involvement (standard of review) will be varied depending on the type of right being violated
(negative vs. positive rights), the degree of infringement, the level of public impact and the
kind of government policy decision being involved. This determination will be made through
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the court’s own analysis. Another paragraph concerning the Constitutional Court’s role and
limit should be added as follows;
The Constitutional Court shall decide on an issue where
the implementation of such a treaty has violated the
rights and liberties of an individual guaranteed under
this Constitution. In the case where the violation
occurred in relation to national security interest or other
important government policy decisions, the court may
defer its decision to the concerned authorities where
these national interests have been determined to
substantially exceed a private right.
This clause, while mandating the constitutional court to address the question that
concerns its primary function (adjudication on the merit of an individual’s constitutional
rights infringement case) in the treaty context, will allow the court to employ its judgment in
deferring important issues to other competent authorities by balancing these interests against
the individual right at stake. The flexibility accorded by this clause is crucial to an effective
function of government, and most importantly the procurement of important national
interests. Because the clause does not require the court to make a deferral, but only to use its
best judgment in addressing an individual’s rights violation while taking into consideration
other public interests, the protection of individual rights is not being compromised. Thus,
even after the treaty has been fully in force, an individual can still challenge in court through
this clause, for instance, if he felt that his participatory right (which is within the
constitutional guarantee) has been violated. But it is up to the court to decide how much right
a person can be accorded pursuant to the balancing test suggested in the clause.
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This is an important power that is currently missing from the Constitutional Court’s
jurisdiction.28 Thus, in connection with Section 190, Section 212 (Chapter 10) must also be
adjusted to grant the court additional power as follows;
A person whose rights or liberties recognized by
this Constitution are violated has the right to file a
motion to the Court for a decision that a provision
of law or a treaty is contrary to or inconsistent with
the Constitution.
The proposal purports to improve competency of the institutional branches by
allowing each branch to perform its primary function effectively. While the court would still
play an important role in adjudicating on the matter that touches upon foreign policy
(individuals’ rights violation by a treaty), its scope of interference would still be limited
through balancing the national security interest or other important government policy against
the individual rights at stake in addressing the substantive violation. Thus, the level of
deference would directly depend upon the kind of individual rights being implicated.
Through this application, the courts could then accommodate the political branches'
institutional competence over foreign affairs issues by according the political branches with
the appropriate amount of deference.
B. Counter-Arguments
The proposed treaty model can be subject to criticism primarily in terms of a good
governing and democratic principles that the approach may undercut several democratic
mechanisms currently guaranteed under Section 190. Because this version of a treaty
provision is regarded as highly protective against corruptive practices, any readjustment or
modification can be perceived as weakening democratic values like transparency and
28

CONST. (2007), Ch. 10 §212-215 (Thail.). See Chapter II, Section III, D (ii).
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accountability.29 The proposed areas to reform will inevitably encounter such a claim that
they are a limitation of the people’s participatory rights in the treaty process, a reduction of
accountability and openness of the system, and an empowerment of the executive branch,
which is not a representative body that is directly accountable to the people.30 To summarize
these potential arguments, first of all, the reduction of treaty categories to one mandatory and
three optional cases, while lessening the safety valve of the people in scrutinizing
government external activity, will deny public involvement in a broader treaty context.
People’s opportunities to hear and voice their opinions in the making of important treaties
will be limited to certain circumstances. Secondly, the elimination of legislative approval at
the early stage is the removal of a mechanism that ensures transparency and accountability of
the executive act. Treaty framework approval is an important step to lock the executive’s
negotiation position in order to prevent self-seeking individuals from pursuing their personal
agenda. And thirdly, narrowing down the scope of important treaties, reducing legislature’s
involvement and allowing the executive to decide on its competence in the making of
particular treaties will enable the executive to freely exercise, and potentially abuse its
foreign affairs power.
The concern of limited public participation is a valid claim that people should not be
deprived of their rights to take part in government policy decisions. Instead of weakening the
participation mechanism, the readjustment of the treaty categories to primarily focus on
individual fundamental interests, in fact, increases the safety valve by closely guarding the
29

See Chapter I, Section III, A (i), (ii) and (iii) (defining democracy, good governance and their relationship).
See Chapter II, Section III, C (Pursuant to Chapter 9 of the 2007 Constitution, the prime minister is elected
from among the members of the House of Representatives following national elections for House of
Representatives. The leader of the party positioned to organize a majority coalition generally becomes the prime
minister by appointment by the King, who also appoints no more than thirty-five other ministers to constitute
the Council of Ministers.).
30
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interests that personally and directly concern the people and local communities. The
modification does not decrease the people’s rights to participation, but only shifts the
attention to the very fundamental issues to help improve the effectiveness and accountability
in the treaty participation process. This proposed category also goes along the line with the
existing conventional ones which arguably address certain fundamental concerns of the
people by having direct impact upon their lives.31 Broad public participation issues such as
those relating to national interests may increase people’s opportunities to partake, but neither
necessarily invites public involvement nor induces an active government response to the
addressed concerns. Nevertheless, the fact that the government may also seek public
consultation on other important treaties could provide a broader ground for public
involvement, which could slowly mature into a routine practice for the government to secure
public approval. Thus, under the new proposal, people’s participatory rights will rather be
strengthened, and better guarded.
The second area of criticism concerning the elimination of legislative approval which
is amount to abandoning an additional screening process may be a removal of a mechanism
that helps secure the openness and accountability of the system, but not necessarily the
openness and accountability themselves. These democratic elements, as argued in the
previous section, are best protected at the final stage of a treaty-making process. The
weakness of the current language that allows the executive to bind the country to
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The conventional categories which are those that provide for change in the Thai territories or require the
enactment of an Act for the implementation also concern people personally. While the Constitutional Court has
interpreted that treaties affecting territories of the country could create social impacts by affecting social and
economic rights of citizens living in the disputed area in Thailand-Cambodia Joint Communiqué case, the treaty
which requires an enactment of an Act, in the same manner, have strong implication upon people’s lives by
committing the people to a new law. See Saan Rattatumnoon [The Constitutional Court], Jul. 8, 2008, Ruling
No. 6-7/2551 (Thail), available at http://61.19.241.65/DATA/PDF/2551/A/108/1.PDF.
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international obligations through signature prior to securing a formal authorization from the
legislature, although requiring a two-step legislative approval, does not truly protect against
unwanted or bad commitments. At the same time, a treaty framework is a broad document of
which contents are still subject to future alterations. This aspect does not necessarily provide
an effective measure to prevent the self-dealing claim. The elimination of the early stage
legislative approval may, in fact, strengthen the role of the public by lessening the amount of
time that government has to spend with the parliament and inducing the government to pay
better attention to the public views and concerns in order to secure legislative approval in the
final stage. It is then not necessary that the extensive involvement of the legislature will serve
our best interest, but rather be an impediment to a smooth operation of the executive in the
pursuit of national interest through our foreign diplomacy.
The proposed model may still open up another area of criticism that it would give too
much power to the executive by cutting down the screening process (legislative approval)
and endowing the branch the power to take part in the determination of the special treaties.
The approach will allow the executive to interpret the meaning of these treaties narrowly to
circumvent Section 190 treaty procedure. While this concern is true that the executive has a
high incentive to avoid the extra burden, the approach, however, does not make the branch
the sole decision-maker on the question of the treaties’ definitions which are to be codetermined with the legislature and the Constitutional Court. The executive’s legal opinion is
still subject to the Constitutional Court’s final decision in the case of conflict in terms of
legal interpretation. The legislature, which is the representative body of the people, will have
a strong interest in ensuring that treaty frameworks affecting individual rights or fundamental
interests must be made in accordance with Section 190. Thus, the participation of the
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legislature and judiciary is still acting as a balancing tool against any possible abuse of the
executive’s discretionary power. The approach that enables the executive to partially
determine its competence in the making of treaties is to facilitate routine, technical
administrative or cooperative agreements if the branch could demonstrate their characters
that are outside of Section 190 concerns, and establish a pattern of these agreements in order
to expedite the treaty negotiation process.
In addition, the risk of the abuse of power will be minimized by a scrutinizing
mechanism at the conclusion of a treaty rendering the treaty to have no legal effects unless
formally approved by the legislature, and made available to the public. The Constitutional
Court will also serve as an enforcement body that addresses individuals’ rights violation by a
treaty made under the capacity of the executive. This additional jurisdictional grant to the
Constitutional Court can provide another effective means that undercuts the executive treaty
authority in a way that supports the institutional competency of each branch. Although
arguably the court’s involvement in the treaty context can be limited, the restrictions either in
determining the executive’s treaty power or in addressing an individual rights’ violation are
to increase the executive’s competence in the area which highly demands expertise and
expediency, and involves important government policy decisions. In fact, this type of
empowerment is not necessarily a bad thing if it means flexibility in guiding the direction of
our national foreign policy. This is empowerment in the sense that scrutiny still applies, but
does not interfere with the discretionary power so seriously that it impairs the primary
function of the executive in the realm of foreign affairs.
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C. Toward Embracing the Model in Comparison to Section 190 Amendment
The potential criticisms of the proposed modal previously addressed have much to do
with the concerns of the principles of democracy and good governance which have been
weakened throughout Thailand’s political history. This is what Chapter II sought to explain
to us to realize and understand the dynamic of political struggles among various factions and
the intensity of political exploitation of which the concern makes it harder for the 2007
Constitution to compromise.32 These concerns became the forefront of limited amendment
made to Section 190, which only sought to resolve the problem by spelling out significant
treaties without attending to the issues of public mindset and institutional competence in the
political process.
Unlike the simple solution in the amendment,33 the study of the past democratic
failures requires this proposed model to maintain accountability and transparency as top
priority in the readjustment of Section 190 while strengthening other democratic elements.
This model must at least be taken into consideration for its several positive aspects that aim
at correcting the weaknesses of Section 190. These are (i) enhancing the principles of
democracy and good governance, (ii) preserving the executive foreign affairs power, and (iii)
maintaining the country’s international relations. The model can serve as an improved
version of Section 190. By focusing on the people’s fundamental rights, securing
administration responsiveness and efficiency, and preserving the country’s international

Supra note 4 (“the PAD gathered in front of parliament to protest against the government-supported plans to
amend two parts of the constitution”).
33
“There shall be the law on the determination of the treaty types, negotiation framework, procedures and
methods for the conclusion of treaties having extensive impacts on national economic or social security or
generating material commitments in trade or investment…” CONST. (2007), Ch. 9 §190, ¶ 5 (Thail.) (amended
2011) (emphasis added).
32
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credibility and reputation, the proposed changes are ways of cultivating trusts in both
domestic and international relations.
i. Enhancing Democracy and Good Governance
The proposed model, which has been formulated from the analyses of Chapter III to
V, can directly address weak elements of democracy and the principle of good governance
through improving the effectiveness and responsiveness of the public administration, while
maintaining transparency and accountability as priority components. In comparison to the
amendment which only requires a treaty legislation, the model, although seeking to delineate
the scope of public participation, eliminate legislative involvement and increase the executive
competence in the treaty process, neither undermines the safety valve of the people nor
renders the executive the monopolist of foreign affairs power. The suggested changes rather
aim at protecting important functions and fostering the characters that each body should have
- which are active and discerning citizens, a responsive executive, an attentive legislature,
and an effectively- policing judiciary – desirable levels of which may not be achievable
under the amendment. These are the primary outcomes that the model is expected to generate
in the improvement of our democracy.
The three areas of reforms, which are the scope of public consultation, the level of
legislature involvement, and the manner of the judiciary intervention, are all relevant to the
satisfaction of the four prime democratic and good-governing characters. As argued in the
previous section, openness and accountability in the treaty-making process will remain
secured in these readjustments through the increasing consultation of the public in a
personally affected area, a legislative authorization of only treaties that truly reflect people’s
interest, and effective judiciary intervention that can timely protect people’s constitutional
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rights. The manners in which the legislature and judiciary are involved pursuant to this model
will not leave the exercise of the executive foreign power go unchecked, and becomes the
subject of public criticism as the treaty provision of the 1997 Constitution faced.34
By contrast, the Section 190 amendment which may preserve all the original
democratic mechanisms, such as a wide range of public consultation, two-step legislative
controls and the strict observation of the Constitutional Court in policing the constitutional
boundary among the branches, is expected that a minor change made to require a treaty
legislation will restore the executive and legislature’s effective functions. These mechanisms
without careful adjustments will continue to pose the problems I presented in Chapter I.
Creating the law to specify important treaties may not be sufficient to induce public
participation, to improve the quality of the administration, and to strengthen the power of the
Constitutional Court as the primary guardian of the individuals’ rights for the facts that the
amendment did not take cultural and political (institutional arrangements) factors into
consideration. The legislation will undoubtedly provide a short-term solution as a temporary
guidance for the executive’s treaty authority, but may never address the long-term issues
such as the public mindset, social reconciliation, balances among the institutional branches,
and propriety of the judicial intervention.
Thus, the proposed model will involve substantial changes in order to undertake a
more comprehensive approach to achieve these results. Whereas accountability and
transparency of the system would not be compromised, the model can quickly restore the
effectiveness and responsiveness of the public administration. By boiling down the issues for
public consultation to those concerning individuals’ fundamental rights, the proposed clause
Martinez Kuhonta, The Paradox of Thailand’s 1997 People’s Constitution, XLVIII ASIAN SURVEY 373, 374375 (2008).
34
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will help excluding a number of routine or cooperative agreements which can make the
arrangement of a public hearing unnecessary and cumbersome, and possibly causing many
treaties to go unattended.35 In addition, this readjustment of treaty categories, while requiring
the government to pay close attention on and distribute resources to those important issues,
will allow the government to exercise its discretion in seeking public consultation on other
subjects of national concern when time and budget permit. The process will eventually
warrant a better response of the government toward the people’s concerns by making the
people’s interest the center of the public discourse, while giving the government enough
resources to incorporate public comments in other areas of national interests.
The second adjustment which only requires final legislative approval (for all four
important treaty categories) also serves similar purposes, administrative efficiency 36 while
acting as a safety net to ensure that the concluding treaty will truly reflects people’s interest
before giving its permission for the country to be bound. The elimination of the legislature
involvement prior to a treaty negotiation is to increase the autonomy and flexibility of the
executive in taking the lead in the shaping of the country’s foreign policy, and to reduce the
workloads of the legislature that would have resulted in its frivolous supervision when it
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Cf. John C. Stennis & J. William Fulbright, Senators, Lecture at American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research: The Role of Congress in Foreign Policy (July, 1971), in THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN FOREIGN
POLICY, 1971, at 5 (suggesting the negative outcome of having every international agreements to go through the
Senate that it would be literally impossible for them to pay close attention, and give thoughtful consideration),
LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 50-51 (1990). At the same time,
Tocqueville advanced why high-profile or broad issues will not produce effective public participation since it
has a tendency to intensify social conflicts driven by participants’ biases, political alliance and emotion which
tend to make individuals lose touch with reality. Stephan Holmes, Tocqueville and Democracy, in THE IDEA OF
DEMOCRACY 28 (David Copp, John Hampton & John E. Roemer eds., 1993) (“In the heat of the struggle each
partisan is driven beyond the natural limits of his own views by the views and excesses of his adversaries, loses
sight of the very aim he was pursuing …”)
36
See Stennis & Fulbright, Lecture at American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: The Role of
Congress in Foreign Policy (July, 1971), in THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 35.
HENKIN, supra note 35 (describing the Senate as the Senate as “the grave-yard of treaties”).
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comes to scrutinizing important treaties.37 The efficiency argument is thus also connected
with a guarantee of administration responsiveness by allowing these two political branches to
channel their energies into important matters. It is then more important to ensure that the
legislature serves a serious function at the critical stage than playing several light roles when
committing the country to significant treaty obligations. The procurement of legislative
approval will work as a formal guarantee for an effective response of the public institutions.
Similarly, the timeline and scope of the judicial interventions will serve as a
safeguard for the people’s constitutional rights, in the making of Section 190 treaties. While
the judicial involvement in the treaty determination which has been moved up to the stage
prior to a negotiation will provide a certainty in the government’s public hearing obligation,
the Constitutional Court’s additional jurisdiction in hearing a case concerning individuals
rights’ violations by a treaty will be another important safety net that protects the people
against the government’s potential abuse of treaty power. In terms of administrative
effectiveness, this “pre-determination” approach will enable the executive to decide on its
competence, especially in the making of routine, technical, or cooperative treaties to advance
diplomatic relations with other nations. At the same time, the concept of judicial deference
that has been applied to the Constitutional Court’s standard of review concerning the
infringement of individuals’ rights either by the making of a treaty or by the treaty itself will
better accommodate the government with policy space, the area which falls outside the
judicial primary function. The proposed method of the judicial interventions, by making the
executive’s treaty activity less disruptive, may be understood as a readjustment of judiciaryexecutive relations through transforming from adversary to a more cooperative one.
37

HENKIN, supra note 35.
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Nevertheless, the policing power of the judiciary remains unaltered, and will still serve as a
check mechanism on the executive’s exercise of power in the realm of foreign affairs.
ii. Preserving Executive Competence in the Realm of Foreign Affairs
From the analysis of Chapter V, it is quite clear that the interest in preserving the
executive autonomy in the exercise of its foreign affairs power should not be compromised.
While the democratic values can be strengthened as previously argued, national interests
such as economic and political benefits or diplomatic relations will be best served when the
executive, legislative and judiciary operate as “partners” (respect each other’s authority and
responsibility) within the framework of the constitution. The proposed model therefore
addresses this institutional interaction which aims at creating legislature consultation and
judicial review (the ability of the Constitutional Court to review the government’s treaty
conduct) in a proper balance, and maintaining mutual respects among the branches in the
area that demands expertise, speed, and effective communication for national interest to be
well secured. Thus, the proposed model goes beyond a simple claim about conserving a
conventional treaty-making practice by raising economic, social and political justifications to
prove why the tradition of ensuring the executive’s sufficient autonomy in foreign affairs is
crucial in our time.
Although the Section 190 amendment can arguably help preserve the executive’s
treaty authority by providing a legislation to determine important treaties, the solution may
still invite controversies on the treaties that might not have been contemplated on at the time
of the enactment, but share the important aspects with those special treaties, which in effect
will still create an uncertainty in the boundary of the executive’s treaty power. And if the
treaty’s nature has not been ascertained, this can again raise the issue of an improper process,
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which will affect its constitutionality. The amendment will thus only serve as a temporary
relief to facilitate the executive’s foreign affairs administration on the foreseeable or common
types such as routine, technical agreements, which provides no guarantee that other
cooperative ones such as the joint communiqué (understood by the executive at the time that
it carried no legal obligations) will be safely executed without political backlash. Above all,
the amendment only addresses one angle of the problem.
On the contrary, the important changes proposed by this model which especially
concerns the reduction of the legislative approval, the creation of an oversight committee to
(prior) ensure the constitutionality of important treaties (as a guarantee of the executive
competence), and the application of judicial deference concept in the Constitutional Court’s
review of the individuals’ rights infringement can tremendously help restore the executive
branch’s autonomy, and facilitate an efficient exercise of its treaty negotiation authority in
the long run. First of all, the absence of the legislative approval requirement on a treaty
framework prior to a negotiation will enable the executive to act on its own discretion based
on the information, experience and time it has while maintaining a certain level of secrecy
concerning the country’s position in the negotiation process. This again by no means
suggests that its broad discretion will not be counter-balanced, given the mandatory public
participation on the fundamental issue, and the final legislative approval for all important
treaties. An early authorization, if resulted in a deadlock of a negotiating position, will create
further complication as whenever the country’s position has been counteracted, the executive
will be subject to a series of legislative approvals for each adjustment. On the other hand, if
the early authorization serves merely as a broad permission for the treaty framework, it
would not serve any democratic purpose since the legislature would not have foreseen future
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changes in the treaty content in order to act as a real screening agency. Secondly, the
establishment of an oversight committee to pre-determine the nature of a treaty proposal to
ensure each treaty’s compliance with Section 190 requirements will allow the executive to
fully exercise its negotiation authority without disruption later on (at least on a procedural
level). This method will reduce a number of “bad treaties” that render the executive less
competent and less credible in the making of treaties. The issues of competency and
credibility can also affect the flexibility and autonomy of the branch directly by weakening
its capacity to negotiate, and indirectly by raising doubts in the mind of its treaty partners
whether to make any concession to the agency of the country whose negotiating power is
unsettled. As a result, it would not give the executive much room to bargain. In addition,
enabling the executive to decide on the nature of a treaty proposal with other branches is a
restoration of its competence, especially in the making of routine, administrative or technical
agreements by giving the branch an opportunity to assert its position that it believes within its
treaty authority, and by taking into account an opinion of the branch that is primarily in
charge of a treaty process. And finally, limiting the power of the Constitutional Court’s
review on the issues affecting important national policy in the treaty context by asking the
court to simply apply a balancing test where a strong legitimate national interest is present is
to provide the executive flexibility in redressing individuals whose constitutional rights may
have been infringed as a result of the treaty implementation without completely withholding
the Court’s ability to render a judgment.
Therefore, the elimination of an early legislative approval, the creation of an
oversight committee and the application of judicial deference in the treaty context, while
coinciding with the conventional treaty practice by preserving a certain degree of the
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executive foreign affairs power, are deemed crucial to the assurance of an effective and
competent exercise of the executive’s treaty authority that the amendment may fall short.
After all, this is the area where the branch is warranted within the framework of the Thai
Constitution. The adjustments are arguably compatible with the constitutional structure in
which the plenary foreign affairs power (while subject to certain limits) is vested in the
executive body. And this is so due to the fact that the undermining of this executive’s
character is bound to create complication in the matter of the country’s international relations.
iii. Maintaining Foreign Relations and Avoiding of International Breach
The analysis of Chapter IV on the preservation of the executive’s autonomy in the
realm of foreign affairs in relations to the principle of separation of powers suggested the
significance of this political characteristic to the maintenance of the country’s image,
reputation, credibility and good foreign diplomacy in the world stage. Thus, another goal of
the proposed model is to improve the means to secure this outcome, which in a way, is for
the people to fully exploit the benefits of the global networks. Although there are both gives
and takes in the process of making international commitments, and it is important that the
process should not allow the preservation of good foreign relations to take priority over the
people’s interest, these two interests should still be equally weighed for the fact that the state
of domestic well-being is also contingent upon the condition of external relations.38 Not only
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See ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1987) (focusing on the
interplay of international market forces and the increasing economic interdependence among national
governments while recognizing that poor countries will suffer as opportunities shrink). In the case of Thailand,
unstable diplomatic relations between Thailand and Cambodia have undermined both countries’ economies.
Closure of their border crossings due to the political tension had been reportedly affected the trade volume and
local lives of the two countries. See http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-10/26/content_10255381.htm. See
also http://www.tannetwork.tv/tan/ViewData.aspx?DataID=1039922. In an extreme case, economic sanction
which is a severe form of a diplomatic protest involves the systematic deprivation of a nation of economic
resources through the prevention of sales or purchase of goods as well as the denial of investment, foreign
exchange or credit to the target country. In an increasingly integrated global economy, the impacts of economic
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does an inadvertent termination of a treaty could create “bad relations” between the countries,
it may also incur the country in breach liability (possibly in a form of financial obligation)
when the demanded compliance could not be made. Thus, it cannot be simply said that
maintaining good foreign relations is less relevant to the people’s interest. By understanding
the difference that an efficient, yet accountable treaty-making process could make, the model
has therefore been formulated in the realization of these interests.
While the amendment is still lacking a mechanism to ensure that a treaty has received
a proper process, and will not be subject to later challenge for a procedural violation, the
proposals of the treaty category adjustment and the creation of an oversight committee are
the guarantee for the maintenance of the country’s foreign relations. Both methods are ways
of assuring the country’s treaty partners the success of the treaty conclusion that it will less
likely be subject to a constitutional challenge for circumventing an important process. While
the contraction of important treaties to only require that those affecting fundamental interests
of the people be subject to public participation can help guarantee a survival of “less
significant treaties”, the operation of the oversight committee will ensure that each treaty will
receive a proper process in accordance with the constitutional requirement to prevent the
country’s future repudiation to its international obligations, which will inevitably affect its
credibility and create embarrassment. The fact that setting up this determination body to
ensure the constitutionality of a treaty can save time, energy and resources on both sides is a
contributing factor to fostering a positive and friendly environment in the treaty process. The

sanction upon, not just the targeted country’s economy, but also the imposer are tremendous by resulting in the
reduction of trade flows and job loss. Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al., U.S. Economic Sanctions; Their Impact on
Trades, Jobs, and Wages (Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper, 1997), available at
http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/wp.cfm?ResearchID=149.
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model can thus help promoting greater certainty in the treaty procedure which can, in turn,
preserve the country’s international relations.39
In terms of international breach avoidance, while the creation of this committee is
especially important to reduce the possibility of a later judicial challenge on the procedural
ground, 40 the re-wording of the final legislative process is also required to prevent the
executive from binding the country through signature prior to obtaining formal legislative
approval. The current constitutional text which only provides a final legislative approval after
the treaty had been signed can open up a huge liability as there is a possibility of the
legislature’s disapproval which could have resulted in the country’s repudiation of the
binding treaty. With regard to the issue that results from a judicial challenge, the termination
of a fully enforced treaty on the basis of a procedural violation does not simply release the
country’s obligations. Even in the case of a cooperative treaty such as the Joint Communiqué
between Thailand-Cambodia that simply contains a statement acknowledging Cambodia’s
Pra Vihear World Heritage enlistment of which withdrawal does not create any financial
liability for Thailand, it nevertheless costs the country in terms of diplomatic relations. A
worse scenario certainly is when the country is involved with concessions and trade
commitments that could have resulted in enormous political and financial consequences.
Securing certainty in the treaty process is directly relevant to a country’s credibility and stability of its foreign
relations, In the case of the U.S., a sharp bifurcation of the treaty process between the presidential stage and the
Senate stage has been criticized by foreign governments as making it impossible to do diplomatic business, and
that it gave no chance of any predictability on the treaty approval, As a result, such a reaction caused annoyance
to foreign governments and troubled United States foreign relations. HENKIN, supra note 35, at 50. See also,
Harold Hongju Koh, Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade Policymaking after I.N.S v. Chadha, 18
N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 1191, 1217 (1986).
40
The operation of an oversight committee does not entirely foreclose a judicial challenge on the basis of the
treaty’s unconstitutionality since the Constitutional Court can still decides on the questions of the individuals’
rights infringement by a treaty or the sufficiency of a public hearing held by the government. Judicial review
must nonetheless be limited in addressing the infringed rights based on the balancing test, and in deciding on a
public hearing standard made in accordance with legislation. See Chapter IV, Section V, C and Chapter V,
Section II, D (ii)-(iii).
39
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Thus, to ensure that the role of the Constitutional Court is involved early through the creation
of this special committee to establish a proper process for important international agreements,
and the participation of the legislature is effectively executed through requiring it before
being bound by any legal instrument are to relieve the burden not of the executive, but most
importantly, of the country. Thus, in comparison to the Section 190 amendment which still
opens the door for the treaty’s procedural challenge due to the lack of an adequate
determining process, the proposed model seeks to undertake a preventive approach by
creating a mechanism that can reduce the possibility of inadvertent treaty termination in the
realization that, when it comes to matters of international relations, the cost of providing a
remedy can far exceed that of prevention.
The three areas of reforms proposed under this treaty model, which involve
readjusting the scope of public participation and the roles of the executive, legislature and
judiciary as equal partners can have positive effects upon the implementation of democracy
and the principle of separation of powers within the treaty context. While empowering the
function of public participation, and guaranteeing administrative accountability, transparency,
effectiveness and responsiveness are ways of strengthening the country’s democratic
characters, preserving each branch’s autonomy and its primary function is an effective
implementation of the system of checks and balances. Despite the suggested elimination of
Section 190’s certain mechanisms, this model still serves as an active constitutional
safeguard for the people’s fundamental and political rights in the treaty process. The
eradication of broad treaty categories and excessive legislative involvement are to enhance
the realization of these important constitutional rights. Shifting the scope of public
participation to center on individuals’ fundamental interests, inducing effective and
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responsive characters of the public administration upon which the protection of the people’s
rights depend, securing the people’s participatory rights in a timely fashion, and empowering
the Constitutional Court to address individual rights’ violations in the treaty context are the
primary methods of constitutional guarantee under this model. These are not just good
principles that the model can induce. In terms of practicality, the proposed reform introduces
a more realistic approach for applying the mechanism of public participation, by creating
efficient roles for the public institutions, and by limiting damages to the country’s
international relations. Through this vision, the proposed model makes the principles and
practice complementary. While the existing treaty provision may build upon a strong
principle, its impracticality, unfortunately, turns into a major impediment to furthering its
primary objectives.
IV. Unresolved Questions
The research conduct of this dissertation primarily deals with a broad framework of a
treaty process which has been taken out of and adjusted in accordance with the current
Constitution. The proposed treaty model therefore provides only a general treaty-making
procedure, which does not go into details concerning specific mechanisms such as a public
hearing process or the determination process of the proposed oversight committee. These are
the questions that will require further research, and must be answered had this model been
accepted.
Legislation enactment may be necessary in order to establish the committee and to
determine its member composition and the manner of conduct that has been proven to be
most efficient. The participation of the legal offices of the executive and legislature in this
committee is also a possibility, given the office of the Juridical Council already acted as the
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executive’s primary legal counsel. The manner of the conduct will determine whether legal
opinions from different branches should be deliberated at the same venue within the same
time frame or in circulation by having the executive be the first to take up on the issue, and
forward its opinions to the other two branches. The composition and determination process of
the oversight committee must be dealt separately outside the constitutional context which
should only provide a broad framework of a treaty process.
Similarly, legislation enactments concerning a hearing standard and a specific
procedure are required to establish a public hearing process. In the absence of the law,
Section 190 will open up an opportunity for the Constitutional Court to assert its own hearing
standard causing greater chance for the country to face international breach. Nevertheless, the
legislation enactment may not entirely foreclose the issue of international liability. The
ability of the Constitutional Court to determine on the question of the individuals’ rights
violation by a treaty and the public hearing sufficiency in accordance with the legislation
means that the government is technically still subject to the judicial challenge even after the
treaty has been in force. However, in terms of the public hearing issue, the law will reduce
the arbitrariness of judgment, and instead help ascertain a public hearing standard by giving
guidance to the executive on what it should expect and respect. Thus, what this model may
fail to solve are the possibility that the judiciary body will still be able to turn down the treaty
that either infringes upon an individual’s rights or does not meet the required hearing
standard provided in the legislation, and the kind of remedy to be furnished to the people
whose constitutional rights were violated as a result of the treaty implementation or the
inadequacy (in the case of participatory rights in the treaty process). These questions present
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a difficult challenge to perfect a treaty model, and are outside the research parameter of this
dissertation.
V. Conclusion
The current democratic dilemma under the implementation of Section 190 Treaty
provision involves the improvement of administrative transparency and accountability that
led to the undermining of other important democratic characters. The irony of the approach
reveals that the principles of good governance and democracy have inadvertently been
weakened as a result of the efforts to upholding them. While facing internal challenges such
as lagging democratic culture, people’s weak faith in the effectiveness and responsiveness of
government administration, the country also encounters external barriers in terms of foreign
relations stability and international responsibility as a result of Section 190 innovation whose
amendment has not provided a better response (Chapter I). A strong motivation of this
reform should then be understood through the political character of Thailand and its
evolution that revealed the struggles in its democratic path. And the reason why the 2007
Constitution is playing hardball with the executive should explain the entire history. As part
of the democratic reform effort, under the new understanding, the recent constitutional
structure has set the new roles and boundaries among the public, legislature, executive and
judiciary in the realm of foreign affairs. The increased participation of the public and
legislature, and the ability of the judiciary to intervene in the treaty-making process were the
new powers prescribed in the Constitution (Chapter II). But because of the issues of internal
and external accountabilities brought by Section 190, each of its mechanism, namely the
requirements of public consultation, multiple legislative approvals and judicial intervention
was required to be examined and reconsidered.
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Pursuant to the new constitutional framework, the role of the public in the treaty
process was translated into a mechanism of public participation to which important treaties
must be subject. In the advancement of the functionality of this mechanism, the theories and
weaknesses of political participation were elaborated and addressed in order to entail public
participation which is one of the Section 190’s latest innovations to foster the right political
culture and enhance the democratic characters of the public administration. The study then
suggested that an incorporation of the liberal approach which places an emphasis on
individuals’ fundamental rights is recommended to advance the objectives and improve the
effectiveness of the mechanism (Chapter III). In terms of the role of the State, Section 190
mechanisms have readjusted the relationship among the public institutions by increasing
legislative and judicial abilities to check upon the executive’s treaty activity. This
readjustment, however, has a strong implication on the operation of the principle of
separation of powers which comes into play in preserving not only the accountability of the
government, but also each branch’s autonomy. Thus, to secure the practicality and efficiency
of these checks mechanisms provided under Section 190, the examination on the principle of
separations of powers provided an answer to a very important question concerning the extent
of the executive’s central authority and judicial deference in the realm of foreign affairs. An
aspect of the separation of powers principle which underlines the independence of each
political branch thus unfolded the significance of the centralized executive foreign policy
making (CEFP) concept. This is the notion that the proposed reforms of Section 190 take into
consideration in order to relieve both internal and external pressures in the execution of our
foreign policy (Chapter IV).
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The analysis of each component of Section 190 mechanisms is a necessary step to
reformulating a treaty model that has been coupled with the examination of the treaty
practices in various jurisdictions. From the treaty experiences of the surveyed countries, the
study on the roles of the public, executive, legislature and judiciary in their treaty processes
showed that these countries reflected the CEFP tradition while a public participation is
commonly absent, except in Switzerland which limits the function of public participation to a
form of a treaty referendum to facilitate efficient execution of its foreign policy. The
derivation of the proposed treaty-making process therefore factors in these variations in terms
of the level of legislature’s involvement, and the degree and manner of judicial intervention
in pursuant to the analysis of the separation of powers doctrine while recognizing liberalism
as a practical approach for public participation. In sum, the proposed treaty model consisting
of the three areas of reforms is fundamentally based on the analyzed components of Chapter
III (the scope of public participation) and IV (the manner of the legislature and judiciary
participation) to secure the rights mechanisms in the treaty process that can further our
democracy (Chapter V).
In the conclusion of this dissertation, the proposed model of a treaty-making process
provides ample justifications for its adoption ranged from the enhancement of the democratic
principle to the practical aspect such as the maintenance of good foreign diplomacy. The
proposal tries to fix the flaws of Section 190 which resulted from the inadequacy in its
response to the internal and external challenges, while still preserving constitutional
safeguards within the treaty-making process. The proposal provides a way of securing
transparency and responsiveness in the internal process, and ensuring efficiency and
accountability in the external course where individual rights and public interests lie. The
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model does not only serve as a minor structural reform that primarily focuses on rearranging
the roles of the public institutions, but also the cultivation of a new political cultural
discipline which can only build upon strong positive relations between the people and the
public institutions. These are the major arguments that, I believe, justify the adoption of this
model. Although Section 190 is considered a revolutionary treaty-making process which
places an emphasis on improving transparency and accountability through heavily restraining
the executive’s treaty power, and increasing public and other institutions’ controls over such
an exercise of power, the costs it brings can undermine the function of democracy and
jeopardize public interest in the long run. The provision accompanies many problems that
may have been overlooked by the writers whose determinations were to protect the
generation against Thailand’s past democratic failure. But these attempts may not lead us far
enough down the road if they constantly present impediments in the executive’s function
without proper balance. Thus, to me, it is very clear why this proposed model should at least
be considered. And why this model should be fully embraced is a question for the Thai
people who are the original owner of the Constitution.
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Appendix
Country
France
(civil law)

Prior to Treaty
Negotiation
LR: No official role

During Negotiation
LR: No official role

EC: Central power of
Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA)

Germany
(civil law)

Prior to entry into
Force
EC: President/MFA
conclude and ratifies
treaties (art.52)

EC: President has
power to negotiate and
ratify treaties
LR: Treaties to be
approved by Parliament
JC: The Conseil
prior to taking effects Constitutionnel has the Peace Treaties, Trade
power to ensure the
agreements, treaties or
conformity of the
agreements relating to
statute authorizing the international
ratification or approval organization, those
of an international
committing the finances
agreement to the
of the State, those
Constitution (art. 61)
modifying provisions
which are the preserve of
PP: President or
statute law, those relating
members of
to the status of persons,
Parliament may
and those involving the
submit a bill relating
ceding, exchanging or
to the economic, social acquiring of territory
or environmental
(art.53)
policy of the Nation
for a referendum (art.
11)
LR: No official role
LR: Observation of
EC: Treaties are
Parliament members at concluded by the
EC: controls initiation, the invitation of EC
President and the Federal
conclusion and
government
termination of treaty
EC: President is
negotiation
vested with full power LR: Treaties to be
to negotiate
required for legislature’s
participation at their
PP: Consulted through conclusions - Treaties
representative bodies
affecting the existing
such as chambers of
legislations or requiring a
commerce, trade
new law, affecting the
unions and other
existence of the state and
organizations
its territorial integrity,
independence, status and
sovereignty (art. 59(2))
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LR: No official role
India
(common law)
EC: In the absence of
any legislation, a
power to enter into a
treaty negotiation is
exercised by the
Cabinet
(art. 52)

Japan
(civil law)

LR: No official role
EC: Sole power to
conduct a treaty
negotiation

LR: Treaties to be
required for legislation
PP: No statutory or
implementation - treaties
constitutional
relating to cession of
requirements for direct Indian territory, affecting
public consultation.
the existing laws or
restricting or infringing
upon individual rights
(art. 253)

LR: No official role

LR: No official role.
The government either
EC: The cabinet has
chooses to report on
the power to initiate
the negotiation to the
and undertake treaty
parliament or can be
negotiation (art. 73(2)) questioned by the
parliament
EC: Maintain the
primary responsibility
to negotiate a treaty
(art. 73(2))
PP: No statutory or
constitutional
requirements. EC may
choose to consult with
public

New Zealand LR: No official role
(common law)
EC: The executive is
vested with full power
to initiate a treaty
negotiation, and to
approve its negotiating
position without
having the official
involvement of the
legislature.

EC: The cabinet exercises
a power to sign or ratify a
treaty

LR: No official role.
But may only partake
at the invitation of the
EC
EC: Primary body that
undertakes a treaty
negotiation. EC
generally secures the
passage of the
necessary legislation
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EC: Concludes and
effects only executive
agreements (routine,
technical, administrative
agreements)
LR: Treaties to be subject
to formal approval of the
Legislature - Agreements
relating to the
Parliament’s legislative
power (new leg.,
modified law), involving
expenditure unless
previously authorized by
the Parliament, and those
that are politically
important in nature (art.
73(3))
EC: May only effect
technical or routine
agreements or treaties
that only aim at creating
rights and obligations
between states, and do
not affect individual
rights and the existing
laws. In case of technical
agreements, parliament
delegates authority to

prior to ratifying the
treaty

South Africa LR: No official role
(common law)
EC: The President and
cabinet maintain the
primary function in
treaty negotiation
(Section 231(1))

Switzerland
(civil law)

LR: Share the treatymaking power through
shaping external
relations and
influencing foreign
policy (art. 54)
EC: Share the treatymaking power through
initiating a treaty
negotiation

PP: No statutory
requirement for public
consultation. But
public (generally
NGOs) may attend
important treaty
negotiation as
observers.
LR: No official role
EC: Sole negotiator.
parliamentary
committees are not
authorized to negotiate
or renegotiate the
terms of treaties,
except inserting a
reservation
PP: No statutory or
constitutional
requirements.
LR: The Committees
on Foreign Policy of
both chambers are
allowed to send their
own observers to
attend international
negotiations. Federal
Council must inform
the committees
through the process
EC: Federal Council
negotiates treaties
PP: Mandatory
optional referendum
when 50,000 citizens
or 8 cantons so
requests for treaties
containing important
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implement a treaty to EC
(in a form of rules and
regulations)
LR: Once ratified by EC,
a treaty is generally
required to be
implemented by
Parliament through
incorporating it into its
domestic law
EC: Concludes and
effects only executive
agreements (routine,
technical, administrative
agreements)
LR: Treaties are
generally required to be
approved by resolution in
both the National
Assembly and the
National Council
Province (Section 231(2),
(3))
EC: The Federal Council
may conclude the
following treaties alone –
(i) agreements the
Federal Assembly had
authorized in advance
whether explicitly or
implicitly, (ii) purely
administrative or routine
agreements of minor
importance (i.e. no
individual rights
affected), and (iii) urgent
agreements that must
require a provisional
entry into force
LR: The Federal
Assembly must approve
all other treaties that EC

LR: No official role
United
Kingdom
(common law) EC: The exercise of
treaty-making power
is the responsibility of
the Secretary of State
for Foreign and
Commonwealth
Affairs, which
operates as a central
coordination with
other governmental
departments that has
primary responsibility
to initiate a treaty
negotiation.

provisions,
establishing rules of
law or requiring the
enactment of federal
statutes for their
implementation. (art.
141(d))
LR: No official role
EC: Main negotiating
body
PP: EC may choose to
consult with public to
ensure legislature’s
approval

LR – Legislature
EC – Executive
JC – Judiciary
PP - Public
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is not competent to act
alone (art. 85(5))

EC: The Royal
prerogative issue Full
Powers for the executive
to conclude and sign
treaties.
LR: No treaty can give
effects without receiving
the cooperation of
Parliament (in the form
of legislation enactment)
Treaties requiring
legislative action are
those;
(i) Modifying/adding to
the existing law or statute
(ii) Endowing additional
power to the Crown, not
previously existed
(iii) Affecting private
rights
(iv) Creating a direct or
contingent financial
obligation upon UK
(v) Providing for an
increase in the powers of
the European Parliament
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